

Inclusive Differentiation:

A Study of Artistic Techniques and Devices of Innovation



Stills from Elizabeth Price, *Choir*, 2011, HD Video, courtesy the artist and MOT International, London

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Declaration

I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where I have drawn from other sources, this has been indicated as appropriate.



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Abstract

This thesis presents a study of innovation that focuses on the promotion of art as a force of genuine invention and the unfolding of a much-desired ability to profit from this development.

Innovation lies at the heart of contested and divergent views on the role of artistic critique and the creation of value so pervasive in recent economic development, not least in the light of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. This research connects to and builds upon an increasing engagement within economic sociology and social theory with the intermingling between art and business, or how art has come into view as a source of change. It takes experimental filmmaking and design methods associated with the European artistic avant-garde and anti-capitalistic critique as empirical examples. In doing so, this thesis explores an *inclusive logic of differentiation* centring on how ‘anti-capitalist’ critique feeds into processes of valuation, and explores how innovation practice benefits from the realities that it also excludes.

The thesis draws together insights from two ethnographic studies of innovation in which artistic critique is translated into tools of innovation. In doing so, it explores the way in which artistic critique suspends, provokes and tests ‘realities’ that might stand as sources of knowledge for the purpose of business innovation. It makes the key argument that art and business exist in differential relations in which the principles and values associated with art and business coexist in multiple combinations, which are intimately bound up with new sites of action, such as the formation of camps, labs and studio workshops. Drawing attention to how such differential relations between art and business are becoming central to the construction of contemporary economies, this thesis makes a critical contribution to innovation studies expanding its vocabulary and, at the same time, its empirical field.

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1. Introduction

Last autumn Elizabeth Price's video installation called *Choir* was running at the New Museum in New York. The 15-minute video brings together a range of visual and disparate material to reflect on spaces of assembly and performance. The photographs and film footage capture visuals that together sketch out the space of an ecclesiastical auditorium. A flow of images of black and white reproductions of leaf-shaped trefoils, flame-shaped ogees and profane wooden carvings direct our attention to church motifs. Images from the destruction of Manchester's Woolworths store by fire in 1979 are included in the montage, which runs alongside scrolling captions which say: 'This is the choir/also known as the quire.' Then the flow is interrupted by pop-music and an explosive montage starts rolling in red colour: from recordings of dance floors, female limbs, marble foliage and miniskirts to a shouting activist who chants 'We know' into a microphone around eighty times. The sound-track includes tambourines and ecstatic handclaps and evokes associations with the 1960's wall-of-sound Girl Groups. This performance is again interrupted, this time by visuals of defunct and broken objects, including utensils, gothic stalls, ornaments and empty coffins before coming to rest on the animated twisted wrist of a figurative sarcophagus.



Figure 1: Stills from Elizabeth Price, *Choir*, 2011, HD Video, courtesy the artist and MOT International.

Despite the fragmented nature of the installation and its seeming attempt to escape any predefined interpretation or to impose upon the viewer a functional meaning, it seems to express a certain kind of *artistic critique*. Combining institutional and bureaucratic features with the complex relationships between commodity, culture and history, Price's works create what Giulia Smith (2011) has called 'a pornography of the inert'. In this installation the darkness from the archival images overshadows those of colourful pop-culture. The chant 'We Know' is interrupted by fragments of old BBC footage of the

Woolworths fire, with the interviewed witnesses again acting as a kind of chorus, describing and interpreting the events. At this stage, it becomes apparent that the joyful coloured dance composes a surface that covers a deeper or darker historical heritage. The slick surfaces immortalized in the black and white close-ups draw an analogy with advertisement and commodity fetishism. The first montage of the installation ends in anticipation of the second: tomb effigies of petrified cavaliers holding their swords half out of the scabbards are displayed. In the portrait of the choir this relation is made explicit, embodying a kind of spatial performance.

Moving from the artistic installation staged inside the museum to the streets of New York, just a few blocks away, I encountered yet another collective assembly. In Zuccotti Park close to the New York Stock Exchange occupants had settled to demonstrate against the neoliberal economic system. Hundreds of people were gathered with signs saying, ‘Healthcare not Wealthfare’, ‘People before Profit’, and singing statistical numbers showing the increasing unemployment rate in the U.S. Some demonstrators had painted their faces like zombies and were eating false dollar bills.



Figure 2: Photographic documentation from Occupy Wall Street, Oct 2011, New York

The event set out to provoke in an attempt to portray the bankers as criminals. One sign read: ‘If corporations are people, why can’t we put them in jail?’ ‘Bankers’ were held responsible for the financial crisis, which erupted in the summer of 2007, and its consequences, such as cuts in public welfare and increased social inequality. Furthermore, bankers were accused of doing business that was abstracted from society only for the sake of profit-making – a division in which traders come to be considered gamblers. The distinction between capital and the social world was suddenly turned upside-down.

The Occupy Wall Street movement occupied a large territory in the heart of Manhattan's financial district, but it also did something else – it constructed a space for itself. The encampment of the protesters by reporters, photographers, tourists and most of all police constituted an assembly in a style similar to the way in which Price wants us to perceive of the choir, the auditorium and its construction of space.

Walking through the crowd gathered in Zuccotti Park, it seemed as if artistic practice had moved from *inside* the walls of the museum to *outside* the walls of the NY stock exchange. The writings of Paolo Virno – a figurehead for the Italian neo-Marxist movement – were in the back of my mind as I viewed the occupation, showing how everything tends to become performative. The protestors needed an audience to show their action, just as dancers, play-actors or musicians 'need the presence of others before whom they can appear' (Virno, 2004, p. 53).

To date the figure of the artist is one of the most prominent in representations of *social critique* – not least against a capitalistic or neoliberal world. Seeing Price's installation in connection with the event of Occupy Wall Street, the performance of space is brought into concert with labour, value and production. Price's installation stages an imaginary scenario, a sardonic or provocative performance, which turns a dark post-human space into a critique of pop-culture and consumerism. This critique already presumes a range of conclusions framed by the incompatible nature of artistic critique and a capitalist world-order that alienates, calculates, rationalises, *limits* and orders the untamed, imaginary and intuitive forces of art.

As part of an economic sociology course at Columbia University, I was reading Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello's book *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (1999) just at the same time as the Occupy Wall Street movement had settled into Zuccotti Park. Boltanski and Chiapello's book is a highly influential account which proposes that 'artistic critique' has entered into a dynamic relation with capitalism. Their thesis departs from the mass revolt against the Gaullist regime in France in May 1968 that targeted the dehumanization of the capitalist sphere based on the demands of freedom, autonomy and authenticity, widely thought to be typical of artistic practice. In their account, artistic critique is separated from the issues addressed by social critique such as solidarity,

security and equality associated with the history of the working class movement.

However, in an article called *The Misfortunes of the “Artistic Critique” and of Cultural Employment* (2011), the political-cultural thinker Maurizio Lazzarato has reacted strongly against the claim by Boltanski and Chiapello that artistic critique is separated from social critique and should come from intellectual and artistic circles (especially that of nineteenth-century Parisian Bohemia). Lazzarato (2011) points out that Boltanski and Chiapello revive the oppositional divides established between freedom and equality, and between sovereignty and economic integration. In their argument, the values of expressive creativity, fluid identity, autonomy and self-development are displayed *against* the constraints of bureaucratic discipline, bourgeois hypocrisy and consumer conformity. In contrast, Lazzarato suggests that it is not among the artists that the critique of contemporary economic activity can be found. Rather, he points to an ‘aestheticization’ of the economy itself (Lazzarato, 2008 p. 174), saying that art and business are not discrete or separate spheres that stand in an oppositional relation to one another but instead are being brought together.

In the three examples presented above, the *distinction – or lack of it –* between art and business is a contested issue, albeit that the terms are used in multiple and seemingly contradictory ways. By comparison, this thesis connects to and builds upon an increased engagement within sociology and social theory with the *boundaries* performed or denied between art and business. This includes how the relation between art and business has been defined or redefined in the debate on ‘the new economy’, which is also to say how art came into view as a source for innovation. By opening this thesis with the experience of Price’s art installation, the simultaneous performance outside the New York stock exchange, and the notion of artistic critique as it has been portrayed from within the academy, I present a story that focuses on the capitalization of art’s ability to construct new sensations and affects (Raffnsøe, 2009). In doing so, I look into the promotion of art as a force of genuine invention and the unfolding of a – by now – much desired ability to profit from this development. This is a tendency that has been explained as a defining feature of contemporary capitalism and its intermingling with creativity (Clough, 2007; Thrift, 2005). At the same time, art is also associated with sentiment, non-rational forces and imaginary constellations, which are sometimes held to be

protected from economic calculation. This dichotomy is a concern that lies at the heart of contested and divergent views on the role of artistic critique and the creation of value so pervasive in recent economic development, not least in the light of the financial crisis. However, in this thesis I do not attempt to fill this ‘gap’, to neglect its divide, or to argue that artistic critique should again be included in economic debates. Rather, I analyse the differential logic that underpins these wedded practices when analysed as an outcome of innovation processes. Three elements are drawn together in these examples of the relations between Price’s installation, the happening of Occupy Wall Street and social science: artistic techniques, performance and social change, and these three elements frame the aim of this thesis, which is to understand innovation as an *inclusive logic of differentiation*, centring on how the critique that art promotes feeds into and also define new forms of capitalist production.

This study thus intervenes in the debates on the nature of contemporary capitalism and its relation to artistic critique. It takes innovation as its analytical object and explores two kinds of artistic critique within the field of design and experimental filmmaking as they are translated into tools of business innovation. It thus includes a range of ethnographic studies within innovation practice in order to reflect upon the enactment and experience of artistic-performative interventions. The enactment of the relation between art and business or the incorporation of artistic critique into the operation of capitalism poses some interesting questions when analysed in practice. What does an innovation strategy between art and business look like? What is its mode of operation? Is there indeed something new and disorienting about the forms of knowledge that are practiced? How are capacities for creativity being legitimized, how are they being mobilized, and with what effects?

The divisions pointed out in the art installation by Price, in the political event of Occupy Wall Street and in economic sociology indicate a change in the way in which artistic practice is seen as permeating economic debates. In what follows, I present an overview of the academic literature on this topic, its sociological relevance and the questions and associated arguments that I develop throughout this thesis. I draw this chapter to a close by providing an overview of the thesis.

Differential Distinctions

A report published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) from 2000 emphasises the capacity to innovate and alternative economic models as fundamental keys to global recovery from the financial crisis. Labs, camps and studio workshops are now organised to facilitate spaces in which such models or alternative solutions are invented whether in relation to public service provision, democratic processes, policy futures or consumer markets (cf. Mulgan and Albury, 2003). In the UK, the Performance and Innovation Unit was established in 2002 as part of the British Prime Minister's Strategy Unit in an attempt to create an environment that would enable the invention of 'untraditional' economic solutions. Geoff Mulgan (2007), the former head of this unit, describes art as being fundamental to economic solutions. Such policy claims are repeated in many recent intellectual debates which share a commitment to change. Furthermore, in some areas of these debates artistic liberation, or even rebellion, is seen to offer the basis of individual authenticity, contributing to the ideal of self-management and the anti-hierarchical social form of the network (cf. Boltanski, 2002, p 6). These examples – and there are many others – serve to illustrate the way in which art-business relations have been opposed, denied, preserved, defended and reinforced, which in itself contributes to yet further dichotomies.

A facilitator of one of the labs I studied commented on the prospect of a change in government due to the then imminent election that took place in the UK in May 2010, stating that: *If the government changes everyone will be affected... my view would be if the Conservatives come into power all the creative-cultural things are going to suffer badly... because it is just a different philosophy when it comes to culture, it's extremely market-led*. Here, as elsewhere, a binary opposition is set up, one in which art is associated with liberal, intuitive and radical values opposed to the rational-instrumental values representative of a neo-liberal market system. In the western world social analysts, business executives and politicians have repeatedly assumed that the social world is organised around contrasting and incompatible categorical principles that are conventionally linked to either art or business: individual vs. collective, intuition vs. rationality and liberation vs. domination.

The belief that these values are antagonistic continues to generate heated political debate. It motivates the widespread fear that the industrial logic of the market will contaminate the intuitive, imaginary and rebellious forces of art. In the chapter named

‘The Culture Industry’ in *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (1947), Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer famously argued that the commercialization of art compromises its autonomy. In other words, marketability dispenses the ‘purposelessness’ central to what they define as high-art (1947). The evaluation of pop-culture as a second rate art has also given rise to the parallel fear posed by Marxist critiques that art serves to enforce and justify prevailing political ideology and power structures (cf. Swingewood, 1986). The contrasts drawn between the principles associated with art and business coexist in multiple combinations and are used to actualise, organise and compare different realities.

Moreover, the art-business relation is organised around a range of dichotomies evident in both neo-liberal paradigms and the politics of what has been associated with leftist thought. These traditions differ in the values they assign to the artistic critique as opposed to economic interests. Yet they agree on the assertion that art’s integration into business is based on a disjuncture marked by a radically different relationship between the economic and the artistic world that followed from the transition to a ‘networked’ society or ‘knowledge’ economy in the 1970s. This transformation has been highlighted by Scott Lash and John Urry (1994), among others, from a social science perspective and this is an aspect of the treatment of capitalism that I investigate in further detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis. For now, suffice to note that the relation between art and business is by no means a simple connection. Far from being incompatible, the principles associated with art and business coexist in various combinations. Price’s installation, Occupy Wall Street and the various voices in social science are good indicators, but also the differentiation of art and business in innovation practices provides important evidence of the multiplication and diversity of the art-business relation. As we shall see later these divisions are also intimately bound up with new sites of action (such as the formation of camps, labs and workshops) in which there is no simple contrast or continuum of art to business.¹

Furthermore, as organised innovation spaces proliferate and art becomes more and more ingrained in business practices, critical attention has begun to be channelled into engagements with specific innovation practices. Here, social studies of science and

¹ A case in point is the public services labs organised by the The National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) that promotes art as a political undertaking, as what gives form to and materializes needs, the imaginary, futures, consumer tastes.

technology have contributed to empirical and situated accounts of innovation and creativity (cf. Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009). At the same time, practitioners have started critically assessing their innovation capacities in order to grasp and make profit from this call for change. Concurrently, there is growing interest in the organisation of innovation not as the end-product of research, but as a processual development. It is in this context that the notion of differentiation plays a crucial role in this thesis. The multiple enactments of the boundaries between art and business requires a careful analysis, so that the configurations which emerge from its intertwining can be understood. More generally, this engagement with the divisions and connections between art and business acknowledges the growing relevance that borders, limits, conflict and critique have acquired in social science, political ideas and artistic practices in recent years.

However, while the present research is very much indebted to social science and, more precisely, to its emphasis on the inseparability of artistic and economic categories, it also engages with critical debates on economic relations and artistic practice connecting to a body of work across a number of interconnected sub-disciplines, including the philosophy of science, social studies of science and technology and critical management studies. The aim is to give a sense of the multiple layers, differential relations and folds that operationalise the relation between art and business. In doing so, I trace where and how different modalities of innovation are performed in and through the way in which particular differentiations are made to connect, blur and separate the field of art from that of business. Let me explain in further detail how this relation can be studied in practice.

Firstly, I connect this investigation to the debates in economic sociology where critique is seen as a pre-requisite of innovation and the unfolding of new forms of capitalism. As Nigel Thrift (2005) notes that ‘capitalists and anti-capitalists alike often share many of the same tropes, of speed, flow, network, and so on.... [C]apitalist firms have taken on some of the language and practices of the opposition...’ (p. 4). Here, as with the earlier examples of assembled spaces within Price’s installation, Occupy Wall Street and in social science, the task is not to render the boundaries between art and business unstable or to prove them obsolete. Following Barry, Born and Weszkalnys (2008, p. 26) who define innovation as introducing novelty into a particular domain and

transforming the being of this domain, I investigate the ways in which already acclaimed artistic innovations associated with the European radical avant-garde are translated into business strategies. Accordingly, I take as empirical examples experimental filmmaking and design methods, which pose a specific kind of artistic or anti-capitalistic critique that differentiates them from other kinds of filmmaking practices and design methods. I propose that they are practical examples of how artistic critique is opposed to, but also internal to, the field in which it operates. Handling the notion of artistic critique implies a two-folded research strategy. Let me define this strategy in further detail in order to more precisely define the notion of artistic critique and its importance for a sociological study of innovation practice.

First of all the innovation practices observed draws upon an inherited legacy of artistic critique — one which is rooted in the criticism of Fordist industrialism and capitalism. This has been defined as a passage from avant-garde to capitalist critique through postmodernism into post-critique — and characterized by the emergence of two major registers. Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) define a ‘reformist’ imperative to reflect on and change the organizations that compose the ‘art world’, i.e., the marketplace for the exchange of cultural objects, services and knowledge, museums and galleries where these goods circulate, and a second more radical imperative to directly address larger social calls for resistance and revolt to regimes, authority, ideologies, etc. From these two registers the critical values that are considered somehow to infuse and validate critical art practice emanate.

The study is based on the assertion that the somewhat normative material presented by writers like Boltanski and Chiapello is being absorbed and repeated by art practices as an attempt to situate artistic production in a larger context of capitalist production and market constructions, or further, to justify the values produced in artistic practices. I propose that the investigation of this repetition or doubling of the rhetoric of critique poses an interesting paradox, which challenges traditional sociological methods. It requires a move from critical sociology focusing on the rationalising and reductionist processes of capitalisation of art to a sociology *of* critique. As such, critique is not a peripheral activity imposed upon the study as an explanatory frame of reference but immanent to the practices of this study. Revisiting the problem of innovation within practices making use of artistic critique has several implications for how we are to

understand the empirical, ethnographic techniques, its relation to the field-site itself – to theory and academic writing. In the thesis, I start from the premise that I as the researcher constantly found myself as being both ‘opposed’ and ‘within’ the practices that I study. I attempt to develop an ethnographic method for turning the practices ‘inside-out’, which includes the researcher as producer and consumer, and not simply observer, of innovation practice.

However, the duality of critique implies more than my relation to the field – it also addresses the twisting and bending of relations within the field itself, such as the funding context, which is generated by the practice itself, and the clients, who also acts as tutors etc. What is othered or excluded is also within. It is the multiple layers of differentiation – being both within and outside, both included and excluded – that makes my study a matter of operating at the border. What I aim to show in the thesis is not a study where theory and the empirical are to be considered context and content for one another. Rather, this kind of practice involves a folding or doubling of the object of study and its analysis. Said differently, I do not have a hypothesis to prove, a specific set of concepts I plan to apply or a normative frame of critique. Rather, these are immanent to the practices I study. I find that there is a lot to explore here – a lot to ask about these knowledge practices. Especially I am interested in the justification of research methods and the ways to model the participants’ self-representation in the complex context of artistic creativity. The practices differentiate themselves from business in order to experimentally test it. My study includes the practical implications of the appropriation of artistic critique. I therefore include the destructive and dogmatic forces it entails and draw on a range of inspirations – from affect theory to literary accounts of Kafka (critical theory) and ethnomethodology to reach the ‘creative’ breakdowns.

The attempt is to develop a framework that makes it possible to reconcile these seemingly antagonistic approaches – the one normative and assigning the critical task to the sociologist, the other concerned with sticking as closely as possible to the actions within the field-site itself. In order to do so I develop a topological approach to critical theory in order to render visible the functioning of such assemblages rather than posing a straightforward deterministic critique (as if I am placed outside the field-site). First of all, this is not a story about domination or power struggles in a Bourdieuan sense or about exploitation or alienation in a Marxist sense. Rather, what seems to be at stake

here is something much closer to an endless entanglement based upon the enactment and re-enactment of critique.

I do not engage directly with critical sociology and its description in terms of power relations, which underscores the potency of mechanisms of oppression, alienation and domination and reduces the act of the sociologist to one of reactive critique. In all of this, also the role of art is under transformation and must be considered by its functional application more than by the Adorno and Horkheimer notion of 'high art', where art is considered independent from its application in practice and irreducible to processes of commodification. To sum up, artistic critique is performed simultaneously at a conceptual level and at the level of the empirical case. According to Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) the struggle for autonomy and authenticity has been neutralized by the pseudo-fulfilment by capitalism in the form of self-management and the capitalization of art and its critical potential. Considering this as too simple a divide, I draw a map of innovation enacted by a differential relation between art and business where the reformist might also be radical.

That is, a critique which includes both the divides and connections produced by the knowledge systems and values that actors claim to adhere to without itself opposing such divides (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999, p. xi). A sociology of critique emphasises the importance of paying attention to the justificatory operations performed by the people involved in order to treat the concepts associated with the art-business divide as lived realities rather than formal categories (Slater, 2002). Said differently, the innovation practices mapped out in this thesis do not prove a setting in which the distinction between reformist or radical critique is at stake but rather a doubling of the critique performed by the actors themselves – that is a doubling or folding of radical critique into reformist critique.

This is a sociological endeavour that looks at how oppositional binaries are not only intertwined but also contribute to the boundary-making practice constitutive of capitalism and are instrumental to the making of contemporary politics. This is seen in the light of a move in which organisations are viewed to operate via affective interventions rather than totalising strategies. The aim is thus to develop an account of non-representational innovation (Thrift, 2008), which does not ground creation in the

authenticity of the individual case. In doing so, I evaluate the performative capacities of innovation taking the production of diverse realities as sources of innovation. In doing so, I compare different instances or techniques of boundary-making as *performative* highlighting their mutual implications and the differentiations they effect.

Furthermore, I argue that it is crucial that the recursivity – or doubling – of the rhetoric of critique is not considered as a property attributed to persons, objects or the spaces concerned. Rather, a differential art-business relation can be seen to operate, first of all, as an generative strategy that can be used to characterise, categorise, organise and contrast various spaces, institutions, bodies, groups, activities, interactions and relations. Secondly, differentiation is also understood as a tool which ties the participants to specific political ideas, social worlds and economic relations. In this way, art-business relations are shown to feed back to, and contribute to, those distributed governmental processes and procedures out of which emerge a new set of differentiations. This includes considerations on the way in which academic writing plays into and intervenes in these practices. To put this differently, a study of the art-business relation is as much about acting on the boundary as it is about describing it. This thesis thus explores innovation as a differentially articulated *innovation assemblage*.

Price's installation captures a very important aspect of this thesis, namely that spatial technologies shape human life. This includes some consideration of the social effect of artistic devices applied to the study of management processes. Put differently, innovation techniques are not only accounted for in terms of the objects or products invented but also how devices shape and re-shape spaces of interaction. In recent science and technology studies (STS) scholarship (Callon, 2007; Muniesa and Callon, 2007; MacKenzie, Muniesa and Sui, 2007), the market is being thought anew in light of the recognition that technical devices (non-humans) also operate in processes of innovation. However, my struggle is not to prove that technology is also social, but how artistic tools in themselves might be considered as techniques, which also include the corporeal bodies, devices and instruments that co-constitute spatial arrangements. This includes a reflexive ethnographic account which treats innovation not as a unitary thing, but as a means of developing a set of sensibilities towards physical encounters. Therefore, much of this thesis focuses on the subtle, less visible interactions and differentiations provoked by artistic performative interventions.

This approach allows me to explore the tools and methods that contribute to the making of alternative orderings and forms of valuing produced in and through the utilization of art as a means of innovation. As such, this thesis is not concerned with innovation practices in and of themselves, but rather with the significance and character of the values, norms and meanings which justify such practices. It serves to show, in other words, the ways in which the ‘making up’ or ‘construction’ of economic realities is achieved and how those activities, objects and relations that are categorized as ‘innovative’ are built up or assembled from various enactments of the relation between art and business. The operationalization of boundaries is to be understood as a flipside to or fold of the processes of flexibilization, networked society and deterritorialized capital flows (also named post-Fordism, cf. Chapter 2).

Drawing attention to artistic devices as powerful tools that work according to a logic of differentiation, this thesis makes a critical contribution to innovation studies, expanding its vocabulary and, at the same time, its empirical field. Building this study upon a sociology of critique, I work from the assertion that the dynamic relation between capitalism and critique can be observed in practice. I address the workings of late capitalism without compromising attention to ethnographic detail. This thesis is an attempt to combine those two. In doing so, it presents a collection of ethnographic accounts and aims at narrating a coherent story about innovation through the entanglements of the economic and artistic practices that materialise in and through the enactment and experience of artistic-performative interventions.

The ethnographic accounts I present here inform the treatment of innovation as a hybrid or complex phenomenon drawing together different fields of research practice, rather than as comprised by a domain-specific set of methods and techniques. This also highlights the fact that ethnographic methods cannot be considered external to the practices they seek to trace, the field it aims to map and issues that they address (Lury and Wakeford, 2012). I do not attempt to pose a critique of the inevitable occurrence of the new and its differentiation of art from that of business from a privileged position outside of the field of study. Rather, I investigate the way in which *affective* events and moments of critique make visible the boundaries that perform the empirical sites as insides and outsides to each other. This movement, the production and folding (in) of

the outside, is an ongoing concern throughout this study, and one I explicitly return to at the end of the thesis in the hope of rendering innovation as *inclusive differentiation* or how innovation practices in effect benefit from what they exclude.

Thesis Outline

Investigating the differential enactment of innovation as a practice between art and business has several implications that I deal with in the following chapter. Chapter 2 introduces the literature that informs the study of innovation as a practice between art and business. This review connects the issues addressed in this chapter to the broader field of capital and creativity. Firstly, it provides an historical overview of the way in which creativity has entered the economic sphere. This includes some reflections on how the production of the new has been characterised as an aesthetic and material process. Secondly, I draw attention to the different ways in which art has been applied as a strategy of innovation categorized as artistic production, art as leadership, or art in business. I illustrate these categories with a few empirical examples in order to demonstrate the way in which such practices reproduce the binary distinction between the two separate fields of art and business. Drawing on the literature of artistic critique and the modern avant-garde as it relates to post-Fordist production, I argue that innovation practice can be considered as an *emergent assemblage* rather than a stable form of organisation, institution or specific art practice.

Chapter 3 introduces the way these themes are turned into research practice. The case studies were conducted as ethnographic studies of two specific innovation processes, including participant observation and ethnographic interviews. In order to account for this study of innovation as an ethnography and, thereby, to address my research question, I employ theory of the assemblage as put forward by Manuel DeLanda (2006), Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1980) and Bruno Latour (2005), and this provides a framework in which to situate my use of various methods. Firstly, I discuss the cases as connecting the fields of politics, art, research and business. In doing so, I explain how each study comprises an assemblage of temporary associations between a set of institutions, knowledge practices and devices that constitute the innovation process. In this way, the artistic ideas that I follow do not pre-exist or have any pre-determined identity or functional definition apart from their actualisation in practice. In pursuing this claim, I follow recent discussions of ethnographic research, which argue that the

field site consists of temporal events and relations, which cannot be accounted for in terms of pre-existing physical sites to which the ethnographer travels (Atkinson et al., 2001, p. 9; Hess, 2001, p. 238). Secondly, I explain how this ethnography constitutes a 'method assemblage' (cf. Law, 2004, p. 144) conducted by the use of multiple methods, that allows me to consider the ethnographic studies not as representational givens, but as emerging empirical entities, emphasising different aspects of the complex nature of these processes of innovation.

Having set out the conceptual and methodological framework for my research on innovation, Chapter 4 moves on to the analysis of the creative practices introduced as examples of the entanglement between capitalism and creativity. I investigate the ways in which such creative spaces are enacted by analysing how they justify and evaluate the selection of the artistic elements for the organisation of spaces of innovation. While mapping such relations, it is to the performativity of the field that I would like to draw attention. In the course of this chapter, I look into the performances that both delimit and, thus, stabilise a particular field and, at the same time, open up the possibility of investigating its mode of operation. The notion of performance structures this chapter in a twofold way. It introduces the key argument of sociological accounts of innovation which claims that experimental activities are instruments that contribute to the construction of contemporary economies (Muniesa and Callon, 2007). Yet, these activities emerge in and through the settings which they also perform (such as the market, governmental institutions and artistic practices). To show this, I identify and map out the terms and statements presented by these practices, providing concrete examples of how an artistic vocabulary is introduced into the economic sphere. I argue that this vocabulary operates according to a strategy of differentiation, by negating any association, similarity or identification with the techniques and methods employed within industrial or corporate forms of production. This chapter provides a kind of survey of different approaches to creativity, while contextualizing the two ethnographic studies to which I draw attention in the next two chapters. In these chapters I turn my attention to cases of the artistic techniques and devices used in order to generate change and creativity.

Chapter 5 explores the way in which sociological accounts of the camp might bring us closer to an understanding of the spatio-temporal structures enacted within the

innovation process and the way in which the spatial configuration of the *camp* enables this practice to theorise rules, constraints and conflict as a creative strategy. I present a case study of an innovation process in which rules and constraints were externally imposed in order to foster creativity inspired by experimental filmmaking. More specifically, I present an ethnographic account of my participation in a 5-week work-camp. I argue that the camp cannot solely be understood as establishing an external order or straightforward exclusion – such as the camp distinguishing itself from its corporate context (promoting a divide between art and business). In the course of the chapter, I examine the way in which the camp-space came to subvert the nature of the relations of representation by the application and appropriation of rules inspired by experimental filmmaking. This investigation emphasises the paradoxical relationship between inclusion and exclusion as it unfolded in the work-camp, which accounts for what Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen (2005) define as its *extra-territoriality*. In order to understand the way in which filmmaking was both applied as an innovation in its own right and as a *means of* innovation, the structure of this chapter is separated into two parallel narratives. The ‘subtext’, normally occupied by footnotes, explains the way in which this particular filmmaking movement has changed the ‘essence’, the effects and the art of filmmaking itself *against* Hollywood filmmaking. As such, this text aims to explain the artistic ideal in order to understand its application within the camp itself.

Chapter 6 investigates another innovation process in which norms and rules were internally generated from the experimental setting itself. I present a case study of a 4-week design brief in which ‘poetic investigations’ were applied in order to invent what the designers called ‘alternative futures’. Moreover, in conducting the design project, fine-art means were applied to provoke debate in order to question a given reality. Such means included the use of artistic interventions, crits and tutorials characterised as *confrontational techniques*, that is, encounters and situations the designer sets in motion that challenge social behaviour and render the practices of everyday life visible. The chapter sets out to discover how tutors, organizers, partners, clients, funders and students perceived and reacted to the devices and what actually happened in the conduct of those devices. This includes some reflection on ethnomethodology, especially Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) breaching experiments, in order to address how those devices came to breakdown a common-sense perception of reality. I investigate the devices as *affective* means of innovation, which provoke the performances that enable the students, clients

and tutors to theorise pain as a strategy of innovation. In a similar style to Chapter 5, the artistic idea of this design practice is presented as both an innovation in its own right and as a means of enabling the process of innovation. Again, I separate the text of the chapter into two parallel narratives explaining how this idea of design is based upon a use of artistic performances and interventionist techniques framed as a critique *against* industrial design.

In Chapter 7 I bring together the analysis from the work-camp and the design brief to explore and question the linkages between innovation, technologies and the *self*. The artistic devices in question are considered ‘the specifically modern techniques of bureaucratic organization’ (Kwinter, 2001, p. 105) where the performative criteria by which one is judged is never revealed. I draw a parallel here to a selection of Franz Kafka’s writings. His stories are preoccupied with the relations of social organisation presented in a fictional universe whose objects, spaces and relations are apprehended and manipulated in the same distorting way as in the organisation of innovation. The second aspect of this, which revisits some of the issues addressed in Chapter 4, is how the relation between the individual and their environment feeds into processes of valuation. I demonstrate the way in which the devices came to act as a public demonstration, test or proof that exhibits ‘the necessary work of ourselves on ourselves’ (Davidson, 2001, p. xxiv; cf. Foucault, 2001) in order to be creative – that is, a performance that gives validity to the processes carrying certain *aesthetic values*. This chapter argues that this is an exemplary case of the strategic, generative unmaking of the self, constituted in and through a space that allows for a certain kind of exemption from a ‘common sense perception of the world’.

In conclusion, I pay attention to the way in which these innovation processes came to be considered distinctively artistic and also commercially valuable. Furthermore, I examine how the artistic devices applied to innovation have *material* consequences measured in terms of its affective enactment crucial for a cultural-artistic reconfiguration of the economic world. To draw to a close, I return to the examples with which I began: Price’s installation and the Occupy Wall Street. The ‘We Know’ chanted throughout the performance is important since it gives a hint of the collective processes of creation and their repetitive nature. Price exhibits a visual imaginary montage that repeats itself over and over again – a structure that is born out of the call for the new. It is this repetitive

structure or territorial occupation that I return to at the end of the thesis, where I portray how local affective interventions bring about a differentially enacted strategy of innovation, or put differently, how an industry is performed in and through local interventionist forms of interaction.

2. Creative Assemblages and the Production of the New

Introduction

Having presented this thesis as a study of the art-business divide in relation to a call for change, in this chapter I consider the ways in which innovation emerges from the intermingling of creativity and capitalism. The notion of creativity has accompanied the history of capitalism from the start, along a spectrum from intertwinement to antagonism. The notion of capitalism originates from Late Latin *capitalis*, meaning head, as in leadership – or ownership of capital. This definition of capitalism also refers to *produce* or ‘bringing into being of economic value’ (OED, 2007), which in the sociological tradition refers to a wider economic system based on the notion of the market in relation to consumption and production (BD, 1993). Creativity, on the other hand, originates from Medieval Latin *creativus*, which means to create and stems from *creare*, ‘to bring forth, produce, bring into being or form out of nothing’ (OED, 2007).

Both concepts – capitalism and creativity – stem, in part, from the notion of production or, more precisely, from the concept of *produce*, which refers to ‘production of something, by either natural growth or as result of some action’ (OED, 2007). However, these two concepts are also radically different in the way in which they refer to the emergence of the new. The one has roots in the meaning of *capit*, that is, to capture the new by transforming it into capital investments in terms of financial assets, and the other means to open up the notion of production as the emergence of the new, as something that is brought into being out of nothing. This etymological difference between *capitalis* and *creativus* reflects the dominant tendency in the economic literature on innovation, but it also relates to more sociological accounts of creativity and capitalism, which have considered the one as a prerequisite for the other; that is, creativity must exist as a process of production of something new before it is captured in capitalistic ideas of the market. This chapter documents various ways in which newness has been presented in relation to production. I thereby focus on innovation as a dual construction, i.e., as consisting both of *new forms of production* and the *production of the new*, which refers to the sociological literature on new forms of capitalism and its intermingling with creativity.

At the beginning of this chapter, I provide an historical overview of the way in which creativity has entered the economic sphere and thereby the discourse around innovation. As such, creativity is considered to be a crucial strategic resource for survival and growth in contemporary capitalism (Thrift, 2008). More specifically, I argue that the increased focus on creativity and the power of the market show that new ways of structuring the future have entered the scene and introduce artistic creation as an integral part of the processes of production within contemporary capitalism. I do so in order to explain my empirical cases as instantiations of such a broader historical shift, which is addressed in the work of social theorists such as Thrift (2005), Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), Lazzarato (2011), Negri and Hardt (1999) and Virno (2004) as they focus on new forms of production in contemporary capitalism. In brief, this shift relates to new ways in which economic and cultural processes are being understood in the light of post-structural theory. Before I address the question of how to analyse this theme in relation to my research object, I draw attention to the way in which art is understood as a strategy for innovation.

The various ways in which the art-business dichotomy outlined in the previous chapter has defined what is considered internal or external to new forms of capitalism can be addressed in relation to three major categories: (1) *artistic production*, referring to the production and circulation of art objects; (2) *art and leadership*, referring to artwork introduced into business practices; (3) *art-in-business*, referring to artistic processes where business executives are introduced to the production of artworks. These are the three major directions within the current debate on innovation; however, they cannot be considered as mutually exclusive. Rather, these are three categorizations that constitute the research field on innovation studies within the social sciences. For each category, I provide illustrative examples of different creative practices. In doing so, I account for the ways in which these different forms of innovation strategies have been contested as ways of instrumentalizing art and thereby reducing its creative potential. The recent intermingling between creativity and capitalism invites a critique of Boltanski and Chiapello's (1999) thesis on a *new* spirit of capitalism. The notion of creativity is introduced into commercial organisations with the assumption that creativity and capitalism are two separate paradigms in relation to strategies of innovation. In continuation, I argue that the creative practices described reproduce such binary

categorical distinctions and thereby produce a certain idea of innovation within contemporary capitalism.

Having described recent work on the intermingling of capitalism and creativity, in the next section I explain the analytical framework which I apply to study such entanglement in practice. The spheres of capitalism and creativity are not considered as two separate fields but as constructs from a plane stretched out between the interrelated concepts of *detrterritorialization* and *reterritorialization* proposed by Deleuze and Guattari (1980). These concepts allow me to explore processes of production before they become categorized as strategies generating either capital or creativity. It is on the basis of these themes that I develop my analytical perspective and the theoretical grounding of this study of innovation.

To bring the chapter to a close, I briefly discuss the methodological implications, which I develop further in the following chapter. As such, I use this conceptual plane not only to situate the issues of my research object, but also to define the analytical tools by which to conduct such a study and thereby ground the analysis of the empirical material throughout the following chapters. With this theoretical positioning, I aim to follow and to demonstrate empirically the argument that creativity and capitalism cannot be distinguished and that they are enacted in practice in multiple and heterogeneous ways. This argument resonates well with the idea that capitalism invokes its own special metaphysics, where the economic field is seen as a processual ordering rather than as an objectively given fact.

The Rise of Creative Capitalism

There has by now been a significant amount of research on creativity within the academic literature, describing how innovation has come to be considered as a social phenomenon within contemporary capitalism (cf. Thrift, 2006; Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009; Raunig, Ray and Wuggenig, 2011). However, the notions of innovation and creativity have only recently been introduced directly into the social science literature. A variety of theories within social science claim that an economic transformation has taken place within the last 40 years, where the notion of innovation has come to play an ever-increasing role in economic development.

These theories emerged as a consequence of historical developments that have caused a repositioning in writings on contemporary capitalism. This has been framed as a shift from mass production to flexible specialization and post-Fordism (Lash and Urry, 1987; Harvey, 1989; Amin, 1994). This rather recent development taking place in the 1970's is explained not only in terms of ways of producing but also in terms of new ensembles or arrangements in the corporate world, such as: design, marketing, branding, research and development (R&D), communication strategies, as well as human resource management, and other activities regarded as 'immaterial'. A range of political thinkers, such as Negri, Virno and Lazzarato have framed this as a shift from 'manual activities to the ability to put together creativity and imagination' (Lazzarato, 2004b). Instead of defining innovation purely in terms of techno-scientific developments, these thinkers connect innovation to the fundamental notions of production, consumerism and value creation. These are areas of production that are directed towards consumer differentiation, focusing on the symbolic value of commodities and relating to individual identity construction (Appadurai, 1986). In this field there is a growing appeal to Deleuze and Guattari's (1972; 1980) work on affect in their two-volume work on 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia' as a means of capitalistic production, which I return to later in this chapter. In what follows, I introduce the broader historical shifts preceding this understanding of immateriality.

Innovation From an Historical Perspective

Within economic sociology, the significance of innovation is said to emerge with the economic transformations that followed the second industrial revolution corresponding to the latter half of the 19th century until World War I (1870-1914). This includes the invention of advanced technologies for transport and communications, together with the rise of information technology, especially the proliferation of software, global actors and transnational corporations, and the globalization of international trade. A common way of accounting for these transformations, which have taken place since the latter part of the eighteenth century, is the rise of a knowledge economy (Amin and Thrift, 2004). This shift also entails the transformation in commodification (from physical products to knowledge), which again gave rise to terms such as immaterial production which have often been used to designate the operation of these new technologies. Bhidé explains this shift by referring to issues such as off-shoring, outsourcing, entrepreneurship and venture capitalism as new forms of international trade where flows of capital are related

to cross-border activities and transactions (Bhidé, 2008 p. xii). Increased use of networks, the circulation of capital and the globalization of production create a spatially dispersed field of production, which is neither physically located in the factory nor spatially bound to a geographical territory. These transformations are said to invoke a new historical phase of capitalism and a process of accumulation and production where capital is said to circulate at a global scale (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980; Lazzarato, 2004a).

This shift also entails the decline of regulation and production by the nation-state and gives rise to global markets and corporations. Capitalism then becomes associated with a market-driven economy, where innovation is said to be of importance as a means by which to differentiate (Porter, 1990). This means that being first to the market and thereby distinguishing the company from its competitors is considered crucial for survival and growth with the rise of a new economy. This differs from the classical focus on demand and supply, which implies a change from producing for pre-existing needs identified within the market to companies inventing the needs and desires of its consumers (Thrift, 2008; Lury, 2004; Arvidson, 2006). This shift emphasises a change in production where it becomes diversified and differentiated. Economies of scale (mass production) are said to be replaced by economies of scope, whereby a specialization of production takes place (Chandler, Jr., 1990). Furthermore, a move occurs from hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations to network-based organisations, which are able to provide such flexible specialisation. Prahalad and Krishnan (2008, p. 42) suggest that this era can be described as a 'new age of innovation'. More specifically, innovation is said to occur with the increased focus on knowledge production, where invention and new ideas are claimed to be the crucial capital asset, driven by business strategies and technological transformations. In this case, innovation occurs as a process by which an organization generates creative new ideas and converts these into valuable commercial products, services and business practices (Kuhn and Marsick, 2005). The notion of creativity specifically designates the process of generating novel ideas, considered as a necessary step preceding the innovation process.

This fundamental split between capitalism and creativity has been presented in terms of the neoclassical distinction between invention and innovation as proposed by Porter, who has defined innovation as 'invention brought to market' (cf. 1990, p. 119-126), a

distinction widely recognised and still prevailing within economic theories of innovation.² Invention and thus the process of creativity are therefore conceived as being external to the economy and as a resource that a corporate firm might transform or turn into economic value as it becomes realized in the market (Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009, p. 4). Studies of invention have until recently been conducted from *outside* the economic field. A number of critiques have been directed towards this neoclassical economic perspective, claiming that this is a rather reductive approach to innovation.³ Such a critique has been posed by Virno (1996; 2004) and Lazzarato (1996; 2004a; 2004b), among others, who depart from the notions of immaterialization, a perspective to which I now turn.

An important aspect of this historical shift is the transformation of the relationship between production and consumption. The specificity of the commodity produced within this era of immaterial production is characterised by its informational and cultural value. These values consist in the fact that they cannot be destroyed in the act of consumption, but they enlarge, transform and create the ideological and cultural environment of the consumer (Lazzarato, 2004a).

Writing from within a post-structuralist tradition, this perspective originates from a neo-Marxist critique of the liberal economy. Such a critique is based on a re-reading of Marx's 'Fragment on Machines', a section in *Grundrisse* (1939) focusing on economic development incorporating 'scientific labour, technological application of the natural sciences, social structuring of global production' to the work of capital (Virno, 2004). Virno refers to Marx in this respect saying that 'the development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production' (Virno, 2001, p. 1). In continuation Lazzarato writes that 'within contemporary capitalism the company does not exist outside the producers or

² See, for instance, the works of Afuah (1998), Afuah and Bahram (1995), Helström et al (2003), Kuhn and Marsick (2005), Kline and Rosenberg (1986), Henderson and Clark (1990), which are currently being taught at business schools worldwide.

³ One of the critiques raised against neoclassical economic theory is the assumption of an atomized and anonymous market brought about by fully competitive conditions, as this is a conception that neglects the role of social relations among individuals in bringing order to economic life (Granovetter 1985). Other theorists have challenged what they call 'neo-liberal orthodoxies' (Harvey 2010) arguing that it creates an idealistic abstract model of the individual firm separated from its structural relations within the rest of the economy (the critique is raised against the conceptualization of the firm as a black-box where the formatting of a specific income will create a predefined outcome). Furthermore, the emphasis in neo-classical economic theory has been on the spatial patterns produced by large industrial enterprises rather than the processes internal to those enterprises (cf. Watts, 1980, p. 29-30).

consumers who express it. Its world, its objectivity, its reality merges with the relationships enterprises, workers and consumers have with each other.’ (Lazzarato, 2004a, p. 188) Furthermore, Lazzarato claims that the sensible defined as desire and beliefs are integrated into the circulation of capital. From this perspective, immaterial labour is said to produce first of all a social relationship. This activity shows that labour produces not only commodities but first and foremost the relationship of capital with creativity (see for instance Deleuze and Guattari, 1980).

Such a re-reading of Marx points towards an understanding of capitalism characterized by affective labour as proposed by Hardt (1999) and implies – when joined with Foucault’s (1976) notion of *biopower* – that ‘life itself’ becomes internal to economic production and the circulation of capital. This view contributes to discussions of new forms of production in terms of sensation and affects and represents a neo-Marxist intellectual route that has problematized, or at least articulated, a change in the way of thinking about capitalistic production, value creation and aesthetic transformation.⁴ As was indicated in Chapter 1, this perspective sets the background from where to understand industries as constructed by affective spaces rather than by territorial occupation (Thrift, 2008, p. 21). Let me unravel this point in relation to the claims made about new forms of production in contemporary capitalism.

The increased focus on the creation of value in relation to the production of knowledge means that capitalism is not an external force, an economic system that occupies a certain geographical or physically constrained territory, rather it occupies ‘territories of ‘thought’’, as Thrift (2008, p. 17) argues, which refers to the notion of ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Boutang, 2008). This notion has constituted the ground for critiques claiming that human capacities, and thereby thought, become a means of innovation, which composes new forms of value creation. Lazzarato claims that immaterial labour constitutes itself in forms that are immediately collective, and exists, so to speak, only in the form of ‘network and flow’ claiming that the organisation of production is not

⁴ The concept of affect stems from the Latin *afficere*, (influence) and *affectus* (disposition), which refer to the idea of making ‘a difference to’ (OED, 2007). In this aspect, O’Sullivan and Zepke (2008, p. 3) write on affect in relation to artistic creation that: ‘...the affect becomes a trajectory of transformation, inasmuch as the artist constructs from the continuous variation of matter as expression (affect) capable of embodying its continuous development, capable that is, of producing a difference’. This has also been understood in relation to Deleuze’s (1986, p. 60) description of power as the ability ‘to affect and be affected’. The definition of this concept is based on the analysis of new forms of power that transform our understanding of production and consumerism.

immediately visible as it is not confined by ‘the walls of a factory’ (Lazzarato, 1996). Furthermore, the organisation of immaterial labour tends to happen within new forms of organisational construction such as small ‘productive units’, which are organised for temporary, or ad hoc, projects and thereby constituted only for a given time, which often institutes a temporary spatial order of production.⁵ It is further argued that such new forms of organization coincide with artistic forms of organisation, as they are often said to be organised on the edge of established structures and make use of freelance work, creative self-employment and temporary projects based on materialization of new or creative ideas (Lazzarato, 2011, p. 43; McRobbie, 2011, p. 122; Thrift, 2005, p. 34).⁶ It is through this inversion of the relation of capitalism from being constituted by external territorial occupation to being constituted by internal processes of territorialization that the new economy is said to be constructed.

Value Creation

It is not only at the organisational level that the economy and creativity are taken into account in terms of artistic creation. Moreover, writings on capitalistic production emphasise the need for imagination and invention of the new as means of differentiation (Porter, 1990). Thrift (2008) writes that ‘...value increasingly arises not from what is but what is not yet but can potentially become, that is from the *pull of the future*, and from the new distributions of the sensible that can arise from that change’ (p. 31, italics in original). This is an economic development that he defines as the ‘cultural circuit of capitalism’ (Thrift, 2005, pp. 20-50). This aspect belongs to the range of theories which emphasise the way that artistic creation enters the economic sphere, which are then related to what Lazzarato has claimed to be an ‘aestheticization’ of the economy (Lazzarato, 2008). Sociological scholars have argued that the market is *constructed*, since the objects that are invented or produced do not satisfy pre-existing needs in a market but invent new forms of being. Innovation means to produce objects

⁵ Instead of being a mechanic production function as proposed in neo-classical theory or an abstract capitalist imperative, the enterprise here emerges as a contested site of new forms of production at different organisational and spatial scales. At the same time, the boundary of the firm is increasingly difficult to define, and this is why the identification of its boundary-making practices become even more important – that is, to identify its wider relations with other actors and institutions composing its territorial organisation (cf. Chapter 4).

⁶ Tiziana Terranova has also introduced a similarity between artistic production and new labour in the post-Fordist era. She claims that the interpretation of Marxist value (from *Grundrisse*) is not only generated from ‘alienated surplus labour of the individual worker but also a more indeterminate activity which captures and re-combines features of aesthetic experience and artistic experimentation – an engagement with the world which produces new ways of seeing and feeling’ (Terranova, 2006, p. 30-31).

that invoke the sensible, which means that value is produced by creating a world in which the object exists rather than the functional qualities attached to a consumer product (Lazzarato, 2004a, p. 188).

These themes have been represented in the literature of economic sociology from the perspective of constructivism. Relatedly, Mitchell argues that the economy cannot be considered as a pre-existing sphere, into which creative processes of innovation introduce changes. He claims that '[t]he economy is a twentieth-century invention that was built out of such projects', saying: 'There is no simple divide between an experimental or simulated world of the industrial workshop or business planning and a real world outside it' (Mitchell, 2008, pp. 1118-1119).⁷ It might be said that a particular metaphysics underlines this economic perspective from which it becomes possible to argue that creativity is an integral part of contemporary capitalism. The analytical point is that the economy is taken as processually constituted and not as an objectively given reality. This metaphysics implies a shift from looking at the economy in terms of industrial production, considered a limited physical space, to the internal construction of a space as it relates to the production of *affect* and *sensation*. Space, then, is not conceived of as an empty volume in which events, entities or relations are contained, but as a temporally contingent category constructed in order to foster innovation and creativity. These aspects propose that the historical shift to a post-industrial society has been a turn towards creativity, not, however, as a prerequisite of innovation, but as the very functioning of capitalism itself (Thrift, 2008; McRobbie, 2011; Boutang, 2008).

Thinking about the economy in relation to a particular form of metaphysics, apart from the focus on space and on the market, also implies a change in the relation to objects. Alfred Gell (1998) has argued that a redefinition of the aesthetic takes place, since artistic work does not only relate to the representation of an aesthetic object (that is, its visual imaginary in packaging, the design of products or the construction of a logo for a company). Rather, the aesthetic refers to the production of the sensations and affects that are afforded by the objects invented (Verbeek, 2000). The notion of aesthetic objects refers to a dimension other than the extension of commodification into the

⁷ Lash and Urry argue that the transition in the relations between production and consumption are symptoms of the postmodern condition. However, they also argue that postmodernity constructs a specific idea of what new forms of capitalism might be and its future implications (Lash and Urry, 1987, p. 286).

world of art products. Objects produced within the new fields of consumption such as design, fashion, video or film can be thought of as aesthetic objects, that is, objects that are affectively loaded and which transform a way of being or a way of perceiving the world (Verbeek, 2000).

In this way, the artwork is not only the outcome of an innovation process which is introduced into a market, but one that constitutes that market as well as the space in which it is produced. This changes the way we can perceive the market from being a recipient of innovation to ‘constituting the utility of innovations’ (Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009, p. 12). It is from such a perspective that the market has been seen as being performed, a notion which was suggested by Callon (1998; 2007) from the field of STS. Such a vision transcends the idea that R&D, academic institutions or the laboratory constitute enclosed experimental sites, which create new knowledge. Rather, the process of creation is itself considered as a performance (Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009, p. 13).⁸ This type of argumentation goes against a neoclassical assumption in which creativity is seen as being external to or outside the market. Theories of the market in the economic sociology literature disregard the chain of causation implicit in Porter’s economic analysis (1990). This notion of performance transcends the dichotomy that was previously held within economic sociology, considering the economy as an independent system where the distinction between the economic system and the broader social field was preserved.⁹

In summary, I have suggested that there has been an historical shift in which creativity is said to enter the field of capitalistic production. The construction of objects as commodities has now become aestheticized and the market is said to be performed. These tendencies are seen as implications of this historical shift within theories originating from a post-structuralist tradition. These are all developments that have been

⁸ This is where the STS literature and economic sociology intersect, starting with the work of Michel Callon (2007), who emphasised the notion of the ‘performativity of the market’. From this perspective, STS will prove relevant for a study on innovation and I develop this perspective further in the following chapter.

⁹ This distinction was upheld by Weber in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1958) and Polanyi in *The Great Transformation* (2001) where he presented a critique of the disembedding of the market from the wider social field. Mitchell (2008) takes this point further by arguing that the economy is not to be understood as one separate field into which the social can be translated, or in Polanyi’s terms *embedded*, rather the economy must be seen as an invention in itself, as a processual construction. It is from this perspective that the economy does not represent an objectively given reality but is processually constituted and performed. As a result, the economy cannot be considered to be a pre-existing sphere into which creativity introduces change.

argued to constitute the backdrop to the current operation of contemporary capitalism. This literature provides a view of innovation and production that moves beyond an understanding of industrial production as existing in relation to external spatial formations into the realms of the aesthetic and the potential as constituting crucial dimensions of the economic sphere. A central point is that affect and sensation are seen as constituting new means of production and the creation of value, producing social networks or new forms of connectivity. Based on such perspectives, a notion of production emerges, relating to the production of the social, which is captured in critical theories of value (Arvidsson, Bauwens and Peitersen, 2008). Moreover, creativity was previously considered to be an activity *outside* the economic system and, according to this approach, it has moved *inside* the very mode of capitalistic production. From the perspective of economic sociology, the economy is theorized as a construction, which enacts a metaphysics of processes, rather than of essences, and of performance, rather than normative certainties.¹⁰

It is in relation to this historical shift that I want to situate my research project. However, before I demonstrate the analytical tools needed to frame my empirical research, I outline the way in which art has been introduced as a strategy for innovation. In doing so, I attempt to render visible the dichotomies between creativity and capitalism constructed within recent studies of art and business within the field of social science.

Art as a Strategy for Innovation

Following the above account of the connection between creativity and new forms of capitalism, some intersections between artistic sensibilities and mainstream socioeconomic structures can be mapped out, which resonate with critical contributions to theories of contemporary capitalism within economic sociology. This section

¹⁰ However, critiques of constructivism have suggested that such a perspective reduces the economic market to relativism. More importantly, the British author and academic Gavin Kitching (2008) has argued that constructivist accounts implicitly presuppose a deterministic view as, in this case, the economy is not just constructed by language, object and processes, but also determined by it. I include this critique in order to study innovation by drawing on contributions from the field of STS. John Law, commenting on the notion of Actor Network Theory, notes that ANT is not to be understood as a purely semiotic endeavour, but that it also needs to include materiality and sociality into the study of economic constructions. This definition he further argues is what distinguishes ANT from other post-structuralist accounts and also from the work of Foucault (Law, 1999, p 3-4)

identifies the perspectives from which the notions of capitalism and creativity have been discussed and will point out a few examples of the fields that have been objects of such debates. I highlight three predominant fields to explore the intermingling of creativity and capitalism: *artistic production*, *art and leadership*, and *art-in-business*. These categorizations have been identified and specified within the literature on economic sociology, which takes art as an object of study as it has been translated into a strategy for business. In this way, the categorizations represent different ways in which the aestheticization of the economy might take form. They illustrate how artistic performances and methods have been used as tools to intervene in the system of production, e.g., product-development, strategic thinking about the firm and processes of invention (Boland Jr. and Collopy, 2004).

The first category that I want to draw attention to is that of *artistic production*. Within this field, art has been investigated in relation to economics in terms of cultural production, that is, through the creation of artworks such as artistic objects, performances or methods. This type of production has been discussed on a broader scale in relation to the emergence of the creative industries, especially within the UK. In this field, artistic value is articulated as a value *of* the creative industries, where art is seen to make an economic contribution to an emerging industry in terms of value added, employment and enterprise. This is seen in recent studies by, for instance, Howkins (2007), Florida (2002) and Cunningham (2002). The assumption here is that the production of the new is related to the emergence of a new industry, which means that new kinds and forms of objects are exchanged as commodities in the market, generating economic profits for new kinds of businesses and contributing to the Gross National Product (GNP).

The second category relates to how innovation has been understood as the management *of* artistic organisations. This field can be categorized under the name of *art and leadership*. An example is organisations such as ‘Arts&Business’, situated in London, facilitating partnership opportunities between the art world and business. The organisation is established to maximise financial investment in the arts sector. This approach focuses on the application of business models to artistic practice (cf. Martorella, 1996). The assumption here is that the rational logic of the business world captures and structures the more irrational and messy world of artistic creation.

The third and last category is the category of *art-in-business*. In this field, art is taken as a tool for transformations within business practices. Such transformations are related to processes where artistic methods of creation are applied to business, changing the character of the organisational structure of the firm, or inventing a new structure or new products. Thrift (2005), for example, writes about forms of practice where artists make employees perform a play or paint a picture. Such techniques are used to make employees more creative and inventive. A number of studies have been conducted exploring the logic of artistic creation in various different disciplines. The theatre has been used especially as a metaphor for new or inventive forms of leadership (cf. for example Austin and Devin, 2003; Eikhof and Haunschild, 2006; Monthoux, 2004).

This categorization represents three predominant ways in which the notions of creativity and cultural production come into the picture and guide the discussion on innovation, where art is taken as a strategy for business. The artist and the studio are taken as material sites of creative action, which are translated into corporate strategies materialized as different forms of in-house innovation, or research centres within private companies, public organisation or governmental institutions.

Within the historical shift to post-Fordism, the interrelation of art with the field of business entails such kinds of organisational practices as mentioned above. Lazzarato describes the rise of workshop-based processes as constituting new forms of spatial organisation (Lazzarato, 2004b). Others have argued that small-scale network-based organisations employing less than ten highly specialised skilled workers are symptomatic of a new way of organising processes of innovation (Bhidé, 2008; Prahalad and Krishnan, 2008). These are said to be design-oriented and multidisciplinary, involving collaboration between entrepreneurs, designers, and engineers (Kumar, 1995). Andrea Branzi has defined this development as the end of the historical avant-garde and the rise of a permanent-avant-garde, ‘where corporations work with small experimental design centres to develop new scenarios within which the corporations develop new products’ (quoted in Dunne, 2005, p. 91-92). Besides, an increase in art practices that rely on both subsidies from state funding and/or commission from corporate companies has emerged.

Common to these practices are that they emerge as small-scale organisations coordinating ‘inter-disciplinary’ innovation processes involving business, art, design, research institutions and policy-makers. The practices are typically short-term projects that take place in a remote site outside the realm of the company. Such configurations arise as a result of connections between various different actors, engaging in forms of production which cannot be reduced to a single discipline or occupation, either that of business or that of art. It is in this way, a new hybrid model of economic growth has been said to emerge including freelance work, and self-employment (McRobbie, 2011, p. 122; Thrift, 2005, p. 32) – a model that tends to look more like artistic and creative practices than businesses (Lazzarato, 2011). I argue that it is possible to detect a range of practices emerging within this shift to ‘creativity’. The important point to keep in mind is that these practices are both dependent on state funding from research councils and private subsidies – and the notion of creativity is produced in and through these funding contexts. In order to explicate this argument, I provide a few examples of artistic spaces that have been taken as attempts to create a ‘realistic economic model’ based on a particular anti-capitalist orientation (cf. Gielen and Bruyone, 2009).

The first example is the Italian art practice Cittadelarte’. This is an interdisciplinary art organisation that organises creative processes in a discarded textile factory near Bienna, Italy. This practice facilitates innovation processes based on the principles of the Italian artist Michelangelo Pistoletto. The art city was instituted as a concrete action of the *‘Progetto Arte’ Manifesto*, where Pistoletto proposed a new role for the artist: that of placing art in direct interaction with all the areas of human activity, which constitute a society. Pistoletto invests his earnings from the international art market in Cittadellarte.

Another example is the Watermill Foundation, which organises creative processes in the forest of Southampton, Long Island based on the artistic practice of Robert Wilson. The Watermill Foundation enables research into the arts of the stage. Watermill supports projects that mix and integrate different genres and art forms, which break with traditional forms of representation and which aim at developing democratic approaches. The primary activity of the Watermill Centre is a Summer Program led by Robert Wilson, focusing on new projects developed in all areas of the arts. Other activities include workshops, artist residencies, conferences and lectures, and a variety of local and international educational partnership programs.

These practices have been characterised as ‘revolutionary art strategies that would like to undermine neoliberalism’ (Gielen and Bruyne, 2009, p. 11). Their artistic objects such as Pistoletto’s mirror-paintings have been seen to have revolutionary pretensions outdistancing modernity since the 1960s. Such projects oppose art or design that identifies with the consumer society, and which is absorbed with the attention of mass media. However, in recent years, Pistoletto has attracted attention with the founding of Cittadellarte and Rob Wilson by establishing the Watermill foundation. These artistic enterprises, such as the Watermill Foundation and Cittadellarte, have been written about as spaces that fuel an artistic but also ethical, political and economic sense of possibility. Virno argues that Cittadellarte introduces a ‘dismeasure’ inside the more general measure or common sense of culture (interview in Lavaert and Gielen, 2009). This dismeasure, he suggests, is aesthetic and formal. These practices invite scientists and businesses to develop and implement practical new economic methods of production and to redefine their activities to be in themselves works of art (Lavaert and Gielen, 2009). In doing so, Pistoletto is said to install a different measure of art and to operate within a post-Fordist model of value creation.

This artistic orientation serves to distance any mainstream arena (including the media). Instead, process of transition and experimentation defined in solely artistic terms are valued, having an artistic practice (e.g. film production, interactive design or performing art) as their overall frame for innovation. Furthermore, they use the name of contemporary artistic celebrities, such as the British sculptor Anthony Gormley, the Danish filmmaker Lars von Trier or the video-artist Bill Viola to express the specific artistic practice they adhere to and to frame a methodology for innovation.

However, these practices are characterized as creative inventions that facilitate the process of innovation. They incorporate aspects of artistic production to produce art objects, contributing to the creation of value within the creative industries, as well as organising the processes of creation in which business clients take part in both observing and being taught the artistic method. In this way, the practices in question implicitly propose an innovation strategy where business itself is taken as the experimental object. The creative practices I have paid attention to organise innovation

processes that include various aspects of the above-mentioned categories: *artistic production*, *art and leadership*, and *art-in-business*.

Within the innovation practices just mentioned, art is taken as a sort of creative template for business to follow. Art practices are seen as paradigmatic sites of observation for new business strategies, models of invention or market promotion within the new economy. This aspect of the art world was previously associated with critical activities in a search for alternative values and was therefore seen as being not only outside the prevailing economic system but also as being *against* capitalistic values. The examples given above all proclaim a strong political or cultural programme as an indication of their artistic approach and as forces against capitalism or consumerism. However, the three approaches outlined above are exactly enacted in terms of practices of collaboration with the corporate world, that is, they are enacted in processes of economic innovation facilitated on the basis of specific artistic principles.

The claim that creativity might drive economic growth has framed a lot of debates on how artistic creation enters the economic sphere. In the three categories, such intersections are represented in a story about how capitalism has come to occupy a non-capitalistic territory. In all of these categories, art is taken as a metaphor for business or as a model to which the business world has to adapt. These examples demonstrate the way in which a binary logic is constructed, as they translate the logic of one (art) into that of the other (business). These research approaches therefore seem to be caught in a rather reductive dichotomy where the values of the art-world enlighten business and where business rationalises art.

Art as Resistance

The creative practices described above associate their artistic principles with those of the modern avant-garde. An internal contradiction in relation to theories of capitalistic value-production and innovation as a matter of differentiation would seem inevitable. Avant-garde art is often defined by its ability to provoke or shock the public or an audience in order to critique contemporary capitalistic society (Debord, 1967; Jameson, 1991). A case in point is the by now well-known activist group called *The Yes Men*. They produce false websites, blogs and films in which they promote the belief that corporate organizations and governmental organizations act in dehumanizing and exploitative

ways toward the public. Their activities have been considered to advocate art as a type of creative revenge on capitalism (i.e., Hynes, Sharpe and Fagan, 2007). In this context, Lazzarato redefines the avant-garde not as a matter of institutional art practice, but rather as a technique or practice in terms of ‘processes of creation’ encountered as an aesthetic orientation towards the world (Lazzarato, 2008, p. 174). This orientation embeds an anti-capitalistic approach to the field of innovation and constitutes an almost revolutionary contextualization of the field of art and innovation. Following Lazzarato, we see a new kind of ‘functional avant-garde’ – artists that presents themselves as employees of imaginary organisations or companies in order to carry out subversive work that fuses fictional and real legal, economic and cultural systems.

What is interesting about this kind of innovation practice is that it engages with the notion of innovation and at the same time relies on an artistic mode of critique or resistance against the logic of capitalism. A distinction between art and business is thereby maintained as these practices critique the reality in which they also engage. Thus, these examples enact the aestheticization of the economy by constructing a differential relation between art and capitalism as two separate fields of research. Such a perspective entails a specific critical approach, which coincides with the logic of neoliberalism as suggested by Foucault (1994), and later addressed by Boltanski and Chiapello (1999). Budgen comments on Boltanski and Chiapello that:

Capitalism, however, has always relied on critiques of the status quo to alert it to dangers in any untrammelled development of its current forms, and to discover the antidotes required to neutralize opposition to the system and increase the level of profitability within it. (Budgen, 2000, p. 151)

Boltanski and Chiapello define innovation as a mode driving the operation of capitalism. They argue that the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ integrates a new regime of justification and critique based on network-mobility and new forms of connectivity. In continuation, Albertsen and Diken (2006, p. 245) ask ‘[w]hat if contemporary power thrives well in forms of justification and critique based on the notion of creativity?’. This means that the critical approach afforded by such creative practices directed towards new forms of capitalism works to reinforce the very logic which they oppose.

To sum up, the borrowing from an artistic vocabulary, which is now entering the economic field, can be traced back to historical transformations within the operation of

capitalism. Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) argue that creativity might be integrated into the logic of control and subjugation in contemporary capitalism. However, there is a danger of engaging too easily in a critical analysis of art and business in relation to the analysis of a neo-liberal economy. The key point is that it might be too easy to just write off this historical turn to creativity as the full accomplishment of neoliberalism in the area of the arts, as has been done in some academic corners of cultural studies and sociology. I address this aspect in the next section, presenting my analytical approach. However, what I want to ask is: how does the intermingling of creativity and new forms of capitalism work out in practice?

In demonstrating the links between creativity and theories of the new economy, I have been concerned with showing the heterogeneous nature of the art-business relation and the variety of their links and how they might be explained. However, the overall perspective in the theories and directions I have presented in this chapter illustrate the idea that creativity is vital to the operation of contemporary capitalism. However, I wish to focus my attention on other kinds of dynamics rather than the ones Boltanski and Chiapello have proposed. The practices that are my focus in the rest of the thesis (cf. Chapter 3) cut across the three categorizations, enacting multiple differentiations which reproduce the intermingling of art and business. The operation of these organisational forms can be understood as processes in transformation rather than as stable entities of organisation, that is, as emergent assemblages, which might be defined as a specific heterogeneous arrangement bringing together different aesthetic perspectives, economic realities and technological futures.¹¹

Assembling the New

In researching innovation, I wish to demonstrate that the intermingling of art and capital is complex and comprises heterogeneous processes that do not conform to the current criticism of either new forms of capitalism, as outlined in the previous section,

¹¹ On the basis of this the notion of immateriality might be contested and redeployed to include phenomena that are considered to be at once material, discursive, human, corporeal, and technological in studies of innovation (i.e., Latour, 2005). Rather than apply the idea of immaterial production, as it seems to imply a separation of a non-material world from that of a physical world of objects, places, and materials. Furthermore, the notion of immaterial production is not only to be understood as the 'less than material' but refers to what Deleuze and Guattari (1980) have called the 'incorporeal'. In order to explain this in further detail, I draw on the notion of the assemblage, as I explain in the next section of this chapter.

or to the instrumentalism of art, as mentioned above. New relations and connections are being created that expand our current understanding of both art and capital and also have the potential to change the way in which we think about creative practices, economic circulation and artistic production. It is to capture and conceptualize the complex interweaving of the different rationalities associated with the field of capitalism and creativity that I apply the notion of the assemblage. As the vocabulary for this study is still to be defined, in what follows I explore a few key concepts as a way of defining the analytical perspective of this thesis.

In investigating innovation practices, I do not want to judge with a binary categorization whether the result is innovative or not, whether the solutions or the artworks produced are new, or whether they actually create future growth; rather, I aim to investigate how the mobilization of forces takes place, by which the innovative process is assembled and executed. The purpose is to construct a plane from where it becomes possible to investigate the way in which the differentiations between art and business, capitalism and creativity are produced, reproduced, and circulated within and between creative practices. This implies putting innovation at the forefront as an object of investigation and not as an outcome of the innovation process.

I outline ‘the more abstract plane of relations that underlie’ (Kwinter, 2001, p. 34) such considerations of innovation and which form what Kwinter (2001, p. 34) calls the ‘conditions of possibility’.¹² This means considering the use of artistic techniques and tools as conditions for the notion of innovation and the idea of the new and, at the same time, constructing a vocabulary for the study of innovation. It is in relation to such a charting that the complexity of the field may be apprehended, as the artistic ideas, each in their own way, add to a perspective implying that innovation might be understood as more than just a symptom of the ‘new’.

On Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization

The historical transformation to post-Fordism has been argued to constitute a movement of destabilization in terms of displacement of the workforce, dematerialization of labour and decentralization of capital flow. Furthermore, the

¹² This analysis depends on a series of assumptions in which the world is taken as consisting of temporary and only relatively stable forms, not unities or totalities, following a Deleuzian-Latourian route which views capitalism as composed of diverse and changing networks.

aestheticization of the economy proposed by Lazzarato (2008) seems to indicate a displacement of capital across territorial occupations as a consequence of the second industrial revolution (Thrift, 2005), which made the borders of territories look like imaginary constructs. However, according to Barry (2001, p. 38) what is considered technological, cultural, political or economic is in itself related to the concept of the territory. In general, the practices that are thought of as innovative are exactly those which are seen as capable of escaping territorial constraints (as such, practices are seen to respond to new trends and, thereby, to turn the value of globalization into a resource). From this point of view, the structural formation of boundaries or territorial occupation should not be erased from the debate of innovation and creativity (cf. Barry, 2001, p. 59; Cocco, 2007, p. 307).

The demarcation of territorial borders is materially established through the binary differences of art and business. From this territorial perspective we end up with a definition of business where capital is socialized and a definition of art where creativity is economized. In this way, the economy is seen as internally differentiated where value creation happens beyond the financially regulated market. Territorial boundaries are re-enacted most visibly through novel forms of capitalism in the context of innovation strategies.

From this perspective, I draw out the assertion that innovation strategies can best be ascertained by examining the way in which the notion of innovation itself is brought into being by way of differentiation, that is, to articulate its relations to other creative practices, governmental institutions and the creative industries. I argue that the use of artistic ideas as a strategy for innovation entails a process of social ordering, which is described by Deleuze and Guattari as being constituted through the dynamics of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 25).¹³ In doing so, I trace different organisational formations constituted by the spatial dynamics

¹³ In this chapter I address the notion of the assemblage with a specific focus on the definition suggested by Deleuze and Guattari (1972). However, the notion of the assemblage has been taken up in the sociology of science and technology by Irwin and Michael (2003) in the book *Science, Social Theory and Public Knowledge*. They refer to the assemblage as ‘the collection of heterogeneous fragments that can entail ‘territorialization’ (Irwin and Michael, 2003, p. 78). The term has also found resonance in anthropological studies, especially with the publication by Ong and Collier (2005) entitled *Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*. I will return to these references in the next chapter, while addressing the methodological implications of assemblage for the empirical investigations in this thesis.

of the assemblage as they unfold in particular events or social experiments where art is taken as a principle of innovation.¹⁴

To explain this research strategy, I return to the case of Pistoletto's artistic project. The mirror-paintings have been acclaimed as a work of art that attempts to break down the traditional notions of figurative art. The 'mirror-effect' produced through the experience of the paintings provokes the viewer to reflect on their surroundings and they are themselves included as a part of the painting. The attempt is to exhibit an ever-changing spectacle and portray some reflections on contemporary consumer society. The artistic idea of Pistoletto is recognised as a well-known principle that has challenged and reconstructed the essence of art by transforming its methods of production. It is these kinds of artistic transformations that are translated into principles of innovation applied to business processes. The artistic transformation in the example of Pistoletto's art practice provides a sense of direction and orientation producing a specific idea of what it means to be creative. According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991) such transformations happen 'within' and 'in spite' of a given territory – a territory, which in this case refers to the current economic environment enacted by the 'major' institutions within the field of innovation.¹⁵ These institutions include other creative practices, governmental institutions and the creative industries. Let me briefly elaborate on this theme in further detail.

Considering the examples of innovation practices given in this chapter, a proliferation of terms from the arts used to organise innovation processes occur. Concepts such as *script*, *scenario*, *staging*, *casting*, *interdisciplinarity*, *creation* and *collaboration* are key elements that contribute to the enactment of the specific innovation programmes – that is, a vocabulary, which promotes flexible organisational forms and performative character

¹⁴ The processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are defined as the processual movement of the assemblage. John Phillips (2006, p. 108) defines, with reference to Deleuze, the notion of assemblage from the French 'agencement', as a form of connectivity (cf. Chapter 3). The process of deterritorialization is defined as 'the 'transformative vector of a territory' (Parr, 2005, p. 67), that is, as a process of 'coming undone' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, p. 322)

¹⁵ According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991, p. 67) the concept of the territory not only refers to a geographical demarcation of land, but also to a domain of action or thought, as I have already introduced in relation to Thrift's (2005) idea of new forms of capitalism. Deterritorialization has been suggested as the implication of the historical shift to post-Fordism. In this aspect, some writers see the new economy as a decrease of territories, as suggested by Deleuze (1986) in his writings on Foucault. However, Deleuze also emphasizes the important point that deterritorialization cannot be understood without its counter-movement of reterritorialization. That is, a process of reterritorialization always takes place simultaneous with the act of deterritorialization (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 326). In this way, the new economy cannot solely be understood as the erasure of territories, but as a transformation in processes of control, which Deleuze has suggested to be a hybridization of discipline into a society of control (Deleuze, 1986).

that can adapt to any changing circumstance in the financial market. As such, the artistic ideas, which are applied as principles of innovation, become a creative condition for inventing the new. Albertsen and Diken (2006, p. 247) write that '[t]he artistic critique of the 60s and 70s today supply business with a rhetoric of creative productivity, making aesthetics an element of social cohesion'. In this view, the aesthetic critique has entered into a post-Fordist regime of justification where the notion of creativity is re-coded in terms of flexibility, interdisciplinarity, provocation and experimentation (cf. Chapter 4).¹⁶

The idea of the new is closely tied to deterritorialization and reterritorialization as two types of mobility organising innovation processes. On the one hand, creativity is staged as a deterritorializing force 'undoing' rigid channels of power in producing the new. On the other, reterritorialization is seen as the processes by which the creative condition of inventing the new 'antagonizes the determinants of its production' (cf. Read, 2003, p. 91). As I show later, this implies that such an approach to creativity, enacted by differentiating itself from the current discourse on innovation, also means that this differentiation is in itself a reterritorialization of the capitalistic creation of value.

Instantiation of Capitalism

From the historical perspective outlined in this chapter, creativity comes into view as an economic reality emerging from the historical transformations of post-Fordism. In continuation, I argue that the rise of certain kinds of creative practices can be traced as symptomatic of this development or tendency within contemporary capitalism and its engagement with creativity. At the same time, these practices have the effect of contributing to such transformations through their use of the tools and methods of artistic creation. They appear as an enactment of new forms of production, while fostering the production of the new by reproducing artistic ideas within practices of innovation. In this way, the practices in question are not exemplary cases of such a

¹⁶ This development confirms Albertsen and Diken's (2006, p. 247) argument that critique is not a peripheral activity; rather, it contributes to capitalist innovations. The association to the artistic avant-garde in the '60s and '70s indicates an aesthetic critique of capitalism applied as a strategy for innovation. This might be seen as an indication of Boltanski and Chiapello's (1999, p. 169) argument that capitalism has found new forms of legitimation in the latter form of critique, which resulted in a transfer of competencies from leftist radicalism towards management. The movement towards flexibility, experimentation and provocation as means of innovation are then reconfigured into a capitalist logic rather than escaping its mode of production. Albertsen and Diken (2006, p. 247) quote Virilio and Lotringer saying that 'we are today 'condemned to nomadism, at the very moment that we think we can make displacement the most effective means of subversion'".

development; rather, the temporary relation to business in terms of collaboration with clients, funders and research institutions makes them look like interstitial spaces.

In this way, the historical development of new forms of capitalism becomes a creative condition of the future and not a description of closely integrated practices of innovation.¹⁷ That is, the practices are not taken as empirical evidence for an historical tendency or to prove that creativity is intertwined with capitalism. Rather, the study aims to investigate how the differential relations between creativity and capitalism are constructed and deconstructed within and through these creative practices.

This perspective, which proposes a particular form of metaphysics, implies that the idea of innovation might be considered as a process that renders visible the existence of the new economy as a particular configuration. Nevertheless, it follows that I do not consider capitalism *as* a metaphysical entity (i.e., Lash, 2007), one which transcends the physical exchange of commodities.¹⁸ Rather, I view capitalism as enacted within socio-material practices and their interconnections, which determine the way in which we think about innovation. The practices observed entail a processual configuration which renders the ‘objective’ existence of the economy as a particular configuration produced in and through the circulating patterns of de- and re-territorialization.

On the basis of these considerations, I develop the idea that capitalism is ‘instantiated’ (Thrift, 2005) in particular innovation practices. The cases in question are ‘in themselves’ capitalist practices that embody a certain socio-economic rationality. This suggests a perspective on innovation that is not caught in prescriptive models or objectively given realities (De Laat, 2000; Godin, 2006); rather, it emphasises the reality that is constituted in and through these innovation practices. These are arrangements

¹⁷ It is in this way that I view the innovation practices as ‘creative assemblages’. This notion has been addressed by Wilkie et al. (2010) in ‘Creative Assemblages: Organization and Outputs of Practice-led Research’. They suggest that the notion of creative assemblages should be seen as a methodological device to investigate the organization of creative practice-led projects. That is, as a means of understanding how practice-led research is heterogeneously composed as an ‘interweaving of practices, technologies, institutions, authors, knowledge and issues constituting the case studies in question’ (Wilkie et al., 2010). The term is also mentioned by Mar and Anderson (2010) in order to address the complexity of the collaborative contexts in which art production is entangled.

¹⁸ Lash argues that within post-Fordist transformations capitalism itself has become metaphysical as cultural values represent an abstraction of the physical exchange of material commodities (Lash, 2007).

that make up what we tend to think of as economics, arts, creation, capital, state, institutions, organisations, and markets.¹⁹

Compared to the literature on the intermingling of art and business, the dual construction of new forms of production and production of the new raises a set of interrelated problems or issues as to how to account for the 'new'. On the basis of this, I aim to explore the way in which strategies of innovation entail a process of social ordering mediated through the invention of aesthetic objects within various creative practices taking art as a principle of innovation. I follow the critical potential of the artistic ideas enacted within processes of innovation and the relations between capital and creativity that are at stake in them.

Conclusion

The focus on the creative industries and the attempt to merge the cultural world with that of business, or rather, to turn art into a profitable global industry, as well as the increased use of artistic tools to engage employees highlight different ways in which the notions of creativity and capitalism are seen as intertwined. In this view, innovation is in itself a multiplicity of different realms, which are enacted in different sorts of ways, constituting an assemblage of relations, attitudes and beliefs in relation to the production of the new. In drawing attention to writings on new forms of capitalism, innovation comes into view, not as a matter of the dissemination of new ideas or products to a predetermined market, but rather as affecting ontological change (Barry, Born and Weszkalnys, 2008).

In this chapter, I have paid specific attention to the entanglement of creativity and contemporary capitalism. In conclusion, this chapter can be considered as a two-fold contribution to the field of innovation studies. Firstly, I traced the intermingling of creativity and capitalism and, secondly, I mapped out the analytical perspective that

¹⁹ Heelas captures the dynamics of deterritorialization and reterritorialization saying that modernity was characterized by 'a number of differentiations' such as private/public, micro/macro, and postmodern dedifferentiation (Heelas 1998, p. 2). He claims that both differentiation and dedifferentiation processes are taking place within both modernity and postmodernity. Central to the transformation under consideration is the claim that postmodern differentiation and dedifferentiation operate in a new way. They are not regulated by grand narratives, whether these are narratives of religion, science, growth, human self-realization, Marxism, liberal economic theory or high art (cf. Chapter 1). The processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are then bound up with one another in that each can generate the other.

renders visible the role of the production of the new in the historical transformation towards post-Fordism. In this way, I have demonstrated that the increased focus on the creativity and the power of the market show that new ways of structuring the future have entered the economic sphere, and I have described how artistic creation has been considered as an integral part of the processes of production within contemporary capitalism.

The identified intersections between art and business, characterized as an assemblage of heterogeneous relations, explains a configuration of the social world and the forms of strategies that shape how cultural artefacts, new technologies and management processes come into being. By combining detailed attention to innovation practices with an equally developed sense of space, and by visiting a few of these practices, it might be possible to get a sense of how they operate in and through the dynamics of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. At the same time, I hope to contribute to critical studies of innovation by investigating the complex and differential articulation of the field of innovation. It is the methodology of such a study that I turn to in the following chapter.

3. Methodology: An Ethnography of Innovation

Introduction

Having outlined the conceptual landscape of my investigation of innovation, in this chapter I present the methodological framework for this research, an ethnography of innovation. In doing so, I explain how this thesis practically engages with the exploration of innovation. The methodological rationale was guided by the belief that art-led innovation can be better understood by participating in and observing how designers, filmmakers, and performing artists deploy the notion of innovation within a business setting. The object of this thesis is therefore interactive research-based practices utilizing art as a strategy of innovation. I present the artistic vision as it was enacted in practice by following, in a Latourian (2005) sense, the tools and devices utilised within innovation processes and the transformation of bodies and subjects.

This research has drawn on a range of methodological approaches including periods of observation of different innovation processes, participation in camps, labs and studio-workshops, as well as conducting interviews with a range of parties (such as partners, organisers, tutors, students, funders and clients). In addition, I draw on document analysis and literary accounts including the sources used by the practices to frame the artistic ideas upon which their innovation strategies are based. I have sought to find ways in which to explore the articulation of the various ways in which art and business were enacted within the practice of innovation. In doing so, I employ a theory of the assemblage as put forward by DeLanda (2006), Deleuze and Guattari (1980) and Latour (2005), providing a framework in which to situate the use of various methods and, at a descriptive level, to present the cases.

Firstly, I discuss the cases as connecting the fields of politics, art, research and business. I explain how these cases came into view as assemblages, comprising a set of temporary associations between institutions, knowledge practices and artefacts that constitute the innovation process. In this way, the artistic ideas that I follow do not pre-exist or have any pre-determined identity or functional definition apart from their actualisation in practice. In pursuing this claim, I follow recent discussions of ethnographic research, which argue that the field site consists of temporal events and relations, which cannot

be accounted for in terms of pre-existing physical sites to which the ethnographer travels (Atkinson et al., 2001, p. 9; Hess, 2001, p. 238). I draw out an anthropological account of the relational connectivity of the assemblage (Riles, 2001; Phillips, 2006; Strathern, 2004).

Secondly, I explain how this ethnography constitutes a ‘method assemblage’ (Law, 2004) conducted by the use of multiple methods in collecting and analysing the empirical material. I explain how this application of multiple methods allows me to consider the ethnographic studies presented in this thesis, not as representational givens, but as emerging empirical entities, emphasising different aspects of the complex nature of these processes of innovation. I present the methods which are used to facilitate innovation and, simultaneously, which enact the artistic ideas, in order to demonstrate the way in which the notion of the assemblage can be thought of as a heuristic tool within social science (Irwin and Michael, 2003, p. 113).

The duality between, firstly, the characterisation of the empirical cases as assemblages (‘method assemblage’) and, secondly the description of the ethnographic approach as ‘assembling methods’ constructs a critical analytical perspective from where I reflect on innovation as a practice that cannot be apprehended as an empirical object outside of the methodological frame which brings it into view as inventive (cf. Clough, 2009). To draw the chapter to a close, I discuss the sociological implications of this dual construction, as the analytical frame cannot be separated from its object of research.

Method Assemblages

My first encounter within the field of innovation was when I participated in a work-camp inspired by experimental filmmaking. The camp took place in the summer of 2007 in an urban film city over the course of 5 weeks. I participated in this camp as part of a summer programme related to my postgraduate studies within business administration. The team in which I participated was supposed to propose a business strategy for promoting the invention of an aesthetic object, which could be used to digitally transmit emotions across spatial and temporal distances. The camp itself was organised by a small-scale innovation company – a spin-off from a Danish film company. The filmmaking practice they took its inspiration from is associated with the emergence of a ‘new’ artistic avant-garde by stipulating a set of rules to be obeyed as creative constraints

in order to rethink the current state of filmmaking. The innovation practice facilitates creative processes using rules and constraints as methods of invention.

At a later point in time I re-encountered the artistic principle of filmmaking within the field of design where I participated in a 4-week design brief. The brief was set by an international telecommunications company and aimed at a group of Masters students being taught to practice a kind of artistic critique. The brief investigated the future of digital manners, which addresses the emergence of etiquettes modelled around the invention of new digital technologies. The project was organised as a research experiment taking place at an academic institution in London. My first encounter with the design practice was an informal interview with the professor organising the design brief. He discussed the release of *Anti-Christ* (2009) by Lars von Trier in order to explain the shared artistic vision between this practice of design and the filmmaking movement. *Anti-Christ* was taken as an illustration of a film produced to deconstruct any predetermined story that might be represented in the mind of the audience. In this practice of design, the invention of objects is meant to provoke and, thereby, foster critical awareness of social and ethical implications of new and emerging technologies. This is similar to the filmmaking movement that illustrates a vision meant to shock and, thereby, provoke a debate around the use of technological manipulation (i.e. the use of special effects and artificial props). In a similar way to *Anti-Christ*, the design object is not produced to fulfil a specific function, but to leave only cues for the audience to interpret. It is this shared artistic vision that was translated into guiding principles of innovation in both of the practices in which I participated.

The case of filmmaking illuminates how innovation practice uses cinema as a kind of experimental laboratory for producing ideas rather than objects for the screen. Film is not in this case merely ‘an object for perception and expression; it is the subject of perception and expression’ (Sobchack, 1992, p. 167), constituting a strategy for innovation. The idea of design, which aims to promote a specific kind of artistic critique, functions in a similar way by operationalising the principles of design, not to produce functional objects, but to test the social utility of design. These are both interventionist practices that construct social experiments in order to develop their artistic idea. In this way, the artistic techniques applied to foster transformational change within these practices become experimental data processing tools for the study of

innovation. Behind this approach to innovation lies the assumption that innovation studies have moved from a focus on the invention of functional or technological objects to the social itself becoming a resource of innovation (see Chapter 2).

Latour (2005) argues that in technological societies social change takes the form of an ongoing production of new distributions – marked by the proliferation of new connections such as the one between art and business. The organisation of innovation as a spin-off from a film company and as a design brief, as well as the examples mentioned in Chapter 2, exemplify how innovation emerges from diverse settings and is not restricted to institutional research environments. In particular, the work-camp and the design brief were constituted as an interim network of relations across different creative disciplines, political fields and businesses.

The innovation processes engaged a great number of people from a vast variety of fields as diverse as venture capital, academia, cultural institutions, governmental agencies, private corporations, design bureaus, self-employed practitioners, freelance artists, journalists and entrepreneurs. The design brief, for instance, involved a design studio, which consisted of two partners, also situated within the academic department in which the process took place. Furthermore, the brief engaged nineteen students, two external and two internal tutors, a range of specialized designers and artists and programmers for the brief, as well as academic staff and representatives from the client. Similarly, the film company employed six full-time positions and more than sixty people participated in the work-camp, which consisted of thirty nine students, administrative staff, artists, businesses, engineering and marketing professionals as well as script-writers, actors and filmmakers (producers and instructors). For the work-camp the different projects served clients as diverse as unions, political parties, large-scale medical companies, consultancies, insurance companies and publishing houses.

Both the work-camp and the design brief present a form of organisation with no stable relations, no stable amount of staff or employees and no fixed buildings to represent them. The company only exists through momentarily assembled relations that gather for the duration of the innovation process and do not have the spatial coordinates of governmental institutions, artistic practices or corporate businesses. However, this does not mean that these practices are not defined by stable boundaries but that they were

enacted in and through the innovation process. It is these processual constructions or boundary-making practices that define the innovation processes that I investigate (camps, labs and studio-workshops), rather than the practices per se. It is in these spaces that artistic creation comes to be associated with the displacement of innovation away from the centralised institutions of research, such as R&D departments or academia, as well as independent from national politics or macro-economic structures (Marres, 2007, p. 176). Following the cases, innovation came into view as distributed, happening in and through relations and not limited to the traditionally well-defined spaces of innovation (where the market has been seen to be what structures the invention of new technology).

The question is under what conditions can assemblages be recognized as sites in which artistic ideas are enacted, deployed or just played out. Within this construction the idea taken from filmmaking and design came into view as two artistic enactments of the notion of innovation. I investigate the way in which these practices form part of a network distributed by the nature of their temporary organisational structure.²⁰ The artistic vision also relies on assumptions and presuppositions determined by the way in which these practices deploy the notion of innovation. This observation provides a view from which to consider innovation as assemblage. The innovation processes are taken as locally situated practices, in which (global) capitalism is seen as an emergent dimension defining the connection among sites (Marcus, 1995, p.99) or, put another way, how sites are variously constructed in and through the connections in which they participate.

This ethnographic assumption is what Marcus (1995) refers to as the essence of ‘multi-sited ethnography’, which he emphasises is a consequence of the partial or fragmented form of organisation considered to be local and decentralised. This perspective is also captured in the concept of post-Fordism implying ‘the end of organised capitalism’

²⁰ The case studies are considered as ‘strategic fixations’ of a more relational and ever-changing dynamic field. The small-scale innovation practice, which at the time of my research was a spin-off from a film company, has now merged with other companies and forms an independent consultancy specialised in change management and game design. In this way, the cases conducted serve as partial fixations, which are observable manifestations of the operation of the assemblage (Strathern, 2004). In addition, I have to add that the comparison between the events and practices are mine. I emphasise a few examples where the cases speak to or about one another. Following Strathern, this is not to be understood as a traditional comparative study in which separate fields are presumed to exist independently from one another and to inform one another drawing out their similarities and differences. Rather, I draw out the way in which their relational construction in itself performs an industry assemblage (see Chapter 4).

(Lash and Urry, 1987) and replacing the macro-models of the capitalist world system. In light of the flexible specialization obtained through this mode of organising innovation (dispersed across time and space) calls for ethnographic research to be defined as an exercise in ‘mapping terrain’ (Marcus, 1995, p. 99) However, that is not to be understood in a representational manner, but in the Deleuzian sense of exploring the construction of its territoriality (see Chapter 2). I argue that the field is a dynamic one, which emerges in and through the different spatio-temporal configurations (such as camps, labs, workshops). These cannot be accounted for as long-lasting events to be observed (Atkinson et al., 2001, p. 9; Hess, 2001, p. 238), but might better be apprehended as a field site constructed by ephemeral connectivity or associations (Latour, 2005).²¹

In focusing on innovation processes as assemblages I outline an ethnographic study defined as ‘multi-sited’ (Marcus, 1995, p. 97; Hess, 2001, p. 236; Holmes and Marcus, 2005). The challenge for a study of innovation as assemblage is not to translate the field site into that of an isolated space taking the actors as members of a strange tribe, but for the study to form part of the research setting – enacted in and through a number of practices in which they are also situated (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). Such a perspective addresses the shaping of a research object without reference to an overall frame (such as the state, national politics or macroeconomic models) used as ‘contextualizing referents of research’ (Marcus, 1995, p. 103). In this matter, STS has manifested its importance in presenting the lab as a complex cultural and social time-space (Franklin, 1995). In continuation, Hess (2001) explains the transformation from the laboratory to cultural and interventionist approaches as a second generation of ethnographic studies. Defining a multi-sited field whilst rethinking time-space relations in ethnographic research means tracing a territory.

In what follows, I argue that the organisation of innovation operates *as* an assemblage; however, I do not, in a linear fashion, attempt to identify the existence of a specific

²¹ The object of study cannot thus be seen as the type of representational field site traditionally regarded as an object of ethnographic research. The definition of ethnography has conventionally been understood as ‘detailed, first-hand, long-term, participant observation fieldwork written up as a monograph’ (Macdonald, 2001, p. 60). Since the early twentieth century, ethnographic field work has been central to anthropology. Such work was usually carried out in a society different from the west and viewed as ‘a rite of passage required for entry to the ‘tribe’ of anthropologists’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 1). Traditionally fieldwork required living within the field for an extended period of time (over the course of a year or more), in order to document, interpret and report the beliefs and values integral to their way of living (Skeggs, 2001, p. 428).

assemblage taking it as a representational ‘model’. Rather, I operationalise this term in order to investigate the dynamic of the field and the relations which separate, connect and blur the artistic critique from the field of business. It is in this way that my approach to innovation is different from the more network-oriented methodologies which trace the existence of objectively given relations between stable entities. I outline a research design that is based on this methodological principle, as well as paying attention to its challenges and assumptions. In doing so, I consider the problem of representation within ethnographic research.

Techniques, Devices and Tools

Following an STS/anthropology informed ethnography, with Latour (1987, 1991) and Callon (1993, 1999) setting the scene, the focus is on the relationship between the paradigmatic experimental site, the laboratory, and what is outside of it – in this case the ‘real’ economy. This formulation relates to the innovation processes being organised as isolated from ‘real-scale’ markets (Mackenzie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007, p. 11). The construction of camps, labs, workshops, are all temporary constructions located in physical settings detached from the *outside* market. Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) study of Roger Guillemin’s laboratory at the Salk Institute showed how the existence of scientific facts depends on their staging in experiments. In this view, the laboratory turns into a creative-performative condition from where to stage ‘reality’ and presents the spatial facilities of the scientific lab as a facilitator of inventing the new (Latour, 1987; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). This comparison is supported by the fact that the creative practices that I encountered, borrow scientific terms, such as the laboratory, experimentation and investigation. These are then applied to artistic activities in the process of innovation, presenting the innovation processes as set within sequestered places of invention.

Similarly, Rheinberger (1997, p. 37) claims that it is the experimental systems that give laboratories their special character as particular cultural settings ‘where strategies of material signification are generated’. He argues that it is not the scientific or broader cultural terms that determine from the outside what a laboratory is. Consequently, it is *inside* the laboratory that ‘things’ (Rheinberger, 1997) are generated, which in the end gain the power of determining what it means to be scientific. It is also such ‘things’ occurring inside the lab that Mol and Law (2004) pay attention to, such as the X-ray, CT scanning and laboratory chemistry. It is such tools or techniques that Rheinberger

(1997, p. 8) defines as ‘epistemic objects’, considered to be constitutive of the material culture of the laboratory.

I adopt this vision of the object by viewing the tools for innovation as acted out by corporealities (physical presence of bodies) and materials, as well as the tools and techniques used within the innovation processes. The experimental setting of innovation includes techniques taken from the art world, such as crits, brainstorming, tutorials, and interventions (Greenberg, 1992; Simons and McCormack, 2007). These are techniques through which the experimental setting is both generated and also sustains its ‘inventiveness’ and, thereby, its ability to be considered as a site of innovation. More specifically, I pay attention to two such interventions that emerged within the work-camp and the design brief.

In the first case, I draw on my participation and experience in *Rumspringa* (cf. Chapter 5) that took place in the second week of the five-week work-camp. This is an intensive initiation ritual that lasted forty two hours, where the innovation teams were locked in a room without any information about the events to come. Furthermore, any kind of technological or digital devices, such as mobile phones, watches and laptops were confiscated. The teams entered an empty hall with blocked windows and a timer on the wall. Throughout the forty two hours the teams were led through a rigorous sequence of tasks accompanied by strict deadlines of only a couple of minutes. This event served to embody the artistic idea of filmmaking by imposing constraints on the participants in order to generate a process of ideation, that is, as a way in which to construct an imaginary space for invention where the participants supposedly would suspend *outside* reality.

Secondly, I pay attention to the *Berlin Street Experiment* that happened in the second week of the design brief (cf. Chapter 6). It was organised as a three-day workshop, which took place at the client’s headquarter. In this experiment the students were expected to set up spaces for artistic intervention investigating etiquettes around digital technologies. The approach for this intervention was characterised as ‘confrontational techniques’, that is,

encounters and situations the designer sets in motion that challenge social behaviour and render visible the practices of everyday life.²²

Both of these interventions were meant to violate unspoken social rules, to test the limits of a given social situation in order to question the taken-for-granted everyday reality. To understand the operation of these tools as devices of innovation I first introduce the structure of making and unmaking captured in the concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization (cf. Chapter 2). Again I turn to Rheinberger's (1997) investigation of 'experimental systems'. He posits that experimental settings must be capable of 'differential reproduction' in order to act as devices or provocative tools - tools that, according to Rheinberger (1997, p. 3), act as 'generator[s] of surprises' producing scientific novelties that are beyond our present knowledge (brackets in original).

An important task is to look into the processes that construct this experimental system as the driving force of production of the new. Both of these experiments (Rumspringa and the Berlin Street Experiment) were staged to test an experimental situation: to deconstruct normality, to destroy our familiarity with the world, which entails a process of deterritorialization.²³ The idea was to create an imaginary space as an exercise in 'reality suspension', to access affective forces of creativity. Thus, the task in this thesis is to trace the way in which the innovation practices themselves create, utilize and stage *affect* as a source of creativity. On the one hand, these tools were considered as constraints or obstacles in the process of ideation, and, on the other hand, they provoked reactions and responses (as when the participants warrant their right to defend ideas). I refer here to the way in which the participants strategically made use of the crits, deadlines and tutorials as resources to act upon (for instance by withholding ideas at the crits to avoid criticism from the tutors or client).

²² What comes to mind in relation to this experimental method is Garfinkel's concept of 'breaching experiments', which address methods in order to show how people react when violating commonly accepted rules and social norms (See Chapter 5).

²³ Deterritorialization is defined as *undoing of the world* (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, p. 13; 1980, p. 11), or the dismantling of any preconceived structures of the world. Deleuze talks about the assemblage as a 'provoked becoming of thought' (Tomlinson and Galeta, 1989, p. xv).

The Problem of Affect

The notion of affect has been defined by Massumi (2002, p. 3) with reference to Spinoza as ‘an “affection [in other words an impingement upon] the body, *and at the same time the idea of the affection*” (Italic and brackets in original). This definition gives rise to concerns about the status of the concept of affect in ethnographic studies, as it is then seen as resistant to any observation or analytical description. It is even ‘destructive to it, because it appeals to an unmediated experience’ (Massumi, 2002, p. 2). However, according to Clough, affect is not *pre-social*. She writes that ‘[a]ffect constitutes a nonlinear complexity out of which the narration of conscious states such as emotion are subtracted’ (Clough, 2007, p. 2). In this conceptualization, affect is not only seen as relating to the human body, but is also defined by the technologies that allow one to ‘observe’ affect. Artistic innovation entails, for example, the exposure or display of affects (such as pain, frustrations, stress) in relation to particular forms of artistic devices such as crits, brainstorm sessions, tutorials and artistic interventions. Such artistic devices can be seen to be inserted into what Clough (2007, p. 2) calls the ‘felt vitality’ contained in the pre-individual bodily capacities to act, engage and connect.

In this way, events like Rumspringa and the Berlin Street Experiment are not simply occurrences that incidentally deconstruct the made world, but occurrences that deconstruct the structure of making itself (deterritorialization). By investigating the notion of innovation through such experimental settings, these tools can be seen as ‘objects that carry new realities, new ontologies, with them’ (Mol, 1999, p. 75).²⁴ Thus, my focus on deterritorialization and reterritorialization reaches beyond the merely conceptual task. Rather, I draw attention to the techniques of innovation as affective tools of innovation that come into existence through the gathering of bodies and their subsequent transformation. As such, the artistic ideas are investigated through their material embodiment. Rheinberger (1997, p. 37) concludes that ‘a manufactory of epistemic things’ are being transformed into ‘technical things, and vice versa’. However, these are not objects that can be studied apart from the actions that they produce. Rheinberger writes:

²⁴ It is at the level of things or the focus on scientific objects that actor-network-theory (Latour, 2005) contributes to this ethnography by including human and non-humans as internal to the construction of an assemblage. The focus on scientific objects and the technical-performative conditions of their coming into existence locally situated in time and space.

The first I call the research object, the scientific object, or the “epistemic thing”. They are material entities, or processes – physical structures, chemical reactions, biological functions – that constitute the objects of inquiry. As epistemic objects, they present themselves in a characteristic, irreducible vagueness. This vagueness is inevitable because, paradoxically, epistemic things embody what one does not yet know. Scientific objects have the precarious status of being absent in their experimental presence; they are not simply hidden things to be brought to light through sophisticated manipulations. (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 28)

Rheinberger (1997, p. 4) defines the experimental arrangement as a ‘filiation of objects, not as pictures of an exhibition, but as records of the process of their coming into existence’ inspired by the ‘temporal forms of artistic production’. Considering artistic innovations as epistemic things means to follow their coming into being, rather than following the representations of these as objects in themselves. In doing so, I trace these artistic events and their means of affection within innovation practice. Put differently, I consider these as interventionist techniques or devices, which ‘act or they make others act’ (Muniesa, Millo and Callon 2007, p. 2). What is so important in Rheinberger’s view is to take serious the fact that such devices cannot be directly observed, but only portrayed in their vagueness, that is, in terms of their constitutive action.

The three steps outlined above – defining the experimental setting, its devices of innovation and their performative effects – point towards the field as a non-representational space. The field site is seen as being assembled through particular performances, devices and objects enacting the notion of innovation. In this way, innovation occurred as a temporarily articulated and traceable gathering. During this study I came to understand that an investigation of artistic tools and innovation involves a different ethnographic challenge other than directly translating sociological methods into the study of creative practices.²⁵ To achieve a measure of analytical distance where the field site is rarely remote or disconnected from the setting within which it emerges

²⁵ STS ethnographies of the laboratory have addressed the problem of upholding an objectively constructed distance towards the objects researched (Bowker, 2010, p. 123). Latour and Woolgar (1979, p. 40-41) describe the scientists they followed as members of a foreign tribe. In this way, the notion of ‘anthropological strangeness’ is used to explain ‘the activities of the laboratory as those of a remote culture and to thus explore the way in which an ordered account of the laboratory life can be generated without recourse to the explanatory concepts of the inhabitants themselves’. The notion of anthropological strangeness inherent in the definition of ethnography refers to the objectivity to which the process of observing foreign cultures gives rise. The principle applied is that even when the site is seen to be familiar, the participant observer must treat this as ‘anthropologically strange’, in order to make explicit the presuppositions taken for granted as an included member. It is in this way that traditional accounts of ethnographic studies have said to change the research object available for social studies (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 9).

(Hess 2001, p. 238) becomes an important issue for conducting an ethnography of innovation. This approach has been addressed as a post-structuralist turn in ethnography. It is a turn away from the ideal of ethnographic accounts as rendering an objectively given social reality (Marcus, 1995) and which also marks a shift from representation to performance (Mol, 1999, p. 77).

The methodological challenge of this thesis is to look at innovation from the point of view of the materials and devices that constrain and enable inventive processes and, thereby, the production of the new. It is important to note that I do not attempt to describe the experimental methods *as* affective or in a phenomenological sense to access the bodily experience of affect, but to find ways in which to account for the staging, performance and enactment of affect and sensation as specific artistic constructs. The problem of affect leaves us with a number of methodological issues to address when investigating the staging of such experiments. In what follows I explore the various methods used to investigate a field that is endlessly constructed and re-constructed in and through the performance of relations and the enactment of artistic techniques as devices of innovation. I describe the use of methods as they enabled me to grasp this mechanism in order to develop a sensibility to the changing contours of the field that I study (and in order to evaluate its affective-performative capacities).

Assembling Methods

I return to the questions posed in the previous section on how to conduct an ethnography of innovation. In this section I attempt to answer this question by explaining how I draw upon multiple methods in collecting and analysing the empirical material, which might in itself constitute a ‘method assemblage’. I operate from the assumption that different art forms and economic realities are interrelated – explained in the previous chapter as differentially constructed through the way in which various art practices deploy the notion of innovation between the fields of art and business. In order to analyse such a complex field I make use of various methods. It is in this way that I want to reflect on the notion of the assemblage as a practical-analytical tool within social science research, as addressed by Irwin and Michael (2003, p. 113).

‘Assembling methods’ is explained as the methodology of this research project – through a focus on multiple methods. The main ones include documentary evidence of

different kinds, such as participant observation, informal conversations and open-ended unstructured or semi-structured interviews. Such methods are considered as ethnographic techniques that access the participants' experience of the devices and techniques of innovation deployed. In particular, the display of affect (or its performative enactment) becomes important as a way of explaining the experiences said to constitute the strategy of innovation enacted and re-enacted within the work-camp and the design brief. This perspective allows me to study the performative enactment of innovation in practice, which is so far something the discourse of innovation has said little about.

Within the field of STS the notion of the assemblage as a methodological tool amounts to a study in which the empirical is seen as actively constituted out of relations between bodies, objects, practices, and words (Hess, 2001). For the sake of clarification, let me explain the notion of the assemblage in further detail. The assemblage has, according to Deleuze and Guattari, two sides – one of content and one of expression. The side of content has so far been explained as the temporary associations between a set of institutions, knowledge practices and artefacts that constitute the innovation process. The side of expression is defined by Deleuze and Guattari (1980, p. 88) as 'collective assemblages of enunciation', pointing to the reciprocity of acts and statements. It is this aspect of the assemblage that I turn to in the following part of this chapter.

Enunciation refers to the statements and signs that enable the articulation, and its simultaneous construction, of reality. Deleuze and Guattari write: 'An assemblage of enunciation does not speak "of" things; it speak *on the same level as* states of things...' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 87, italics in original). Enunciation is, then, what encapsulates or formalises the articulation of affect, which was also mediated through the ethnographic methods used. The notion of the assemblage acts as a heuristic that both informs my sociological perspective on the cases and does work as a strategic tool for analysis. This operationalization of the assemblage proposes ways in which to display the traits or patterns of invention.

Participant Observation

In the first case, following the artistic idea of experimental filmmaking, I draw extensively on the experience of being a participant myself. Thus, I gained direct access

and was not considered an outside observer. I worked on the brief set by a small entrepreneurial company – within a team of six other graduate students. As a part of the documentation for the client the process was recorded in written notes and photographic representations. I later reconstructed my experience of the work-camp in a reflexive research diary based on day-to-day events from the notes and results produced within the innovation team. One year later I conducted five interviews with the other students and four interviews with the practitioners who facilitated the work-camp.

Within the study of design I followed the project ‘Future Digital Manners’. On a daily basis I followed the process in the design studio and the public events, such as the project launch, artistic experiments and the various crits. These observations were also recorded in a research diary, which encompassed information on the experience of the innovation process as it progressed, e.g. control of access, specific events, adaptation to the studio or design environment and reflections on the research experience as it unfolded. According to Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (2001, p. 353) these are crucial ethnographic techniques for the way in which to frame and select the events of relevance for the further study.

In both of the cases, the ethnographic documentation was accompanied by ‘material dictionaries’ (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, p. 48), like sketches, drawings and graphs illustrating the progress of the process of invention as well as the emotional states the students went through during their participation. These objects as well as the objects invented during the processes are taken as resources of innovation.

I looked into the students’ diaries, sketches and prototypes as well as unpublished documents, including correspondence between the tutors and students (such as feedback letters, written evaluations of the process and applications of attendance). Furthermore, techniques such as written scripts, the use of props and then the artistic interventions helped to guide the analysis of such devices as ‘epistemic things’ internal to the construction of the experimental setting.

As preparation for the ethnographic study, I gathered data on the artistic idea upon which the innovation practices drew. I collected data from their web pages and

conducted a few preliminary interviews with the founders of these practices. Furthermore, I read published reports and articles on these artistic ideas and its reception in the media as well as doing research on the intellectual attention given to these practices. At a later stage I interpreted these secondary data as well as drawing upon internal documentation, such as business plans, internal emails, reporting for funding sources, annual reports, projects proposals and media sources. From this material I extracted the statements and terms used to describe the artistic techniques, tools and devices.

To capture the expressions and affective experiences produced and reproduced within the practice of filmmaking and design, the crits, tutorials, workshops and interviews have been audio-recorded and transcribed. Parts of these transcriptions, my notes and visual documentation in the form of photography were included as part of the internal documentary process conducted by the practice itself used to evaluate and provide rules, methods and principles for future innovation processes. However, the observations conducted in the case on filmmaking, came closer to an analytic auto-ethnographic account (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 159) based on my personal experience of the events.

The second case study was based on confidentiality and trust from the students and organisers participating in the design brief, and this was assured by granting anonymity to those involved (see the later section in this chapter concerning ethical considerations). Through the organisers and the tutors in the brief I was presented as a research participant and considered an ‘outsider’ due to my academic qualification as a social scientist and not a design student. However, due to my position as a non-British student myself, I was in a similar position in terms of age and lifestyle to the participating students and was, by the students themselves, considered to be ‘one of them’. This theme will be explored further in Chapter 6.

I have so far outlined this as an ethnographic study designed around the emergence of technological devices as tools for innovation or ‘epistemic things’. I have presented the way in which these tools can be investigated in and through their enactment in practice and the kind of affective and physical presence that was established. I have emphasised an explicit logic of association or connection among sites and objects that defines the

context of the ethnography. I take from Rheinberger's notion of 'epistemic objects' the idea of tracing things in and through their context – things that construct the multiple occurrences of the specific site. It is in this way that the crits, brainstorm sessions, tutorials and artistic interventions are considered as devices of innovation, which also enact the experimental site observed. These are the things that in themselves were to be followed.

Enunciation and Interviews

Following the innovation process and its constitutive devices from the *inside* I attempt to reach a sense of the field of innovation as experienced by the actors within it. Beside my own participatory experience I conducted a range of ethnographic interviews. This included nineteen interviews with key individuals within the field, such as the organisational staff, designers, students, clients and funders. Furthermore, I conducted five preparatory interviews with external parties, such as the founders and partners of similar practices in order to get a sense of the field. These interviews were two to three hour sessions often during lunch and in connection with a tour on the premises and a demonstration of the objects invented through these processes. These interviews focussed on the notion of innovation while the founder explained their artistic vision.

Inspired by STS, I draw upon the kind of analysis presented by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) in their treatment of scientists' accounts of research discoveries. They do not treat the scientific narratives as if they were transparent accounts of how the science was done, or reliable accounts of how the discoveries were invented. Rather, the analysis is an 'attempt to identify and describe regularities in the methods used by participants' as they make sense of the process in which they are part (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984, p. 14). Innovations are then analysed through the enunciations or statements by which they explicate the experience of affect. I compare the actual performance or exposure of pain, breakdown and crisis and how the students retrospectively reflected upon such experiences. My assumption here is that significant patterns can be observed comparing real-time events with past expectations and the retrospective construction of these events (Brown and Michael, 2003). This ethnographic method is used in order to gain insight into the temporality of the processes and the relations that extend beyond the duration of the practice itself. Thus, an ethnography of innovation informed by actor-network-theory has more to offer than analysing the attributes of a network (Law, 1999,

p. 4). In this matter I hope to say something not about the order of things, but about how its durability is achieved, that is, how things get performed and perform themselves into relations that are relatively stable, showing patterns of destabilization and fixation as they occur in the course of innovation.

The interviews conducted during the innovation process rarely happened within a formal interview setting – they rather happened as intimate conversations with the students as they were trying to make sense of the process in which they participated. Quite often they came to me to talk and very rarely did I have to ask them for an interview in the formal sense. This informed the choice of a relatively open interview structure where the participants were given room to direct the flow of the conversation and sometimes other participants would interrupt or add to the points made. By focusing on the experience of affect, I attempt to maintain a sensitivity to the ‘inner workings’ of such highly subtle devices of innovation. Said differently, I chose to focus on its performative potential in order to demonstrate its generative principle. Michael (2004) emphasises how the interview setting itself might contribute to ongoing processes of re-assembling, intervening, or co-constructing of the experimental setting itself (even in small mundane ways).

An aspect of this is to understand that it is not possible to interpret affect outside of the setting in which it was experienced.²⁶ Thus, the ‘actual’ enactment or experienced affect that emerged from the enactment of the artistic techniques and as a response to its effect were constituted (or re-constituted) in and through the interviews themselves. During the design brief, a few students came to me asking either to rehearse their presentation before the crits, or to discuss problems with an idea or a failed tutorial, as well as finding support in moments of crisis just after interactions with tutors or the

²⁶ Similar to Mol’s (2002) idea of performativity and enactment defined earlier in this chapter, affect is not to be re-presented but re-experienced. In order to understand this point, it might be useful to pay attention to the difference between affect and emotion as defined by Massumi (2002, p. 28). Affect is defined as happening ‘in the present’, an intensity that cannot rely on representation of a past experience, as it would then already have been consciously recognised as such. However, as soon as it emerges it will also be registered consciously. He writes (p. 31): ‘One “wills” it to emerge, to be qualified, to take on sociolinguistic meaning, to enter linear action-reaction circuits, to become a content of one’s life – by dint of inhibition’, which makes affect, again in Massumi’s (2002, p. 30) words ‘a lived paradox’ and leads him to the definition of emotion. This notion refers to ‘a subjective content’, that is, a ‘socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience defined as personal’. Massumi continues saying that ‘[e]motion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized’ (2002, p. 28). In this way, it might be said that the actualization of affect within the interview setting might be affect converted into socio-linguistic means of articulation.

designers. In the interviews, some of the students felt a more intimate relation with me as they were isolated from the rest of the participants. Very often they engaged in long confidential talks about their experience and the feelings they had while being involved in the brief. Other incidental conversations also took place, between me and a number of students, within the studio discussing issues around the innovation process and their mutual experience of this. In this way, my presence on the site came to be considered by the students as similar to the role of a therapist – that is, an outsider to whom they could speak without being judged or evaluated. A few students even expressed a relief after our conversations. Other students used them as a break or kind of ‘time-out’ from the pressure of endless evaluation and critique imposed in the tutorials and crits.

This ‘other’ function of the interview setting created a context from where the students came to make sense of the events, reflecting upon the critique from tutors and legitimising their actions to me. Defining affect as a relational construct allows the interview setting to be addressed as a tool which co-constructs the semiotic-material relations in which affect is enacted, acted upon and performed.²⁷ As such, the interviews came to be constitutive of the affectiveness of the process of innovation through their re-constitution of the experience of the event in my relation to the students.²⁸ Thus, the operation of the interview as an ethnographic tool opens up an understanding of the processes of making and unmaking.

The attempt here is not to seek truthfulness or to reach a kind of phenomenological-intentional experience – as if the student expressed their ‘true self’ in the interviews. Rather, I consider the interview itself as a performative tool, in line with Callon’s (1998; 2007) work on economic methods (which I will return to in the following chapter). His approach recognises that the economy is being remade by the tools designed to study it. According to Callon, the notion of assemblage is defined by its performance capacity. He writes that ‘the *agencement* acts in line with the statement, just as the operating

²⁷ The transformation in the enunciative capacity - from affect captured in the exposure of pain expressed in terms of anxiety, frustrations and breakdown to that of artistic suffering - is described by Scarry in her study on torture. According to Scarry, pain has no referential content – it is not in or of something, but is affective in itself. On the contrary, suffering has a referential context subvertible into language (Scarry, 1985, p. 11). The interviews constructed a context from where it became possible for the students to act on the affective experience, to articulate and, thereby, re-create it. In this case, the specific notion of ‘artistic suffering’ reproduces a stereotype of pain translated into creativity (cf. Barry, Born and Weszkalnys, 2008).

²⁸ This took place through my later interaction with the students (in both cases). Also personal friendships generated data from sources outside the formal context of the interviews, which are included as a part of the empirical material (see the later section on ethics).

instructions are part of the device and participate in making it work' (Callon, 2007, p. 320).²⁹ The articulation of affect contributes to the constitution of the performative devices or tools of innovation, the effect of which the students expressed within the interviews. Affect, then, comes to play a role as the interface which co-constitutes the *inside* and *outside* of the assemblage. The performance of pain acts by distinguishing the fields of art from that of business. The affective experience of pain and its subsequent reflection as 'artistic suffering' justify innovation as an artistic activity, rather than a business strategy associated with the capitalistic value system. Pain, breakdown and crisis become a performance that, according to a particular idea of what it means to be artistic, defines innovation to be existential rather than the analytical.

Such a differentiation is defined by Law as a process of 'othering' (Law, 2004, p. 84). The enunciative capacity of the assemblage captured in the performance of pain internally describes the reality of the innovation process but also defines its context 'out-there' (Law, 2004, p. 84). This is a process of differentiation, which according to Law, demarcates a field and its ethnographic context. Such a distinction between the inside and the outside of innovation practice is what Law defines as the method assemblage, that is, in this case, the way in which a specific relationship to the field of art and/or business is constituted and maintained.³⁰ It is necessary for an ethnographic understanding of innovation to be analysed in relation to multiple and complex contexts (Irwin and Michael, 2003, p. 30). That is, contexts reached through the different methods used to collect and analyse data, such as the ethnographic interview. The relation between affect and its 'objectification in language' (cf. Scarry, 1985, p. 5) is a methodological one mediated by the interview setting and my presence in the field. As such, methods like participant observation, note taking, recordings and the interviews are devices which make accessible the external world through the investigation of the internal working of the innovation practices.

²⁹ I pay attention to devices of innovation fostering a sort of externalization of what might be considered internal to the composition of the assemblage. Informed by STS, 'the notion of enunciation takes into account materialities: the context is not reduced to institutions, norms or rules; it is a sociotechnical arrangement' (Callon, 2007, p. 327). I therefore consider these notions more like enunciations than an actual discourse, which includes the consideration of 'things' and 'statements' in the shaping of a broader economy of innovation (Callon, 2007, p. 327).

³⁰ The connectivity, relations and limits of the assemblage are defined by the process of 'othering', where an 'out-there' reality is reflected in the statements enacted 'within' the innovation processes. Law writes that 'method assemblage is also about the crafting and enacting of boundaries' (Law 2004, p. 85). Put differently, an *inside* reality is enacted by the act of differentiation enacted a reality *outside* (cf. Chapter 4 and Chapter 8).

In summary, the cases descriptively brought into being as assemblages and their methods of assembling provide a few key methodological principles that serve as valuable points of orientation for conducting an ethnographic study of innovation. Firstly, the heterogeneity of actors and entities and the various realms they represent (e.g. political, academic, artistic.) are brought into play in the spatio-temporal construction of the innovation process. This leads, secondly, to the relational composition of these actors and entities, i.e., the way in which they deploy the notion of innovation. Thirdly, this refers to how actors and objects are affectively tied to the specific contexts of the artistic practice in which they participate. Here, I draw on Riles' (2001) notion of the connectivity of the field in order to understand the specificity of devices and techniques that are both mobilized as a resource of innovation and, at the same time, condition the assemblage in which they emerge.

Reality Seen Twice

Having described the way in which an ethnography of innovation comprises a multi-sited field study and how it diverges from a conventional anthropological study, I explain its sociological implications. An ethnography of innovation is not only conducted by observing the techniques and strategies used to facilitate innovation but also addresses the ethnographic methods applied as constructing an inventive research practice in itself. In this way, '[t]he writing engenders a difference between the unfolding and its inscription. In ethnography, the event is always doubled – its taking place as unfolding is 're-enacted' in a taking place as inscription' – that is, through its ethnographic representation, and vice versa (Van Loon, 2001, p. 280).

Debates on ethnographic practice have emphasised the idea that methods are seen to construct the social world (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997; Marcus, 1998). This is a concern that has also been associated with forms of anti-realism within ethnographic research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 10-14). So far, I have accounted for the dual construction of the ethnographic field, and that field's analytical tools were discussed in relation to the methods applied. I have argued that the phenomena of innovation are created in and through the affective-performative capacity of the processes studied and that this capacity is not to be considered external to the ethnographic methods applied. In the following section, these issues are discussed, as

well as the ramifications of getting access to the field, moral principles and ethical concerns.

Access to the Field

Traditionally, ethnographic accounts claim that first hand ethnographic observation depends on the accessibility to the different sites. Such a claim is based on a principle of transparency, a claim which Clifford (1986) problematises while arguing that such accounts of the social appear authoritative. Now, instead of just saying that the ethnographer can have direct access to social structures as a discrete object to be revealed in the light of social science analysis and its methods, Pocock (1971) says, 'the words used and the things or behaviour to which they refer are to be understood in their *relatedness*' (cited in Macdonald, 2001, p. 65, my emphasis).³¹ This approach to ethnographic field studies is preoccupied with how the social world might be understood as ethnography, rather than conducting social research around measures of descriptive accuracy and analytical adequacy (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 212; see also Riles, 2001).

In the design brief, access was secured through the innovation managers, who acted as 'gatekeepers' (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 63). Even though obtained, the access was limited to public events, internal workshops and crits. Daily observations were discouraged in the first weeks of the design brief, as were individual interviews with the students. This was explained as a matter of protecting the 'intuitive and subjective nature' of the creative process. However, access to further observations and interviews was renegotiated throughout the innovation process. Suchman (1982, p. 23) explains that such constraints of access and the ethical concerns described in the following section are a part of the data production itself; it should not simply be seen as an obstruction to efficient research. Rather, negotiating access can provide multiple views on the issues involved showing what is regarded as 'profane and open to investigation' by the practice itself versus what is valued as 'sacred or taboo and thereby closed to investigation' (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 54). The protective

³¹ Clifford (1986, p. 2) writes that ethnographic accounts 'reflects the persistence of an ideology claiming transparency of representation and immediacy of experience'. In continuation, Marcus and Fischer (1999) advocate writing strategies such as personal accounts and the use of dialogues.

environment and the distance assumed between academic research and innovation practice might reflect an expressive strategy of innovation.

Additionally, the intimate, private and secretive nature of these practices, justified by the intuitive and subjective account of the artistic process of creation, distinguishes the way in which the participants accounted for their own affective experience in practice – say, when students claim their right to defend their idea and projects presented at the crits or during the artistic interventions. Likewise, the relationship between the practices and my research constituted a major means of controlling the transparency of the research object (cf. Strathern, 2000). To investigate how these practices draw attention to themselves effected the assertion that ‘to perform is also to invent’ saying that transparency might be designed to construct the practice itself.³² In this thesis, the problem of access to the cases came to be considered as a methodological reflection relevant in its own right and is dealt with throughout the empirical chapters.

Ethical Considerations

An ethical commitment within ethnographic research is said to reach beyond pragmatically following prescriptive methods. Rules and guidelines, Garfinkel (2002, p. 238) argues, oversimplify conceptualisations of the ‘constitutive features’ of social practices. Thus ethical guidelines must aim to sensitise the researcher to the actual field, its context, in terms of a ‘situated active interpretation’ (cf. Suchman, 1987, p. 59) appropriate to the events encountered during the fieldwork. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 23) write that: ‘all research is a practical activity requiring the exercise of judgement in context; it is not a matter of simply following methodological rules’. Nevertheless, the fieldwork and data collection of this thesis was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines and codes set out by the British Sociological Association and the Department of Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London.

The principle of data protection (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001, p. 342-343) was applied in particular with regards to personal and sensitive information obtained through

³² Considerations on issues of transparency as it relates to the operation of power have increased substantially in recent decades, with the rise of the ‘audit society’ posed by Power (1997) and in relation to the points made by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) presented above. In this case transparent accountability becomes a matter of visibility and of legitimizing the process of innovation within contemporary capitalism.

interviews and participant observation. All interviews conducted with or within the innovation practices are based on informed consent from the individual research participants. In this context, Murphy and Dingwall (2001, p. 340) define anonymity as an almost conventional practice within ethnographic descriptions to protect the field setting and the participants' identity. Identifying features such as names, dates and places have been anonymised through the use of acronyms or left out to protect anonymity and maintain confidentiality with the participants involved. The second aspect of data protection concerns the technologies, prototypes and objects invented during the innovation process. In using these as empirical material, I obtained permission from the client to include these in my ethnographic descriptions as they had only been developed as ideas and sketches and would not represent the final solution applied by the company.

In the translation of the field notes into written ethnographic accounts, I made references only to the material published on the Internet, books or scholarly journals in order to provide empirical evidence of the cases supporting my arguments which analyse the artistic idea upon which the innovation practices are based. However, the ethical commitment of this research is not limited to the way in which this information may or may not inform and, thereby, change the practices and principles applied in the field, but also to the way in which this study was expected to legitimize the artistic ideas and methods of innovation. To gain access to the innovation processes observed, the founder of each practice requested that their original name and artistic idea should be mentioned within the ethnographic descriptions. That is an aspect that in itself encapsulates the expressivity of the field which I engage with in more detail in Chapter 4.

In writing on the experience of the innovation processes, I have chosen to name the participants according to their profession and a single capital letter to indicate a personal name. The letter serves as an indicator or rhetorical figure that visualises the operation of power enacted within the innovation process. This choice is also meant to indicate that the ethical considerations of the cases are not just reflections of external moral concerns, but closer to the ethnomethodological connotation of reflexivity, which refers to 'how what actors 'know about' or 'make of' and 'do in' a setting is itself constitutive

of the setting and informed by it' (Pollner and Emerson, 2001, p. 121).³³ This is what I observed, what I heard and saw, but also partly, as mentioned above, what they wanted me, the researcher, to hear and see, controlled through the way in which I was given access to the studio and the different events such as the crits, brainstorm sessions, workshops and tutorials.

Following the route suggested by the innovation managers – leaving the anonymity unprotected – provided yet another way to understand these practices in terms of the social world they create by such statements. In this case, authorship seems to form an issue within these innovation practices, as the artistic idea is used as a brand strategy promoting a certain idea around innovation. However, for the time being I want to draw attention to the way in which such a request emphasises a strategic choice controlling the way in which I accounted for the data produced.

Sociological Implications and Critical Perspectives

Given the exploratory character of this research, I have not attempted to quantify the result and responses from my interviews with the intention of drawing out patterns across participant groups, research sites or individuals. As outlined in this chapter, this study of innovation is an attempt to roughly map out the field through investigating the operational modes of a few creative practices drawing out their similarities and differences. The methodological issues and principles at stake serve as valuable heuristics for conducting an ethnography of innovation. More importantly, the notion of 'assembling methods' refers to an ethnographic technique operationalised through anthropological studies of practice (Marcus and Saka, 2006, p. 103).

However, being concerned with assemblage (the duality of methods assemblages and assembling methods) does not relate to the methodological frame affecting the object observed and changing the research setting as proposed by DeLanda (2006, p. 2). Rather, I claim that my ethnographic approach cannot renounce its own performativity. To explain this point, I follow Strathern's (2004) idea that the network is defined by its relatedness, which, as Phillips reminds us, is the very definition of the assemblage taken from its French origin 'agencement' defined as 'being-in-connection-with' (Phillips,

³³ For a more elaborated account of ethnomethodology and the notion of reflexivity, see Chapter 5.

2006, p. 108). Explaining the performativity of such an ethnographic account I refer here to the aim of following ethical conducts and moral codes, such as the principle of informed consent and anonymity. These are ethnographic principles applied to protect the dynamic of the field (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001, p. 343).

However, I take my ethnographic experience of the control of access, the requirement of anonymity (or not) and the transparency of the field also to comprise valuable sources of data. In doing so, I take these considerations to demonstrate the performative character of innovation where every statement about the assemblage is part of the construction of the assemblage itself (cf. Callon, 2007, p. 318). It follows, that the data are not taken at 'face value' (cf. Pollner and Emerson, 2001, p. 125), but treated as a field of inferences in which processual patterns can be identified. It is in this way the interviews are to be understood as objectifying the experience of affect in order to give expression to otherwise (subjective and intuitive) unarticulated experiences.

Furthermore, Callon (2007, p. 318) writes on the connection between expression and technique, saying that, 'the statement also indicates precise devices, operators, and operating modes which are not directly described but have to be describable ... In other words, the statement contains its own context. Rheinberger (1997, p. 29) also argues that 'stabilized epistemic things turn into the technical repertoire of the experimental arrangement'. It is in this way – drawing on both Rheinberger and Callon – that affect might be seen as a 'performative repertoire' used as a resource of innovation. In Rheinberger's (1997, p. 4) terms, it is an economy of 'epistemic displacement' that is at stake, which means that 'everything intended as a mere substitution or addition within the confines of a system will reconfigure that very system'. Affective experiences are enacted as diverse and multiple – dispersed in space and time, in particular re-created within the interview setting – assembling innovation in a particular manner (Law, 2004). As stated above, affect cannot be known outside of its constitution, and its re-experience in the interview setting becomes yet another affective experience that re-enacts the notion of innovation in yet another way. Thus, processes of de-selving are analysed via participating, observing and interviewing – while providing yet another context from where the participants might sort out processes of self-actualization (see Chapter 7).

Method assemblages indicate not only the use of multiple methods in conducting ethnographic research, but also the hybrid mixtures that make up the context itself, a context in which the brief, letters of evaluations and visualisation of the object invented etc. are also taken as ‘material traces’ (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 3) that display the meaning and representation of the artistic ideas. I investigate the devices of innovation as means by which the network manifests itself by affectively engaging or attaching the participants to a certain artistic idea. The processes I pay attention to internally define the spatial and temporal boundaries of the assemblage rather than externally demarcating their territory.

Assembling methods contests traditional accounts of ethnography by presenting non-representational events, and produces a context that frames and presents these events in particular ways (Atkinson, 1992, p. 17; Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2001, p. 353). Therefore, I have chosen a rather unconventional form of presenting the text in Chapters 5 and 6. Inspired by Mol’s (2002) work in *The Body Multiple*, I present the artistic idea of filmmaking and design in a subtext usually occupied by footnotes. I do so in order to create a parallel narrative to the ethnographic account. I could have chosen to present this in a ‘background’ chapter that would come before the actual ethnographic account. However, I decided not to do so as it would abstract the artistic idea from its enactment in practice and presume too much in the reading of the ethnographic events. The subtexts are written in order to underpin the understanding of the artistic critique as it was enacted within the work-camp and the design brief. They can be read as a separate analysis or alongside the reading of the ethnographic accounts.³⁴

What I have put emphasis on in this chapter is exactly the relationality of innovation, an aspect that I attempt to grasp by this dual structure of the two ethnographic chapters. In this chapter I have described not only how the research objects are empirically and analytically constituted in relation to each other, but also, how they vary with the methods used (Marcus, 1995; Riles, 2001). I have shown that the endless ramifications of processes and context, mean that the *outside* of the ethnographic context is produced in opposition to what is considered as inside and also to what is invisible to it (that which has been ‘othered’ according to Law (2004, p. 88)).

³⁴ In the thesis I have put interview quotations in italics for the reader to distinguish ‘direct speech’ from the quoting of scholarly literature.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have described the methodological framework and various methods employed in dealing with the challenge of conducting an ethnography of innovation. I presented the notion of method assemblages and assembling methods as a response to an overtly complex social phenomenon without simplifying or reducing the ethnographic study to that of the analytical perspective. The significance of these practices is not that they reproduce power by creating or recreating certain discourses, rather that they deploy the notion of innovation, which signals a change in the way discussions on, or rather representations of, affect find their way into the broader economy of innovation. The object is to analyse such enunciations like ‘artistic suffering’ through their affective response, which also acts as devices of innovation.

By describing the case studies, I have explained the way in which the innovation practices came into view as assemblages constructing relations and network formations across territorial spaces. I have, thus, presented an ethnographic account as a way in which to bring the phenomenon of innovation into being which does not take its presence as directly representable, but as performed in and through the relations of institutions, disciplines and devices. Attention has been paid to the overall research strategy proposed by the dual construction between a descriptive level – to account for the research object as method assemblages – and their analytical account. What this approach offers is an account of how the artistic ideas of filmmaking and design enact a strategy of innovation which, in a broader sense, might bring closer an understanding of the intermingling of capitalism and creativity.

To conduct a study of innovation as ethnography emphasises context and practice (Marcus, 1995). In this chapter I have defined the field as one of emergence and its context as hybrid, that is, as assembled not only in and through the practice itself, but also through ethnographic methods such as codes of ethics, moral principles and the interview setting. From this assertion, I do not objectively describe a territory external to or outside the experience of those participating within it. Rather, I explore how the external or ‘the outside’ is differentially constituted through the experience enacted by participants ‘within’. As such, the phenomenon of innovation investigated through method assemblages and assembling methods, amounts to a study where reality comes into view and is seen twice (Riles, 2001).

4. Mapping the Field: Performance, Industry and Differentiation

Introduction

As explained in Chapter 2, Porter is considered the founding father of the use of the concept of value and differentiation as a strategy for innovation. To be new to the market, to distinguish oneself from competitors seems to be the dominant strategy for innovation: what Kwinter (2001, p. 4-5) defines as the ‘becoming-ever-different’ – ‘an in-built wilderness’ that leads him to the definition of novelty. As shown in Chapter 1, this definition of innovation is relevant to the striving for a space of creativity and, more importantly, it is the way in which creative spaces are explicitly driven by an orientation towards effecting transformational change based on various artistic principles. One aspect of this is the organisation of innovation in accordance with appropriate functional or aesthetic criteria. In this way, the theoretical problem of inventing the new becomes a practical one.

Having set out the conceptual framework for my research on innovation in Chapter 2, this chapter moves on to the analysis of the creative practices introduced as examples of the entanglement between capitalism and creativity. I investigate the ways in which such creative spaces are enacted, by analysing the way in which they justify and evaluate the selection of the artistic elements for the organisation of spaces of innovation. While mapping such relations it is the performativity of innovation to which I would like to draw attention. Muniesa and Callon (2007, p. 184) explain that experiments perform by bringing things into being ‘by assembling them ... in a particular manner (in a particular site, through particular trials, and for a particular audience)?’.

In the course of this chapter, I look into the performances that delimit, and thus, stabilise a particular field and, at the same time, open up the possibility of investigating its mode of operation. The notion of performance structures this chapter in a twofold way. It introduces the key argument of sociological accounts of innovation which claims that experimental activities are instruments that contribute to the construction of contemporary economies (Muniesa and Callon, 2007). Yet, these activities emerge in and through the settings which they also perform (such as the market, governmental institutions and artistic practices).

Firstly, I identify and map out the terms and statements presented by innovation managers, providing concrete examples of how an artistic vocabulary is introduced into the economic sphere. I analyse the way in which they perform the process of innovation in relation to their external audiences such as clients, funders, collaborators and competitors. I do so by looking into the various materials and spaces in which these relations are discussed and negotiated, such as websites, annual reports (including mission statements), policy documents (funding proposals and later evaluations), board meetings and also interview data. I then analyse the vocabulary deployed in detail to identify overlaps, patterns and structures – again – in relation to a broader economic perspective. I argue that this vocabulary operates according to a strategy of differentiation, by negating any association, similarity or identification with the techniques and methods employed within industrial or corporate forms of production. That is, it operates according to a strategy that aims to gain competitive advantage which – as was stated above – is in itself considered inherent in the definition of innovation.

Secondly, I explain the way in which innovation is translated into experimental activities. Having set the scene of this operation and the categories through which such a setting might be analysed, I ask the following question: what is their credibility and how do such practices account for the value produced? More specifically, I look into the way in which innovation practice is both connected to and distant from the entities that they differentiate themselves from, such as industry, governmental institutions and academia. The activities organised within the experimental settings (such as camps, labs and workshops) bring together multifarious interests from educational learning, object design, research activities and strategic business planning to artistic evaluation. The innovation processes set up experiments that solve (or provoke) a problem set by the client, which leads to outcomes that are taken as a starting point for further actions within other innovative spaces, such as the funding institutions, the client's in-house innovation centres and R&D departments. Such experimental activities are characterised as 'trials of experimentation', which test the economic realities that are simultaneously differentiated (Muniesa and Callon, 2007).

At the end of the chapter I hope to demonstrate the way in which these practices and the different spaces with which they collaborate work in and through each other. The spaces described cannot be defined in and by themselves, but they are constituted by their relation to each other, actualised through a differential strategy of innovation. Therefore, these practices do not comprise spaces to be juxtaposed, but need to be analysed through their performative capacities, a perspective that frames the two ethnographic studies presented in the following chapters.

Setting the Scene

The pace of change in technological, political, social and economic affairs worldwide creates a clarion call for many radical safe spaces.

This is how a London based innovation practice states its mission of using theatre to organise innovation. The above quotation is taken from the webpage of this practice and expresses the notion of a ‘safe space’. A range of similar practices uses this notion in order to define a space of creativity based on a specific artistic vision that refers to inventing the new through the use of fiction. In what follows, I unpack the use of this notion and explain what it covers and the differentiations that it facilitates. The first example in this respect is from the practice of critical design where Dunne replaces usability with aesthetics and, thus, opens the discussion on innovation to the field of art. In *Hertzian Tales: Electronic Products, Aesthetic Experiences and Critical Design* (2005) Dunne proposes that:

The most difficult challenge for designers of electronic objects now lie not in technical and semiotic functionality, where optimal levels of performance are already attainable, but in the realms of metaphysics, poetry, and aesthetics, where little research has been carried out. (Dunne, 2005, p. 20)

The professor organising the design brief (which I present in Chapter 6) explained this quote as an aim ‘*to disengage from a world where industrial production defines reality*’. The professor will from this point onwards be referred to as ‘Professor A’. Putting these practices in connection with one another by comparing and evaluating their missions and their justifications of the use of fiction, the attempt to introduce an artistic vocabulary into the field of innovation is not only considered a rhetorical exercise,

marketing tool or way of promoting their practice; rather, the use of fiction to organise creative spaces is more specifically explained by the use of tools from filmmaking and role-playing in order to produce a speculative area – as Professor A said: *‘to imagine possible and impossible futures’*.

In this case, fiction is described as the ability to set up critical spaces that make it possible to speculate on how life can change. This vision was explained by one of the tutors interviewed during the design brief as an attempt to: *‘...create an experimental situation to be tested – a design for social exploration’*. Professor A said further: *‘...the fruit of the invention is some understanding or insights ... or design is a way of focusing the discussion in a way that a philosopher or social scientist wouldn’t do’*. Professor A referred to processes of co-creation, where the use of design, film and theatre brings forth a set of ideas that provoke different kinds of discussions. In this case, film is explained as *‘a subtle exchange of emotions’*... used as some kind of transformational process which can be explained as what *‘... makes us find an identity in a changing world’*.

One of the practitioners from the design studio said: *‘...we are interested in using design as a medium ... to ask questions and provoke and stimulate people, designers and industry...’*. Another designer added to the conversation that *‘we are exploring things that exist somewhere between reality and fiction’*. In defining the space of innovation, they also distinguish it from what are claimed to be industrial methods of innovation in order to reach ‘real’ experimentation. This is also shown in the design brief (see Chapter 6). On the project launch, Professor A said that *‘the project was to be presented with a semblance of truth to make people suspend their judgement about the implausibility of the narrative...’*. It is the notion of ‘imagination’ and the need to be ‘genuinely original’ that defines the activity of this practice. In a later interview, Professor A said:

Our practice is like a catalyst... I think the other thing that is important is imagination that is being neglected, you know, that to be genuinely imaginative can be quite scary, I think, for people – as when they see the fruit of imagination as opposed to commoditised imagination, where they only see reflections of the magazines, television or in the branding of landscape.

As if they were in direct conversation, another practitioner organising innovation based on the use of theatre and performing art (Director S) said in a different setting that:

... people are tired of lies from the media, politicians, bankers and so on...the truth is to get behind the news through evidence. And if there is a lack of evidence you fictionalise a story. Theatre is safe from censorship and provides a chance to mirror ourselves – to tell the stories that cannot otherwise be told.

This quotation also explains that a space of creativity is constructed in order to fictionalise a story and not as in scientific research to test a hypothesis. She explained this as a different truth-seeking exercise, saying that: *'drama reveals the truth by picking away masks and behaviours that conceal reality...'* She claimed that such artistic methods could provoke a 'suspension of disbelief', making participants believe in a story that fictionalises a specific reality which is to be creatively investigated.

As has been mentioned above, the methodology behind such testing is not meant to qualify or prove the truth of an already developed hypothesis. One of the tutors facilitating the design brief supported this idea, describing his mode of working in the studio in this way: *'I discover what I do as it happens, not like I have a theory, and, then, this is the experiment to prove it.'* In a document published by another practitioner on their webpage, it said:

Instead the art-world exposes a thesis, often as a provocation, for the audience to judge and draw their own conclusions. The logic of art has the ability and openness to accept the frame in order to break it, and to search for rules just in order to convert them. Moreover, the art-world dismisses the need to prove evidence of the rules, which can be helpful in the area of creativity.

Professor A explained the aim of the innovation methods as being to 'inflict strangeness', to 'provoke' as opposed to being a form of 'problem-solving'. One of the other designers said: *'...my research interest is in new contexts of innovation that reach beyond the market place, which obviously calls for new methods and new ways of thinking ... It expands the space from just the market to a critical space'*. In this context, notions like user-driven innovation, open-source and innovation are dismissed from their vocabulary as mere trends, not based on genuine creativity. Instead, it is the ability to break away from such notions, frames, regularities and assumptions around innovation that is valued. The ability to investigate innovation through critique is explained as being the essence of artistic creation and that which, according to the filmmaking practice, can be translated into valuable innovation. Equally, these innovation managers express a shared scepticism towards methods like brainstorming and the use of Post-it notes as being industrial

devices and, therefore, non-creative. Brainstorming is traditionally defined as a collective technique to foster creativity through idea generation. The idea behind this method is to free individuals from the constraints of analytical judgements and leave the critical interrogation for a later stage in the creative process.³⁵ The refusal of such methods emphasises the fact that innovation is seen as some kind of testing site, where critical interrogation is part of the artistic vision applied to innovation. Professor A said: *I think that creativity is hard work and not everyone can be creative, especially not original and creative, and you have to research, think and reject your idea, rethink, experiment and confirm and validate, all in a kind of informal sense*. The method of brainstorming is considered to be ‘consensus building’ and not ideation: *...It gets everybody in and everyone’s words are taken on board. But I think that originality comes from different routes, things that are genuinely innovative are scary, shocking and new*’.

Explaining how an artistic vision and being critical of the creative industries at the same time are used as productive means of innovation, Professor A referred to a recent project conducted with the internal research team from a high-tech industrial company. In this project, they used an artistic approach of design in order to explore the future of digital money, speculating on how digital money may give rise to *‘new forms of interactions, possibilities, neurosis and poetics*’. This project attempted to provoke thoughts while *‘addressing the mind of the client’* and not inventing just another consumer product for the market. A tutor from the brief on design explained:

... we do not come up with product ideas or service ideas. We try to come up with new ways of working at what they are doing. Like when we did the project on the future of money, it was to try to find a new perspective on that, so new ways of thinking that are turned into concrete media scenarios, prototypes, props, performances to dramatise and make them more interesting as opposed to writing some kind of report.

By suspending an industrial reality through the use of the tools and methods of art, the practice interviewed organise innovation processes according to this artistic vision, as distinguished from the rules and norms assumed within the industry, which are said to prevent and limit the sources of creativity. Instead they claim, as Professor A explained

³⁵ In brainstorm sessions a group work together to find a solution for a specific problem. Alex Faickney Osborn (1953) introduced the term in his book *Applied Imagination*. The method has been very popular in the industry as methods for creative problem solving. The two main principles rely on ‘deferred judgement’ and ‘reach for quantity’ (Osborn 1953; cf. Toubia 2006).

in an interview, to open up an ethical perspective or to look at its ramifications or possible consequences, in what they consider to be valuable innovation. In a similar way, a range of the managers claimed that they did not produce functional solutions; they aimed not to be identified with what they call ‘just’ problem-solving, but to be about ‘*questioning who you are and what you do*’.³⁶

In this way, the notion of safe space does not relate to scientific knowledge production (where a given hypothesis is proved true or false), but rather to situations of industrial or commercial testing, producing what they called ‘*open-ended results*’. In a test something is happening, but it is not quite for real – the experimentation is presented as a test of exactly these methods and tools of innovation. In this way, the processes of innovation I have observed and participated in are meant to provoke and test an external reality. The use of the notion of a safe space does not only demarcate a distinct practice of innovation, but also suggests the way in which these practices externalize an industrial reality – in order to set up a space in which it might be tested. Muniesa and Callon (2007, p. 165) have argued that this is exactly the distance that is normally maintained by the spatial formation defining the laboratory: ‘it is about setting oneself apart from the “world out-there” – or at least keeping some distance – and manipulating objects specially devised and configured for the laboratory’.

In the narrative so far described, innovation is staged as the making of realities in a complex process of imagination. The premise that these practices operate from implies a kind of realism, as ‘alternative futures’ are to be realised through the fictionalisation of business (see Chapter 6). The focus has been on the notion of a safe space, defined by Director S as a hybrid between the artistic, the non-industrial and the market. However, the connection to laboratory practices, drawing on Muniesa and Callon’s (2007) study of the experimental economy, will only suffice at the level of describing their internal differentiation from the market. In the rest of this chapter, I look into how the boundaries that are made between the innovation processes and an outside market equally condition the way in which the notion of innovation is being deployed in the broader economy.

³⁶ However, it needs to be said that some of these managers do also distinguish this practice of innovation from the field of art, differentiating themselves from the gallery space, museums and elitist association with the artworld (see Chapter 6). Rather it is a ‘functional’ application of art that is advocated in these practices.

A Non-Existing Industry

From the way these practices deploy the notion of innovation, the creation of value is defined in relation to film, art and reflexivity and not in terms of sale and business said to be directed by profit. Describing the artistic practice within the industry as a ‘viral anti-movement’ they do not consider themselves to be a conventional breakout, such as art-in-business or residential labs. However, the distinction between art and business that has been put forward so far does not in itself prove a movement. Instead, it indicates that these practices are associated with one another, if not directly by affiliation, then indirectly by their approach to innovation and a shared artistic vision. That is, the definition of a ‘safe space of experimentation’ is defined by reflexivity, aesthetics and metaphysics and externalise innovation to an industrial-functional reality.

In the rest of this chapter, I focus on this externalization of business as an example of a differential strategy, as an expression of how practices like the spin-off, the performance art lab and the design studio manifest and justify their existence in the wider context of capitalist production. In particular, I aim to understand how these practices are part of a wider network which is both connected to and differentiated from the creative industries. Professor A said: *‘we are not anti-capitalistic, but we are not industry-lovers either’*. The artistic vision is to produce or invent a critique of the capitalist system itself, instead of reproducing its circulation. This is practised by the use of art to fictionalise business in order for its logic to be experimentally tested. All of them are based on Manifesto-like statements such as Dogma95 and A/B the design practice (See the subtexts of Chapters 5 and 6). As Director S explained, their aim is *‘to express themselves and their mission in a new and emerging field’*.

The claim to produce the new within a safe space means to produce for a ‘non-existing’ industry, which is considered a risky process within the business world. Director S again said that *‘the process, much like the process of making great art, thrives on risk-taking and not-knowing – on the part of the artists themselves and adventurous funders’*. The question of what values are produced and what kind of funding can be provided for the organisation of the innovation processes was addressed by Director S, referring to a current project funded by Skillset³⁷, saying that: *‘they fund people, even though there are no jobs – they fund people*

³⁷ Skillset is ‘The Sector Skills Council for Creative Media’ and funds activities within the creative industries in the UK.

for an industry that is not there, which is weird. In a practical sense, I pose the question: how do these practices fund the promotion of a non-existing or future industry? In asking this question, I aim to explain how these practices are both differentiated from, but also connected to, an industry (broadly defined as the creative industries). In this way, these practices consciously destroy and then reconstruct the boundaries between art and business, whereby the practice of innovation can be said to territorialize the assemblage, constructing creativity as an integral part of capitalism. As Deleuze (1986, p. 503) argues: ‘Every assemblage is basically territorial. The first concrete rule for assemblages is to discover what territoriality they envelop, for there always is one.’

Such a map illuminates the operation of these practices, which are related to codes and signs that are not quantifiable and therefore not significant for the creative industries (which have traditionally been measured in terms of scale).³⁸ The value of the creative industries and their impact on the national economy are evaluated in terms of GVA (Gross Value Added), number of businesses, number of employments and their share of foreign sales/exports.³⁹ However, the artistic practices of innovation, such as the spin-off, camps, the design studio, as well as the labs cannot be captured or justified in terms of scale, as these practices do not have such a quantitative significance in terms of their size, income or tangible output. In fact, some of these practices have a charitable status and are not even issue-based, which means that they cannot be categorised in traditional industrial terms. Although these practices are of an artistic character, they are not unlike the field in which these industries are portrayed. Finding other means to justify this sector and its impact on the wider economy, the innovation managers indicate the emergence of a hitherto uncharted territory, a new emerging industry operating according to a logic of differentiation.

This industrial chartering is meant to render such a territoriality visible by analysing the way in which an artistic vocabulary is introduced to the field of innovation. This can be thought of as mapping a kind of grammar of business imperatives, an ‘industrial

³⁸ A lot has already been written on the creative industries, particularly in the UK, and statistical data have been provided and presented, especially from NESTA and Demos. These are institutions that I came across during my initial explorative interviews and conversations with people executing different kinds of creative practices or innovation strategies within the EU.

³⁹ For instance, in the UK in 2006 the GVA of the creative industries was estimated at £57.3 billion representing 6.4% of UK GVA. The sector is a major employer, employing 4-6% of the UK's working population. These numbers and their presence in the public discourse on innovation are an example of institutional justification.

archipelago' (Arditi, 2003), where a new territory is marked out or rather performed by certain practices which are intimately bound up with new sites of action (such as the formation of camps, labs and workshops). This is a method used to map the structure of the field of those innovation practices that operate in similar ways. This means that from 'overlapping "manners of speaking and ways of seeing"' (Conley, 2007, p. 11), a map or a sense of direction can be conceived.

Incubators of Innovation

The creation of safe spaces indicates a research strategy where fiction is used as a tool to suspend an industrial reality or – as Professor A would put it – to create a speculative era. In order to understand this logic in more detail, I look into the specific narrative created around the funding structure. Additionally, in terms of the issue of funding, the practices observed like arts lab and the design studio take advantage of the art-world by copying a logic of commissioning where different grants or investors fund only parts of the processes or projects. Professor A said: *'The funding for all of us is really non-commercial, it comes through grants, which are only small grants, so we fall between academic funding and arts council funding and NESTA type funding'*.⁴⁰

In 2009, I attended the board meeting of the practice organising the art-labs. The future strategy of the practice was discussed. The organisation of a money lab was designed to serve as an internal research process to overcome the problem of future funding, which was threatened by the recent cuts in the public research sector within the UK (cf. Chapter 1). The lab was designed to address the issue of 'intelligent funding' investigating the cultural, poetic and social perspectives on money. The aim was to bring people together in order to investigate money as something different than as financial investments. In this way, money or the issue of funding is not only considered as a means to an end, as an external requirement outside the practice itself, but provides the very themes and issues to be tested within the labs.

Another point to draw from this is the fact that the funding structure includes a wider logic of organising innovation and collaboration between the different creative sites,

⁴⁰ NESTA is the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts. It is a charitable organisation promoting innovation by providing grants and investments mainly to support the creative industries in the UK.

practices and processes. The funding is not only an outside relation providing financial resources either through public institutions or private investors. Professor A described his practice as a ‘platform’ that captures and facilitates what happens in these different spaces. Director S similarly described how each innovation lab facilitates *‘discussions between policy makers and artists and scientists, for the producing of innovative ideas supported by practical production’*. Professor A further explained that their ‘fuzziness’, ‘creativity’ and ‘imagination’ are what differentiates them from academic institutions and funding bodies, such as the Royal Society, the Wellcome Trust Fund, the Arts Council of England and the EPSRC⁴¹. The representatives from these institutions explain that what they gain from supporting these innovation processes is some kind of ‘fresh thinking’.

Each of these innovation processes is claimed to be a research exercise generating new insights and understandings that are being explored in the next lab. This is based on what Director S defined as ‘intelligence gathering’, that is, the gathering of accumulated intelligence on their internal innovation processes. Director S explained:

My job is to be a researcher, I am keeping my ears open and picking up things. We gather knowledge the whole time. Our intelligence gathering informs our decisions about what to do next every time ... It is a continuing exchange of intelligence from practitioner to practitioner and then to us.

So the policy-making in these practices (or the strategy implemented) is explained as being ‘artist-led’, informed by practitioners who are producing artworks applied to other collaborative fields. Director S also explained another lab as being constructed through internal research processes – similarly to the money lab:

The [Art of Enquiry Lab] was designed to support our own R&D process. Nineteen artists and arts practitioners and one scientist came together to interrogate their own questions about issues that challenge them in relation to their practice. We explored questions around yet-to-be-invented Lab programmes. This experience informed [Art Lab’s] strategic thinking for our future. It inspired us to commission three of the participating artists to develop three new Lab programmes with us. These commissions increase our capacity to generate strong new Lab programmes while keeping a small and agile core team.

⁴¹ EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council) is the main UK government agency for funding research and training in engineering and the physical sciences.

One of the other practitioners explained this organisational structure as a ‘scratch’ methodology, as being a part of its ‘*ladder of development for new work guided by an artistic vision*’. Director S differentiated her practice from such courses as the Clore leadership programmes, which host two week residential programs for cultural leaders: ‘... *even though they teach a course and try to preach a message for business based on the experience of artistic creation, which is not innovation...*’. On the contrary, Director S described the practice as ‘accumulating knowledge’, where the students, collaborators, tutors, clients and funders not only participate, but also define the processes in which they participate structuring their own activities. Director S explained that the participants all have a stake in the process of innovation and are therefore not paid. She said:

People are engaged, so they continue to challenge the status quo of their practice and the context in which they work after the lab... we are not trying to preach or submit a message to an audience, but to explore ways of engaging people’s imagination or intellect.

The strategy of intelligence gathering that informs what they do next is defined by the activity of the participants. One of the tutors in the design brief explained that the process with the students is very interesting and surprising, as it depends on the participants attending the specific process. In this way, they see the students as their internal research team.

Spatial Prototypes

The innovation process functions as a testing of problems, as a way of posing the problem to be redefined, explored and investigated as conducted within practical experiments, such as the work-camp or the design brief. The processes have a dual aim working both as a testing site for business as well as an internal research process, in which the innovation managers define their own projects as they explore the notion of innovation. Director S explains this saying: ‘*We co-explore this way of working with institutions as well as examining the legacy for collaboration*’. In the annual report from Art Labs 2010 it says: ‘*[Art Labs] researches, designs and delivers experimental Labs with artists, scientists, educationalists, cultural policy makers and other creative individuals that are a catalyst for innovative thinking and collaborative practice.*’

These practices claimed that their innovation program was a ‘lived experience’ and in a publication uploaded on their homepage, the partner from the spin-off (Partner W)

draws on Engeström's (1987) organisation theory, saying that '*... innovation is a craft, which can only be achieved by doing, as a kind of learning by expanding ... it is a creative process in which the entire person, that is, body and soul has to be involved*'. The process of innovation is considered subjective and intuitive, depending on personal attachment, and not as a program or a set of specific rules to be taught and later applied within business. It requires the client to be part of the experience of 'being there'. They claim that the creative process is 'highly intensive and edgy' and that it is fostered by 'a disruption of normal practice'. Director S explained her facilitation of innovation processes as depending on an '*intangible ingredient of alchemy, best explained by those having experienced it*'. The notion of involvement is both what is being used to gather these innovation processes, and also what is being tested within the processes themselves. Partner W said: '*To us the key word is involvement, which creates ownership and commitment. Involvement is the driving force that brings on successful change.*' The aim to fictionalise reality in order for it to be experimentally tested is performed as 'involvement', 'suspension of disbelief' or 'interactivity'. This is similar to what Muniesa (2011, p. 30) has defined as 'the case method of instruction in business administration'. He claims this method is to enact a business situation, 'living it almost for real, that is, in a very realistic fashion'.

The processes might be characterised as 'experimental trials' in which their active possibilities, feasibility or marketability are being investigated. Writing on 'experimental trials', Callon, Méadel and Rabeharisoa (2002) claim that an altered problematisation is often produced as a result. These processes are said to enlighten the company to direct its businesses towards the future, helping the company to reorient their own perception of reality. The funding structure is not considered as external to the process of experimentation – rather, they have to buy into a world by investing their own physical presence. Muniesa says that: 'The reality of business is, rather, rendered in terms of the reality of 'mental courage', of the making of a vital, psychological and exciting act of decision in the face of uncertainty' (Muniesa, 2011, p. 30). The use of art to fictionalize business serves to deconstruct old structures in order to let the companies and clients reinvent new ones themselves through interactive processes of innovation. This creates the feeling among the participants that they have facilitated the invention themselves taking complete ownership of the ideas and creates a commitment to the aesthetic principles applied.

The practice of innovation is made up from performative capacities that reconfigure relations between users, clients, funders, competitors and collaborators. Not only do the funders also act as the users or consumers, but the clients' participation within the innovation process means that they also act as tutors. These innovation practices operate in highly ambiguous spaces and times; it is not clear what outcome, if any, their processes (or experimental activities) will produce. There is no clear account of what will happen or what they are doing, but there seems to be a confidence to invest in this uncertainty. Not only do the funding bodies set the brief to be tested, but they also act as clients said to integrate a modified version of these innovation processes into their own organisational structure. Director S explains how she sees her internal research process as informing the practices funding them:

Each time we try out new and different elements – identify the elements that might work – like a pilot study where we identify the problems and difficulties, ways to address these and then to test them . Then people will go out and do it themselves.

The intended product of these innovation processes is considered to be the labs themselves and not the objects, strategies or solutions that are invented within the innovation processes, which are if not quite incidental at least not central. The client has to buy into a world and not a 'packaged programme' considered as a consumer product. The processes are not 'packed, branded and sold'. None of the outcomes are proven and tested in defined models. Furthermore, the labs are said to be 'pro-prototype platform innovations' (Director S). Director S explained that most of the work is pre-commissioned by funders who want to test strategies of collaboration before implementing these into their institutions at large expense (which is also the definition of a safe space). The rigorous logic of the processes and the processual model, Director S explained, means that each lab has to be a 'testament' to the different artistic principles or methodologies tested across disciplines.

An important aspect of this was elaborated by Director S, claiming that a four-year funding program from NESTA affected the establishment of their own in-house lab, such as the 'FutureLab Initiative' and the 'Connect Programme', which support innovation through what they call '*extreme collaboration*'. These programmes are all of a similar character to the labs run by Director S during the time when her practice was funded by NESTA. In the same way, such practices are both differentiated from – and

connected to – such places as the Helen Hamlyn Centre at the Royal College of Art and the InnovationRCA. These are all places that represent the networks which both participate in and fund the innovation processes. The practice of innovation acts as a platform that brings together spaces that were not connected before in order to ‘test the basic grammar of interactivity’ (Director S). In this way, networks of practices, devices and processes of innovation are said to migrate into funding bodies, private corporations and governmental institutions, but without being an established part of these.

To sum up, these practices are performed by the innovation managers as ‘research engines’, acting as incubators of innovation within the wider field of the creative industries by facilitating processes of ideation before these get implemented into a market or an organisation. They view themselves as research practices more than as corporate entrepreneurs, constructing experiments for their own internal development of processes of innovation. The innovation processes (labs, workshops and camps) are funded and copied into the institutional setting of such larger organisations as NESTA. In this way, innovation is presented as processes of self-reproducing prototypes.

Performing Authenticity

Having defined the multiple spaces in and through which the field of innovation is performed, I have left out an important factor – the academic context of innovation and its relation to scientific research. Before moving further into the analysis of this relational construction of the field of innovation by defining its performative capacities, I draw on my own participatory experience in accessing the field of innovation – that is, how my presence as a social scientist affects the performativity of such spaces.

One of the first interviews I conducted was with Practitioner N, who was recommended by Partner W. The interview focused on my research interest in innovation and the practitioner seemed slightly interested. He emphasised that his interest would be in the practical side of my work, as he would like to know more about the spin-off and their methods of innovation. I then started to explain my experience of participating in the work-camp and the way in which it had informed the practical side of my academic research, naming the filmmaking movement and the name of the film instructor initiating this movement. In the middle of the sentence he stopped me and said ‘*Sorry,*

this is interesting. Let me get my secretary. I want her to listen to this too? After a few minutes, the secretary entered the room and asked if she could record our conversation. I was then included as a practical researcher contributing with my practical experience from the work-camp and informing their internal research on facilitating innovation. This weird experience of being the one recorded and interviewed changed the set-up, as if I was the one who was supposed to inform their experimental research process by providing data for the next process. I was included as a part of their performative capacity, turning the interview setting into an exploratory system (which contributed to the process of intelligence gathering).

Defining innovation as a 'living experience' dependent on the involvement of the participants and the presence of the funders in the process, which they also commission, means that every participant has to be actively involved. Director S emphasised that the labs should not turn into events that serve as objects of academic research. When I asked for permission to investigate the money-labs, which were in preparation at the time of this research, Director S explained:

We only allow people into the labs who contribute with tangible outcomes and who want to challenge their own practice. Therefore, we do not allow observers or anyone else who doesn't contribute to the collaborative process. I want you to consider what your contribution would be.

All of these practices reject observation from any kind of researcher or academic who is not also an artist or entrepreneur who participates in the labs, camps or workshops. This insistence points to aspects of authenticity, which I explore in the following section.

While discussing the opportunity of collaboration with the spin-off, Director S called Partner W, who once participated in one of her labs. They both tried to convince me to observe another innovation process called 'CultureLab', which was being organised as an internal research institution at Newcastle University in the UK. In this way, I was suddenly being treated as internal to the construction of their labs, i.e. as acting as part of their operation as a means by which they could gain information on other practices that run similar processes. Director S said further on the subject of the collaboration with the spin-off: *'I want to know from your thesis how they think'*. Later that day, Director S considered the opportunity of collaborating with the spin-off on the future labs. Then

she said: *'If [Partner W] sends you here to spy on our processes he can forget about it!* Not only did I feel like an integral part in the extension of their work, I also came to be included as a mediator of their internal competition.⁴² They wanted my research to legitimize their practice within an academic context and in return to gain insight into other ways of organizing innovation processes. One might say that I was being differentially included as *one of them*, which also involved an effort to exclude the others.

When discussing this issue, Director S took the opportunity to distinguish her practice from the spin-off by emphasising the difference between her labs and their camps. She said on the use of rules to impose constraints on participants: *'I think it is cruel, if you look at [the spin-off], everything out there is cruel...I would never lock people in a room.'* Director S emphasised that her vision of innovation was different from the filmmaking practice that the spin-off used as a tool of innovation. She continued:

I do things very differently from the [filmmaking] process and the structured rule-based process. I provide no rules and I do not impose any structure on the participants. I am not someone who is able to create ideas, which I do not believe can be done by imposing a structure. I have no religious belief in creativity. Some people believe in it as a gift from God that they have to impose on other people as the only way of doing innovation.

This differentiation – or internal competition – was a chance for her to emphasise her artistic ideal performed around the notion of ‘authenticity’, as opposed to cynicism and provocation. Instead, she claimed that the environment she builds for the labs is protected by rules based on confidentiality and that it therefore creates a free and protected atmosphere – *'pure exchange, generous and trusting exchange of ideas and knowledge, that happens naturally on a need to know basis'*.

These examples do not only serve to illustrate the competitive relations or difference between these processes and practices of innovation, but more importantly, the way in which these differences are means by which the founder and organisers perform themselves as artistic inventors authorising specific artistic ideas, such as design and filmmaking as means of creativity.

⁴² See Simone (2010 p. 325) on how collaboration leads to competition and comparison and thus value judgements.

In the interview after the design brief, Professor A explained his relation to the notion of design, claiming it was not a label that the students can apply or a frame that they must obey: it is not a discipline. Again, a claim to authenticity is performed. Professor A said that:

In schools, [design] gets misinterpreted, it gets misused and dramatically reduced to non-practical design and becomes an excuse for everything that does not solve a problem. The students should therefore be critical of critical design; that is healthier. I am now writing on [design] to clarify it from other critical activities and I don't want the students to get tangled up in it.

The two specific configurations of such authors are the 'design genius' and the 'eccentric film instructor', which attract, or have an appeal, to business. The people who are engaged in the innovation process collectively enact the performance of such individuals. The spin-off organising innovation in concert with the creative application of the film-manifesto consider themselves a part of the company, participating in the rituals and culture of this company, such as the singing of Christian hymns, skinny dipping and gatherings in the sauna and other characteristic events. The participants have all been involved in the filmmaking, in one way or another, such as being a script-writer, game designer or artistic curator. The other enactment concerns the notion of design, which depends on Professor A's artistic vision of employing every one of the other facilitators, controlling the re-interpretation of the design concept, which is applied by staging himself as the inventor.

Those individuals frame the rules and keep together the network, creating a specific attraction for the businesses and funders who are engaging in these processes – a performance akin to those of the management guru (Heelas, 1996) and the genius artist (Barry, Born and Weszkalnys, 2008). In spite of the dependence on the performance of specific charismatic individuals, the practices claim that they never take ownership or copyright of the elements defining the structure of the processes. Partner W said '*we give copyright to the people*' and that '*ideas only live on by being shared*'. These processes might live from this sort of 'generosity' attracting private investors and public funding. One might even say that the innovation methods are protected or are held together by the charismatic performances of specific individuals.

As has been explained above, funders come to the labs for its tools and methods, which are to be disseminated at a later stage. The practices never do the same lab twice, but inspire people to do their own versions of them. In this way, the processes are never repeated in a completely similar manner as copies. Director S described their role in terms of aiming to make themselves redundant: *'we design, document and form prototypes for viable outcomes and ingenious applications through creative teamwork.'* As soon as one lab is implemented in an institutional context, that institution stops funding the processes and the innovation practice moves on to organise other kinds of projects. This presents an innovation strategy that is 'invested-in' and simultaneously 'bought-out' by other innovation environments.

These are processes transported by the promise of generic creativity held together by charismatic individuals. In relation to organising these processes, Director S said: *'... it is the who-you-know network... it is a network that creates a bureaucracy of its own'*. Innovation is based on the performance of affective relationships and having their own hierarchies and criteria played out between them. *'Each lab is research for me, I look out for interesting people to build up relationships over time'*. She said further: *'We build a matrix of people'*. The processes defined as spatial prototypes produce a feeling of connectedness or authenticity, which serve to legitimise the organisation of innovation. This is supported by the fact that innovation, in these cases, is limited to specialised spaces – between the stakeholders who are often defined by the funding context and do not travel into mainstream news channels or media.

From the description of the funding context and my experience of being performed in and through this context, the contours of an industry start to emerge. Funding is considered not only as a means of gaining financial support but as a means of connection, exchange and competition. The meeting with Practitioner N showed that I was not supposed to be the one to narrate the story of innovation, but the one to be observed. My role as an investigator was turned inside-out. To grasp the way in which I was also performed as the mediator of their internal competition, Clemens Thornquist's words are particularly pertinent. He explained to me in an interview on the Rob Wilson practice that *'they use academia as an obscure mirror'* (Interview London 2009). These practices produce spatial prototypes, which are not fully replicable (not a developed method to be implemented in a context outside the space in which it happens), but

which operate as an effectuation of innovation that re-enacts parts of the reality negated. The spaces considered external to the practice of innovation, such as the funding institutions, academia and business, provide a structure from where the practices enact their own internal research process testing methods and devices of innovation and, thus, turning the assemblage inside-out (Riles, 2001).

An Expressive Strategy

The innovation processes are considered as prototypical structures; however, they take place in the course of an alteration where the process is always different from itself – always in a temporary construction that is ready for change and is never fully articulated or developed into a model. So far I have explained the notions and terms that are used by these practices to present themselves. I have provided a sense of how performative capacities are also constructed in and through the audience addressed in the articulation of innovation. The operational modes of these practices produce relations by differentially distinguishing themselves from the market and their competitors. From the overlap of the terms used to define these practices of innovation, it seems as if they constitute a distinct vocabulary that operates according to a mobile and multi-purposive logic of differentiation. Funders and competitors are differentially included, which means that they are also constructed in and through the articulation of such difference.

Looking into their funding structure, the artistic vocabulary applied by these practices also appears on the webpage of the funders. NESTA, for instance, made a clear statement about the purpose of funding the Art-labs, saying that *'it is a unique artist-led process which evolves the piloting, making and launching of ideas'*. The fact that the labs are mentioned on their webpage and the follow-up marketing report evaluating the four years funding shows that it also plays a part in performing or expressing the funder's own capacity for innovation. In this case, it seems as if the terms that are used to describe the practice of innovation are to some extent 'owned' in and through the funding contexts. This means that the outside market determines or performs the valuation of these innovation processes by affecting the internal configuration of creativity and innovation. I explain this in the following section by considering the ways in which these practices account for the value created within the innovation processes (or what outcomes are produced).

The significance of these practices is not that they reproduce power by creating or recreating certain discourses. On the contrary, I argue that their methods and politics (critique) are performative. Callon (2007) suggests that performativity is ‘co-performance’, highlighting the collective aspect, as well as the fact that performativity is an activity, not just a property of statements. The collective aspect of enunciation relates to the relations that these practices either create or destroy in their articulation of innovation, that is, how these practices strategically connect to the notion of art and of business. The organisational self-image of these innovation practices, enacted through an artistic vocabulary, possesses, like a map, a ‘language’ of its own that does not pertain to a linguistic field of study. This study does not belong to a study of language structure or grammar, but provides a semantic space defined by Law (2004, p. 69) as materially produced through words and concepts, signs and symbols. It is a way in which a grammatical structure of what can be said and what cannot be said is produced. This is not a language form but a performative structure that reaches a particular audience defining an industry of innovation.

A further point in this performative structure is to consider not only the content of what was said, but also the way in which it was said. To elaborate this point, I consider the literary forms by which these practices present themselves, including funding proposals, annual reports and evaluation material, as well as board meetings.

Firstly, I turn to the role of the students and the ways in which they were performed as innovation assets. Constructing the innovation processes as experimental trials by using the students as internal researchers was performed in the design brief in relation to a notion of ‘unemployability’. This was presented as a goal for the students to pursue, as they are trained to be artists rather than consultants. A student in the design brief explained to me that: *‘the way they inform you and make you believe in the concept of [design] means that you cannot be employed afterwards, as you don’t want to be’*. Professor A explained that his students are trained to see the world differently and that the students thereby might be thinking too radically to be employed in a company afterwards. He said:

Our students are a little bit niche ... in a team of ten or twenty there may be room for one that can shake things up a little bit and question things – kind of, like, disruptive you know – creative in a positive way and obviously two, three or four are gonna be a bit of a disaster... to produce original ideas and communicate them well is what makes them valuable and it does. They go and work for Yahoo, Nokia and Sony ... and you know these others, like Microsoft

research lab. So they go into the industry being asked to bring originality and a fresh angle rather than to do a what-is-expected sort of job.

They are trained to practice the artistic idea upon which the innovation processes are based, such as design, in order to provoke creativity in the company for which they are later employed. The training of the students to become creative thinkers is performed as an asset migrating into institutions, funding contexts and academic settings. Professor A explained that he interpreted the employment of his students to show that there is economic value in the processes he organises.

In the design brief I followed, one of the tutors (Tutor J) also acted as the client representing the company setting the brief. She was a former student graduating from the design program a few years ago and is now employed in the industry, leading the client's internal design centre. I return to the organisational aspect of this relation in Chapter 7. For now, I draw attention to the fact that she wrote a second brief for the company's internal board in order to convince its members of the value of such an investment. The second brief materialises the dual construction by which the funding bodies are performed as an outside, which the innovation practice addresses by adjusting the internal documentation and methods of validation to a business context.

The second brief is a specific device that adheres to an outline dictated by the funding bodies in a search to evidence the output of these processes. In the annual report (2009), the spin-off promotes their innovation program as a '*cost effective R&D research process*'. In this case, the balance sheet is also a 'technical device' (Callon, 2007) that contributes to the performativity of the practice oriented towards the future and potential value creation. Another aspect of this capitalization is the use of free labour, such as that of the students.⁴³ In the case mentioned above, Tutor J acts as a mediator of the dual construction by performing herself as a former student trained to be a creative inventor, or by selling the principles and methods of innovation as 'spatial prototypes', which migrate into other institutional or industrial contexts mediated by the literary forms or devices mentioned above.

⁴³ Lazzarato (2011) and MacRobbie (2011) have discussed the aspect of free labour as part of post-Fordist production claiming creative work and intellectual labour as the new 'precarious labour' in the culture industry and the art world (see also Rauning, Ray and Wuggenig, 2011).

The practice of innovation is performed in and through these various spaces providing a context for the operation of innovation. Value is not performed as a progression along the line of the value-chain (Porter, 1990). Rather, it seems that space is in itself distributed across the different actors (clients, funders, academia) by which the inside and the outside of the assemblage come together. In Riles words:

The inside and outside of the artifact are not text and context to one another ... Rather, it is all within the recursivity of a form that literally speaks about itself ... and thus to generate a sense of reality or dimensionality, each serves as the inside or outside of the other (Riles, 2001, p. 69).

Arvidsson (2009, p. 17) claims that the value chain's geographical extension also stretches to include the public and consumers. Considering the work-camp, design brief and artistic labs as experimental trials it can even be said that the market itself is differentially included in transforming the linearity of the value-chain. Not only is the market considered to be an object of investigation, but such trials also include the involvement of governments, authorities, public institutions, private corporations and academia. The process of capitalization is performed as an outside to creativity, however, at the same time, it provides external validity to the experiments. These are mechanisms by which expression form part of the fabric that it produces performing the assemblage from the outside-in.

What I have described so far is a system that sustains itself by setting up an experimental system where the funding context informs the innovative research process providing the basis for multiplying the qualities or attributes of the prototypes – as well as managing the relations between these entities. In order to understand this system, let me go back to the connection previously introduced between the experimental activities and the laboratory. The creation of a market of innovation is not exactly about transporting things outside the laboratory but more about constructing different experimental sites that go beyond the pure laboratory conditions and that redefine (or even abolish) the boundaries between the *inside* and the *outside* (Muniesa and Callon, 2007, p. 184). The system described in this chapter is one that leaves room for infinite flexibility in its articulation of its relationship to business, which signifies the market, performed as an outside reality, within the parameters of the design of spaces of innovation.

Introducing an artistic vocabulary into the field of innovation changes the discussion from talking about innovation models to a discussion of realities. Instead of exploring corporate efforts to create particular affective environments, the further study of this thesis investigates, more generally, the way in which the innovation devices provoke, test and suspend realities that may stand as sources of knowledge for the purpose of innovation. I analyse these as what Muniesa and Trébuchet-Breitwiller (2010, p. 323) calls ‘performative achievements’, rather than natural or given conditions provoked through the aesthetic principles applied in order to fictionalise business. The boundaries are not only transformed but also constructed by the strategic use of aesthetic principles, such as imposing rules or regulating activities and also through the activities of the actors within them. The assemblage consists of a series of mechanisms which filter not only the flow of capital and creativity, but also organisational forms, devices and methods that are negotiable and contestable.

In the following chapters, I examine two variations of such designs. In Chapter 5, I look into the use of provocation as a tool of innovation, where rules are externally imposed defining the structure and design of the process. In Chapter 6, I explore the unfolding of the design brief investigating the notion of design applied as a research strategy where rules and norms are internally generated within the processes of innovation. The difference is framed in terms of whether rules are imposed from the outside or whether they are generated within the innovation processes themselves.

The articulation of innovation as the enactment of a space fictionalizing business in order for companies to reinvent their own perception of reality builds an environment – as Thornquist writes on the Watermill Foundation – that ‘is more of a living installation than a staged illusion; it is in itself a work of art’ (Thornquist, 2005). This means hiding a ‘real reality’, otherwise the artistic vision cannot be separated from its performative capacities. It can be said that the backstage is not separated from the front-stage (Marres 2007, p. 187). The ethnographic studies that I examine enable me to analyse the performativity of the assemblage following Muniesa and Callon (2007, p. 184), when they say that ‘[e]xperiments are a particular instance of performativity. The experimenter performs in quite a basic sense. She brings things into being by assembling them in a particular manner...’. The characterization of the practices outlined in this chapter equally provide opportunities to examine situations in which participants are expected

to perform as internal researchers in order to test the artistic approach to innovation. I am interested in how the participants are affected by such a task – being ‘enactors’ rather than merely objects of innovation devices.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have mapped out the vocabulary by which the practices of innovation are constituted – in order to gain a sense of their articulation of space. It may be that specific techniques of innovation cannot be captured, but their actualization can be mapped and its performative capacity analysed. Such a map is foreign to the practices themselves as they employ a claim to resist any categorisation, mapping or articulation of their methods, tools or devices of innovation.

Each of these innovation processes act as sites of experimental trials – they are each discrete experiences and thereby also theatrical sites that in themselves perform. The way in which the spaces within the assemblage are related to each other is closely connected to the activity of the participants acting within it, that is, their experiences and relation to each other. The spaces are not held together in a formal network defined by territorial occupation of land, such as an industry defined by external measures of scale (GPA), but by their performative capacities, by the activities and investments they at once promote and enable. That is, a territory constructed in and through a funding context, which acts as a configuration against which these art practices define the notion of innovation and, at the same time, more or less justify their value. The funding structure not only facilitates the organisation of innovation processes, but also includes the logic of the market to be experimentally tested within the processes of innovation.

The performative capacities – being both connected to and differentiated from the market – are what makes these processes distinctive and commercially valuable. That is not to conclude that these practices fail to create the creative economy they attempt to endorse. On the contrary, these maps are powerful tools that work according to the logic of differentiation where the measure of value or the capitalization of the future becomes a part of the performative capacity of innovation. The map underlines what these practices are and what they do, but it also visualises the internal contradiction (or binarism which they put to work); this split brings into view a site where a critical relation can begin to indicate the emergence of a territory.

5. A Study of Cinema: Dogma, Rules and Reality

A constraint is a limitation or obstacle voluntarily accepted by the artist...The obstacle is gratuitous in the sense that it has been set up solely for the pleasure of overcoming it.

(Rodriguez, 2008, p. 39, 41)

Introduction

In this chapter I present my first ethnographic study, that of cinematic innovation through my participation in a 5-week work-camp. The process was organised by a small-scale consultancy firm – a spin-off from a Danish film company associated with the production of New Danish Films. More specifically, the organisation of the camp takes its inspiration from the Dogma movement (introduced in Chapter 2) presenting the rather abstract idea that the use of constraints might bring about a process of ideation. The Dogma95 was a movement announced in a manifesto that gives the filmmaker ten commandments to be applied in the filmmaking process. The artistic vision builds upon ‘liberation through relinquishment’ (Schepeleern, 2005, p. 83). The translation of this artistic technique into business is conceptualised in the description of the practice by its proponents as ‘dramatic innovation’. Focusing on the development of the work-camp and the progression of the process of invention, this chapter explores those cinematic techniques as they were applied in the camp.

The innovation process took place in a fencing hall located in the film city outside Copenhagen. The process builds on the notion of ‘skunk-work’ emphasising a form of collaboration that does not cohere to corporate norms and values. At first glance, what is significant from this practice is the notion of the camp defined as ‘a temporary site, a spatially delimited location that exists only for a limited period’ (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 17). This spatial structure together with the physical setting, the location and artistic orientation emphasise the subversive, secretive or alternative character of the process. An obvious reference that comes to mind when thinking of camps in general is Agamben’s (1998) notion of the camp as a space of exception. The camp has been traditionally defined as a piece of land placed outside the normal order (Diken and Laustsen, 2006). Gilroy (2000b) speaks of camps such as labour camps, refugee camps, death camps etc. claiming that what racism demonstrates is a ‘camp-mentality’. Although Gilroy’s (2000a, p. 83) concern differs from mine in that he is directed toward

race, nation and ethnic difference as sources of camp-thinking, it should be obvious that the solidarity of the camp can be constituted around dimensions of division other than race.

This chapter explores the way in which sociological accounts of the camp might bring us closer to an understanding of the spatio-temporal structures enacted within the innovation process and the way in which the spatial configuration of a camp enables this practice to theorise rules, constraints and conflict as a creative strategy. The camp might not solely be understood as establishing an external order or straightforward exclusion – such as the camp distinguishing itself from its corporate context (promoting a divide between art and business). Agamben (1998, p. 170) says that '[w]hat is excluded in the camp is, according to the etymological sense of the term "exception" (*ex-capere*), taken outside, included through its own exclusion'.

In the course of the chapter I examine the way in which the camp-space came to subvert the nature of the relations of representation by the application and appropriation of rules inspired by the Dogma movement. The rules of abandonment of any technological devices manipulating the natural setting in which the film is to be shot aims to reach a documentary effect, however, without 'just' representing reality (Rodriguez, 2008). However, I do not compare the events happening in the camp to Dogma as a predefined model of innovation. Rather I look into the ways in which Dogma is performed or translated into a model of innovation in practice. Therefore, I present the enactment of this artistic vision in the footnotes explaining the cinematic tools and techniques which create a documentary effect and analyse the way in which

The camp serves as an example of how the Dogma manifesto with fully articulated rules is translated into a creative principle guiding the structure of the innovation process. This subtext examines the enactment of Dogma by analysing the Dogma manifesto and other published material, having categorized the Dogma-method as an invention, which breaks with both fictional and documentary styles of film production (Rodriguez, 2008). The most important aspect of Dogma is the fact that it represents an attempt to reach reality by imposing constraints. One could define this as a 'more-than-representational' effect of rules. Such an endeavour expresses a formalistic demand. The movement refers to Stravinsky's edict that 'the more constraints one imposes, the more one frees oneself of the chains that shackle the spirit ... the arbitrariness of the constraint only serves to obtain precision of execution' (Quoted in Schepelern, 2005, p. 76). It is this relationship between reality and constraints that I analyse in this subtext usually occupied by footnotes. This text is meant to underpin the ethnographic reading of the main-text. However, it can both be read alongside the ethnographic material or as an independent narrative (cf. Chapter 3).

Dogma is re-enacted in practice as the more-than-representational. This investigation emphasises the paradoxical relationship between inclusion and exclusion as it unfolded in the work-camp, which accounts for what Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 113) define as its *extra-territoriality*.

At a practical level, what is investigated is what happens when rules imposed from the outside become a tool for self-transformation instead of a condition of control. This chapter addresses some of the practical questions around the construction of such a topological space. It asks: what are the tools, techniques and devices used to enact dramatic innovation? What are the objects produced as a result of the camp? What are the rules and norms imposed and how to make the participants voluntarily accept these as creative constraints? What does it mean to be a camp-member and how is that experience in itself considered to produce value?

The chapter is in three parts. Firstly, I describe the camp from my participatory experience and explain the way in which it constructs a space of exception. I follow here the continuity of the process of invention as it happened in the camp. In doing so, I consider the use of props, models, rituals and the rhetoric operationalising the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion demarcating a space of exception by its ability to break down the distinction between 'pretence and belief' (Lury, 2003, p. 313). Secondly, I analyse the way in which these experiences contributed to the relational construction of the camp in and through the events that happened in the last weeks of the invention process. In order to get a grip on the complex structure by which the camp is composed, I analyse the performance of relations. Therefore, arguments, strategies and tactics are analysed in terms of the objectives and rules they produce, the enemies they identify, the alliances they seek and the collections and divisions they enact.

Dogma 95 is an avant-garde filmmaking movement started in 1995 by the Danish directors Lars von Trier and Thomas Vinterberg. The movement began with the signing of the Dogma 95 Manifesto and the 'Vow of Chastity' announcing the Dogma artist's 'ten commandments', which are aesthetic rules that suggest alternative methods for film production. The main issue is restricted access to cinematic technology to ensure that technical obstacles obstruct the production process at a number of critical points. The goal of the dogma collective is to purify filmmaking by refusing expensive and spectacular special effects, post-production modifications and other devices to strategically manipulate the film image. Furthermore, the manipulation of the audio-visual is restricted; no optical work or filters are allowed; no special lighting is permitted and sound and images must not be separated.

Recruitment

Starting with the beginning, in what follows, I explain my entrance point to this field of innovation through my application to become a camp-member. In the summer of 2007 I was invited – based on a written application – to participate in a recruitment day, together with 80 other masters students out of whom 40 would be selected to participate in the camp. Furthermore, my invitation to participate in the recruitment day was also subject to the completion of three different personality tests online. From this event the camp is presented as a ‘gated community’ in which the exit is open but access is closed (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 96) and based on voluntary participation. I will come back to this distinction of the camp as a space of exposure and the voluntarily application of rules later in this chapter. For now, let us first get a hold on what actually happened in the recruitment process.

On the day of the event I was asked to meet in a fencing hall, where the camp would later run. I was welcomed by one of the tutors and asked to fill in a form to specify my academic qualifications, which was compared to the results from the personality tests. After a brief introduction to the practice of innovation explaining the agenda of the day, I was asked to put a paper sign specifying my academic specialization and personality type around my neck. Not quite sure of which one to pick, I was advised to take the green one signalling my business education.

We were separated into groups of five students where we had to negotiate the optimal mixture of colours. We were then to exchange members with the other groups in order to get the most optimal team. I was one of two green members. It was decided that I was to be exchanged for a ‘yellow’ member. A tutor asked me to step up on stage for the other groups to make an offer in order to adopt me as a member of their group.

The rules also relate to the interference with pro-filmic settings grounded in the requirement to shoot on location and not to bring in props. The requirement to use a hand-held camera has the effect that actors are given more freedom to improvise their characters, rather than having to keep their predetermined blocked-out movement – as to limit the space for directorial manipulation of what is in front of the camera. The emphasis on technological constraints is intended to force the filmmakers to focus on the actual story and the actors' performances. The goal is also to make the audience more engaged as artificial settings would not alienate them from the narrative, themes and mood shown on the screen (Bondebjerg, 2003).

Luckily for me not many candidates had a green sign person and another group quickly adopted me.

When all the groups were complete the task was launched. We had to make up a strategy for the survival of the Danish Royal Family over the next one hundred years. While the groups began discussing and drawing to express ideas and solutions to this problem the tutors were surveying the activity. During the discussion a tutor asked me to show my colour-coded sign so they could take note of my name for their records. Our solution to the problem was a suggestion to privatise the Royal Family and make fake princes and princesses as a marketing exercise.

At the end we were told to step up on the stage and, then, to pitch the idea in two minutes, the audience being the other students, tutors and organisers of the event. I remember the anxious moment in which I was looking at the others and everyone was waiting for the first person to speak. One of the other members in the group broke the silence and was very eager to talk: everyone knew it was a matter of being heard – presenting oneself as a leader and a team player – in order to be selected for the work-camp. It was an ambiguous feeling of being exposed and at the same time having to struggle to get attention.

When all the presentations had finished we were asked to fill in a few questionnaires. These were meant to map our experience of the event and asked us to give our view on the other group members' experience of our own performance in the team, as well as evaluating the other group members. I looked out into the large hall in which we were all seated. While answering specific questions evaluating any of the other group members I knew that they were equally evaluating me. As a final test we were individually called in for a 5-minute interview with the facilitators. I was asked to explain why I would like to attend the camp and what my contribution to a team working on a

This edict was also followed by members of the literary group OuLiPo established in 1960 by figures such as Raymond Queneau, Georges Perec and Italo Calvino working with creative obstacles and inspirational rules. Also, it needs to be mentioned that art, from the renaissance to the romantics, develops under formalistic demands, for example sonnets, terzains and quatrains, which apply a system of ground rules as a source of inspiration. The Dogma has obvious parallels to earlier movements and initiatives in the cinema, such as Vertov's *Kino Pravda* and Italian Neo-realism.

business case would be. During the interview Tutor D explained dramatic innovation as 'a proprietary framework' providing guidelines for creating the environment, staffing and process needed to generate and qualify radically new ideas. He further stated that when a play or a film is based on a script, dramatic innovation is initiated by a challenge and built around a case description, as in the case of privatizing the Royal Family.

Staging 'Dramatic Innovation'

The colour-coded signs, the auction and later negotiation among team members were all dramaturgical activities carefully planned and used explicitly as evaluative measures for the facilitator to gather the right mixture of divergent personalities and academic specializations. The staging of a gated community based on voluntary participation is according to Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 8) associated with a double meaning, both with a liberating and restrictive power as in detention centres and gated communities, voluntary as well as restraining camps. However, they emphasise that in each case 'camps seem to function as two extreme horizons that attract or repel the consumer-citizens' (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 9).

The rest of the camp was shaped by similar style events formalised in a script taken from filmmaking. The structure was organised by defining different sets of rules depending on the specific cases and dynamics within the teams. However, some basic rules were given from the outset. Temporal and spatial constraints were to be followed equally by all participants, defined by the structure and the physical setting of the camp. It is in this way that the camp serves as an example of how the Dogma manifesto, with fully articulated rules, is translated into creative principles which guide the structure of the innovation process.

The parallels in cinematic history to these self-enforced limitations are films that operate under particular rules such as the French New Wave films represented by directors like Alain Resnais, Jean-Luc Godard and Jacques Demy, which serve as direct inspiration for the Dogma movement and especially Lars von Trier. With the ten rules of cinematic restrictions, Dogma is also categorised as an anti-establishment reaction, an initiative taken to counter the trend towards bourgeois and superficial entertainment. Dogma answers this aim in the liberation from technique and money stating an anti-capitalistic project against Hollywood and the commercial film (Stevenson, 2003; Schepelern, 2003; Hjort and MacKenzie, 2003).

The structure of the camp was divided into different stages which guide the process of invention. Partner W illustrates the structure in a diagram published on their web-page (Figure 3).




Figure 3. The structure of Work-camp 2007

The process consists of different stages: *flirtation*, *conception*, *incubation*, *birth*, *upbringing* and *examination*. This model is divided into sequences ruled by specific themes such as ideation, analysis, process handling, prototype development, marketing and business planning.

Its most important function is to structure the dynamics and the dramatic elements of the innovation process. The script told the organisers when to give more freedom or introduce constraint, when to impose breaks or induce stress and when to facilitate collaboration or inspire competition among the teams. In a later interview, Tutor A presented the process of innovation as a dramatic story with conflicts, climactic moments, resolutions and so forth. More specifically, he explained that they attempt to

The most significant example of this mode of production is the *The Five Obstructions* (2003), a theatre documentary about the production process of experimental film. The film is directed by Lars von Trier and Jørgen Leth. The film is focused around an investigative journey into the phenomenon of ‘documentary’, based on manifestos written by each director. The story is about a filmmaker recreating one of his first films, *The Perfect Human* (1967), which is an ironic interpretation of the world of advertising. The film exposes the human as an object of investigation by the visual imaginary and the voice over asking questions like ‘how is it functioning? how does it function? We have to look into what kind of thing it is - what it can do and how it looks?’

apply three main points from dramaturgy within the work-camp. The first being ‘the respect for expectations’, the second is ‘the need of surprise’ and the third is ‘the importance of conflicts’. He claimed the main themes in the process of innovation to be ‘rituals, staging and ceremonial leadership’.

The events that I follow in the present chapter were organised as theatrical performances. The dramaturgical structure set out in the script presented the frame of the camp, which was established in order to provoke an experimental trial solving a specific brief set by a client. The brief introduced to my team was called ‘Evoke’, defined as ‘Digital Emotional Communication’ and the task was to invent an object that would transmit emotions across temporal and spatial distance. The object was supposed to be qualified or tested through market analysis, user surveys, prototypes and business development. At the end of every week we had to present specific ‘deliverables’ for the organizers, the client and the tutors. The case description served as a navigation device and as an initial description of the desired outcome.

Below I give a taste of how one aspect of this world unfolded in the camp during a specific event where the activities were regulated, constrained and specified by the rules imposed. This event served as a way in which to radicalise the students in order for them to be critical of the case and step out of the world in which corporate principles of justification and valuation guide the space of invention. Also, the event serves to illustrate how the artistic idea of Dogma was executed in practice by imposing rules and constraints on the students. This event was the realization of the second stage of ‘flirtation’ presented in the script – an event intended to manipulate the actors, i.e. the innovation teams, to experience and actively join the dramatic story.

The aim to reproduce this film five times limited by five different obstructions examines this investigative method. The Five Obstructions has been described as a theatre documentary, as it is both a result of dogma production techniques and an experiment documented in film. The challenge to reproduce this film five times in five different versions with a new set of increasingly demanding preconditions (that is technical, ethical or even moral types), functions as an examination of the method of Dogma itself.

Initiation, Control and Ritualization

Having spent the first week with the client analysing the case and defining the problem of Evoke, in the second week we were asked to show up for a sleepover. No preparation was required except to leave a telephone number in case of an emergency. Arriving at the entrance to the fencing hall with my sleeping bag I was – as was everyone else – curious about what would happen and how long we were expected to stay. All kinds of technological and digital devices were confiscated (mobile phones, watches and laptops). The hall was empty, equipped only with one pallet of tools and materials (office appliances) for each of the teams. I noticed that the windows were blocked and after a while the doors to the hall were also locked. We were told that we would stay in the hall for the next forty two hours and that anyone breaking out would be dismissed from the camp.

During the hours of imprisonment we were led through a rigid sequence of tasks delivered to the team by a messenger. In best ‘Robinson-expedition’-style a man entered the hall with a letter explaining the task and under what conditions it should be solved. The messenger was not allowed to talk and none of us in the team knew what to expect, which created a strange kind of anxiety and group-dynamic. What could the tasks involve? Would anybody be singled out? Would I be singled out? We were, after all, a fabricated group with different skills. Would the tasks challenge our morality or even our bodily boundaries? This anxiety mostly disappeared with the first task and in the following heat and rush of things, where playing the game took over and replaced anxiety with adrenalin. A shared sense of togetherness was aroused when we all understood that the tasks were problems to be solved collectively within the team. The task was to be completed with no outside intervention at all.

After each remake Leth and Trier discuss the results, their negotiations are recorded on video and edited into the film. The hindrances from Trier were an attempt to force Leth to think differently, to economize and improvise in the same way that the manifesto attempted to force filmmakers to use limitations as creative offsets and to incorporate the moments of combating those limitations into the film. This experiment is the exact opposite from a pre-designed or storyboarded film, where the style, structure and themes have been predetermined in advance by the auteur as film illustrate an open-ended journey for both of the directors. This openness is an important concern for Trier extending his belief that cinema should extend the authors’ and the viewers’ ways of thinking and perceiving, leading beyond ordinary frames of expectation towards *the new, the unseen and even unthought* (cf. Rodriguez, 2008, pp. 48-51).

First we had five minutes to reformulate the brief given by the client. The next task was to come up with one hundred ideas in two minutes. Then we had to define the criteria for an inventive idea in 5 minutes. After that we had to select the ideas matching the criteria. A timer on the wall counted the deadline for each of these tasks. The next forty two hours continued like this (except for time scheduled for eating and sleeping). This structure created an awareness of the fact that every task was scripted and that we were being put under constant scrutiny from a largely invisible production crew (the facilitators). Within the group we started wondering if they could watch us working and if they would control the light to disrupt our sense of time since the windows were blocked.

During the forty-two hours we all got a sense of being objects in a game show or on reality TV, similar to 'Big Brother' surveillance. In this situation, the conspiracy we imagined where we were thinking that we were under surveillance from the facilitators could, according to Erving Goffman, be defined as a way of making sense of, or of interpreting, the situation. He writes that the operations of teams in such specific interactions act in order to maintain a relevant definition of a situation in order to keep up some kind of stability – he emphasises that while participating in teams 'we must all carry within ourselves something of the sweet guilt of conspirators' (Goffman, 1959, p. 108).

Guided through the tasks, we came up with a solution to the concept of Evoke. Our suggestion was to develop an object to be used by a subculture or emerging artistic movement in order to later make it a mainstream application. We wanted, furthermore, to develop a marketing strategy through producing a fictional film about Evoke and not through the traditional commercial media. Later in the camp we came to define our

Furthermore, the documentary illustrates how self-transformation is at stake in the process of artistic creation, expressed in the comments in the discussion between the two filmmakers (Dwyer, 2008). The digital artist Hector Rodriguez describes the five obstructions as an unfolding conversation as its artistic content and value is inseparable from the dialogic process of its production, and therefore not as an attempt to produce a documentary effect (Rodriguez 2008 p. 39). Both filmmakers start out by agreeing on a basic constraint. Trier invents new rules in the moment as a response to casual comments made by Leth, (e.g. when Leth mentions his love of Havana cigars Trier immediately states that the next film must be shot in Cuba). The 12-frame-shot reflects Trier's awareness of Leth's preference for long-take style. Trier adopts a special attitude regarding the utterance of Leth as material from which to elaborate new constraints.

target-audience as ‘extreme users’, referring to the users that are not considered mainstream, but rather represent a subculture. This notion was based on the inverse of Eric von Hippel’s (1986) concept of ‘lead users’, which was presented in the written material handed out prior to the camp.

Towards the end of the forty two hours we got a note saying we had fifteen minutes to prepare a presentation on the idea selected. When the time was up, the team was called on stage to present it to the client, the organizers and the tutors. The solution we presented received positive feedback and was evaluated as a great idea that illuminated the soul of Evoke and that captured the spirit of dramatic innovation itself.

After the final presentations we were all taken for a walk outside and asked to bring all the material and notes we had been working on for the last forty two hours. We stopped by a fireplace and were ordered to burn everything we were carrying. The forty-two hours ended with a gathering around the fire with a glass of champagne and Partner W declaring: ‘...all the presentations were good, just not good enough’ and that ‘the best ideas will survive in the mind’. This statement functioned as a ceremonial closure of the encampment – like the final applause in the theatre, which in a Goffmanian sense ‘wipes the make-believe away’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 131). The event marked the return back to everyday reality.

We all knew that the confinement and different tasks were staged in order to provoke innovation. But the feeling of having been manipulated became more and more disturbing to many of the students. I started to wonder what kind of game I was part of – was it all a joke? Other students were walking around cheering and saluting with their glasses with glances of reciprocal (self-) admiration. One of the members from my team walked up to me and said: ‘*Wow, this is really Carl-Mar-Møller like!*’ Carl Mar is a Danish

The interplay between self-revelation and the formation of constraints is suggested by Dwyer (2008) as the theme of the film. Trier describes in an interview how his methods and techniques of film production are situated between irrationality of religion as an artistic expression and an ironic provocation: ‘Although the film isn’t an introduction to religion, it is an expression of my religiosity, but it’s also, once again, an attempt to provoke myself’ (Hjort and Bondebjerg, 2001, p 220). It is implicit in the whole programme of restraint that renunciation is used as a valid artistic principle. Imposing limitation on yourself is considered a means of becoming powerful, i.e. to be able to control yourself to such degree that it becomes possible to overcome yourself (as seen in asceticism).

provocateur known for his creative and provocative psychotherapy, which has caused a lot of controversy in the Danish media because of the orgy-like experiments he has conducted on public television.

Reality Suspension and Dramaturgical Tools

In later interviews partner W explained the event as functioning as an ‘intensive initiation ritual’ named ‘Rumspringa’ taken from the Amish tradition of accepting the temporary excursion of adolescents into non-Amish territories. The intention is that the students suspend the real world. For this exercise Partner W explained their specialization of expertise to be ‘*to choose and establish a set of spatial and temporal constraints*’. This rigid process of spatio-temporal constraints constitutes a framework as a set construction that serves to realize this initiation ritual as a mean of innovation (cf. Leth, Raffnsøe and Holm-Pedersen, 2011). The process is designed as a journey to facilitate the analysis and deconstruction of a given community of practice in order to open it up for radically different perspectives. Rumspringa is explained as fostering such a process of transition – to effectively separate the team from the reality and constraints of everyday life. Several factors render the fencing hall a distinctive component staging this environment – by its location in the film city, a discarded military base now functioning as a site for film production, media companies and game-designers. In the later interview Partner W explained that ‘*...the function of this was the demonstration of a doorstep into the special world*’ and further described its purpose: ‘*... entering the arena should be like crossing the threshold into a magic space where anything is possible.*’ The fiction is sustained making everyone aware that they had entered into a world that is not their own. In the camp such a performance was supported by the use of specific material devices; the glasses, the fire and the champagne are materials used to stage the transmission to an imaginary world.

The requirements set by Trier are intended to restrict Leth’s directorial control, making it more difficult for the director to force a possibly idiosyncratic vision onto reality. However, the ontological transformation exhibited by the dogma principles of film production is attributed to Trier’s individual talent as an auteur escaping the constraints of established uses and meanings of genre by set-up of obstructions. Paradoxically, the process of innovation has therefore a great sense of authorship centred on the name of Lars von Trier. In the film we see a power relationship where Trier is performed as the creative genius and the one in control as he gets the right to define the constraints.

Partner W said that this instance was the most important part of the staging of the innovation process. Dramaturgical tools were used to enact the event as ‘an exercise in reality suspension’ that tends to leave the participants ‘exhausted’, ‘exhilarated’ and ‘somewhat bewildered’. The myth of ‘Hero’s Journey’ (Figure 4), also introduced by Partner W, echoes this vision. The myth of ‘Hero’s Journey’ or the ‘Monomyth’ was coined by Joseph Campbell in 1968 and later applied to screenwriting by the Hollywood filmmaker Christopher Vogler (1998) and is now functioning as an actual guide for screenwriters. Campbell writes that ‘[o]nce having traversed the threshold, the hero moves in a dream landscape of curiously fluid, ambiguous forms, where he must survive a succession of trials’ (1968, p. 97).




Figure 4. The Hero’s Journey, material from case description

The dialogues between Trier and Leth concerning the punishment of Leth after evaluating each remake evidently illuminates how Trier not only attempts to make Leth strange to himself, to de-author his artistic style, but he has Leth create the very vehicles that manifest that strangeness, as he indirectly defines the punishment himself (a kind of self-produced and reinforced violence). ‘The provocation is always initially inwardly directed, and then it becomes other-directed as a side effect’ (Hjort and Bondebjerg, 2001, p. 221). Trier says that: ‘In all actuality, it’s a kind of masochistic play with pain for me’ (Schepelern, 2005, p. 77).

We are here presented with a generative version of creativity where ideas must be created from the imaginary or subconscious world supported by the use of ‘psychological tricks’, such as Rumspringa, guided by the structure of Hero’s journey. Rumspringa has been characterised as an attempt to provoke the making of the new by ‘manipulation of mental dispositions’ (Michelsen, 2009, p. 68).

This approach shares a major characteristic with what Heelas (2008, p. 202) has defined as ‘inner-life spirituality’. The tools and devices to facilitate innovation taken from filmmaking indicate that creativity is seen to come from a subconscious world beyond rationality. Thomsen writes on dramatic innovation:

...in order to find something new we must become aware of our assumptions and limitations and be prepared to have them challenged... Beyond the horizon lies islands with unexplored or sparsely occupied land, and the task is to find and explore those.... In a carefully choreographed process the teams are brought further and further along into the unknown. (Thomsen, 2007, p. 3)

Rumspringa enacts a specific process of innovation by staging this distinction between an outer and inner reality. The hero’s inner journey defined as ‘an emotion-laden register of human experience’ (Campbell, 1968, p. 75) is primarily said to be the unconscious experience of the external world (the outer journey).

Rumspringa happened in an artificial and ‘unnatural’ environment imposing forced constraints upon the participants. In this way the organisers gave the teams the awareness that every task is scripted and observed from the outside. This setting assembles the camp as ‘a practice of identifying and organising persons in such a way that certain aspects of human experience can be induced in isolation from what are typically thought to be their natural environments’ (Brown, 2012, p. 64). Moreover, this event separates out the constitution of an outside by maintaining a differential distinction between the *inside* and the *real* world, what Heelas (2008, p. 202) explains as a ‘progressive disassociation from this-worldly sentiments or attachments tending to an

This approach to technical restrictions in film production is often conceptualised as an attempt to reach a more authentic way of representing the real on the screen. However, the dogma structure is not an attempt to produce a documentary effect (Schepeleyn, 2005), but rather constitutes a social technology in itself, which transforms our conception of dramaturgy and film production in general. The claim to purity is maintained by the focus on contemporary true and realistic subjects with open-ended plots.

‘acosmicism’ of indifference to the condition of the world’. Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 112-113) point out that such spaces create ‘zones of indistinction, into which people can ‘exempt’ themselves from their usual identities or territories’. Rumspringa is an instrument of self-exception from an industrial reality. The participants were considered as ‘being in’ by submitting to the event as a sort of purification ritual where the students were considered as taking the role of the hero departing on the innovation journey. This was demonstrated by the celebration at the end of Rumspringa. This act emphasised the experience of voluntary abandonment as ‘a hedonistic excess or enjoyment’, which Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 11) refer to in relation to low-profile camps such as theme parks and sunbathing resorts. Simone (2010, p. 324) refers to the experience of a talent show as an ‘interment camp’ exposing the participants to ‘various exaggerations of religious sentiments pointing to rebirth’. Huizinga (1950, p. 15) considers the rite to facilitate such a transition as demarcating the ‘stepping out of reality’ – the self-exception and suspending identity – saying that ‘the rite produces the effect which is then not so much *shown figuratively* as *actually reproduced* in the action ... it causes the worshippers to participate in the sacred happening itself’. That is, a process which promises a paradoxical form of belonging in the shape of abandonment and which is experienced as ‘freedom’ (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 113-114):

Rumspringa envisions a space in which the students participate in its construction – a space enabled through staged interventions whether these take material or psycho-social forms. This brings me to the second other principal aim posed in the opening of this chapter: to question and explore some of the spatial structures arising from the ethnographic details, which might depict a picture of the relational construction of the experimental setting of the camp. To the extent that the empirical evidence permits, I also address the question, how much does the experience of ‘being within’ matter to the reality performed? The following ethnographic descriptions provide details on the performance of relations, the alliances and divisions enacted in the final weeks of the camp.

Realism in Dogma means that the narrative deals with actual contemporary life; it questions social, political and ideological aspects of life by experimenting with reality. Relatedly, the point Trier claims with the second obstruction to be shot in Mumbai is to see whether the unrepresented context will somehow creep into the scenes shot. As such this cinematic practice brings the unpredictability of the event into play. Dogma presents a challenge to fictional film, creating a ‘dialectic between fiction and the pursuit of truth’ (Schepelern, 2005, p. 84).

Evoke: Enactment of Rules

The weeks after Rumspringa were spent developing the idea for a solution to the brief set by the client. However, the transformation that took place in 'Rumspringa' meant that the members in the team had been 'connected' and a kind of trust and confidence developed as a group against the 'establishment' in the form of the client and the facilitators. In my team, we began to become critical of the brief's introduction of Evoke as just another consumer product. The idea of communicating feelings across distance seemed absurd and somehow meaningless, and we all had difficulties working with the concept of Evoke. We spent some long nights together in the fencing hall negotiating our feelings around the project, and at this stage we used the more traditional methods of brainstorming. In the end we decided not to follow the brief and not to produce yet another consumer product, a new gadget for a possibly already oversaturated market.

Instead we came up with the idea of inventing a device for people with autism. One of the other students had a lot of experience with the developmental disorder of autism, which she characterised as impaired social interaction and communication. In our discussions, autism was held to result in the difficulty of sharing or communicating feelings, showing a lack in the ability of emotional expression and control. The idea was then to make Evoke a tool, which might reduce this disability. At first the tutors supported this idea and we started to prepare the research needed in order to develop this tool.

Dogma 95 opposes what is called 'the film of illusion'. In the manifesto it says: 'By using new technology anyone at any time can wash the last grains of truth away in the deadly embrace of sensation' (Stevenson, 2003, p. 22). In this statement there is a search for reality, for the truth without illusions and a movement towards the genuine and the humane. The rules function as a kind of production code used on the set and establish a specific aesthetic line to be complied with. The manifesto claims that 'the film of illusion' does not reveal actions as grounded in psychological states, that is, events that occur in real time. In the manifesto it also says that superficial action is banned, and so are genre movies, which are likely to have predictable plots, being driven by generic patterns, rather than letting their plots be directed by their characters' inner lives (see Gaut, 2003, p 89-101). Furthermore, the manifesto implies that the film of illusion is now an individual film, made by the individual artists' 'free choice of trickery' (cf. the dogma manifesto). As such, the Vow of Chastity combats both the film of illusion and the individual film.

While we were working on this proposal however the client suddenly appeared. We now had to justify our idea before it was fully developed into a proper proposal. As we tried to explain the new idea the client seemed more and more reluctant to accept this approach since they felt it opposed the initial brief. At some point the discussion broke down and the client completely rejected the idea. A long and exhausting process of negotiation with the client started, lasting for the next two days.

The negotiation process was facilitated by the four partners and a few tutors. In particular, Tutor B assisted in drawing a story line of our conceptualization of Evoke in order to illustrate our disagreement. The client claimed that the new idea did not capture the spirit of Evoke and that it had been changed too much from its original purpose. One of the representatives from the client directly opposed the idea of the device being able to solve emotional disorders and another member tried to oppose the idea by making the new proposal be about consumer life and stress-related diseases.

We tried to argue that autism might be used as a point of departure in order to develop the idea further and question the function and purpose of digital emotional communication. Partner W, who had tried to enforce the radical nature of our ideas, supported this proposal again, referring to the notion of ‘extreme users’. However, the client was not so easily convinced. Further negotiation was then facilitated by the use of non-verbal tools and a collaborative game called ‘Vision Pool’. This is a visualization tool to foster dialogue between the participants explicating their inner pictures of a given object or situation. The game is based on the participants choosing among a range of images (on bricks) and explaining their associations in relation to Evoke. It turned out that the images which we chose to visualize our understanding of Evoke radically diverged from those of the clients. One of the client representatives said that it was not

The Dogma-method combines personal therapy with artistic discipline and is thereby said to be a kind of *aesthetic sadism/masochism* (cf. Rodriguez, 2008, pp. 51-52). Trier acts as the psycho-therapist in relation to Leth inflicting a form of self-imposed punishment. This is what Schepelern (2003, p. 64) defines as ‘an artistic flagellation intended to cleanse the artist of all commercial vices, leaving him purer and better’ and he continues by claiming the dogma rules express ‘a spiritual cleansing process that touches on religion, sexuality and, in the last analysis, on aesthetics’. Non-contemporary milieu and strange, artificial settings had to be abandoned making the project a way of investigating how artistic expression would find its way without its usual tools. This aspect of the process can be seen as a development of cinematic expression through an artistic and technical liberation of the method. In these obscure methods Trier has taken the role of generous leader figure – a guru to whom we turn for the sake of creativity.

a consumer product and another said it had to be produced for young resourceful career women. While discussing the reasons for choosing each brick the client disagreed on the concept's meaning and development, which came to cause further frustrations within the team.

Having been through Rumspringa the confrontation with the client felt like being put under new constraints as we were asked by the client to be aware of the commercial value of Evoke. At this stage the client came to act as the facilitator initiating conflicts by contributing their own strategic resources, and staging a particular context of action, of interpretation and of interaction in which we had to engage. According to the script the client was not supposed to interfere in the second week, as this week was devoted to the creation of ideas outside the reality of the client. The stated aim was to render visible the 'subconscious world' of the client, defined as the implicit assumptions and blindfolds that might limit innovation. However, in this case, the client was contacted and the idea rejected as an invalid solution to the initial brief. I felt betrayed by the facilitators and tutors, as I found out that they had called in the client in order for us to renegotiate the idea. In the team we felt that the conflict with the client somehow foreclosed the possibility of a radical new solution for the concept of Evoke. In the following days we had to find a quick solution to what had now been negotiated. However, in light of our different academic specializations, but also very strong personalities, the conflict continued within the team obstructing further development. The tutors decided to exempt us from the final delivery as they thought we would not be able to deliver a new solution within the short time frame. Disappointed by the facilitators, I realised that the enactment of rules did not define a repertoire of relations by which I could form alliances, but instead were actively being redefined depending upon the specific situation. Let me explain this relational construction a little further.

Bondebjerg (2003, p. 75) writes that Dogma states a new realism and that Trier aims towards a search of the genuine. In continuation, Leth explains in an interview that the film is a result of Trier's romantics believing that truth is revealed through extreme humiliation (see the later considerations on Scarry's account of torture as it relates to innovation in Chapter 6). Leth says that 'Lars [von Trier] has this crazy theory that truth come out if you are broken' (quoted by Rodriguez, 2008, p. 52). However, Leth dismisses this vision as naïve and sentimental. Thus, the intended dogmatic and obstructing realism intended to counteract other strategic movements might be said to invent a new illusion.

Alliances and Divisions

In the same week I was asked by Tutor B, who was also a PhD student, to give an interview elaborating on my experience of the process I had been through. The conversation was not a part of the camp, but was supposed to inform his research. He drew a diagram showing his assumption of the level of stress and anxiety of my team. He expected it to diminish once we got exempted from the final delivery of that week. This was the first time since entering the camp that I felt I was able to step out of the game and reflect on what I had been through. I realised that the most stressful element was not the conflict but the staging thereof. The exception meant that we had failed to deal with the structure set out in the script and that we might be considered as having failed the project. The result of the last few disruptive days was suddenly reflected as a confused and embarrassing break-down.

However, this newly found awareness of acting within a scripted (and even manipulated space) fostered a new engagement with the team, making us realise that we had to fight the structure imposed on us in order to make the project of Evoke work. Therefore, we now insisted on presenting the delivery expected at the end of the week. In the presentation we held in the third week of the camp we approached the client and suggested three frameworks for a new direction in which we could take the concept of Evoke. These were *Play*, *Body&Mind* and a *Communicator Device*. We presented three personas and a revised explanation of the concept of ‘extreme users’ now defined as a target audience. We got the go-ahead for the idea of *Body&Mind* as it fulfilled the idea of Evoke as a device to help people cope with the stress of everyday life.

In the feedback session the client criticised the perspective as being simple and said that it was too shallow. In this situation I felt the need to speak up and to defend the ideas

The critique raised of these methods of filmmaking has been posed against Dogma’s creative vision and the idealistic abandonment of the Hollywood industry as a ‘dream-factory’ depending on a capitalistic narrative. The possible problems of this approach relate to the extent to which these techniques can be seen as in themselves an illusion, and whether indeed the use of Dogma to enable creativity in business is itself a form of corruption. In this context, such critique enacts yet another form of fiction – the fight against illusion transforms into self-delusion revealing the recursive structure of the dogma movement. Giralt paraphrases David Bordwell on this subject, saying that, ‘the modern realism of European Art cinema is no more real than that of classical Hollywood representation of reality rooted in late nineteenth-century realism’ (quoted in Giralt, 2009). It may just ‘reinforce the production of Hollywood’s dream factory in its persuasion to reach reality’ (Giralt, 2009).

and respond to the critique, but I was quickly silenced by Tutor D who pointed out that none of the team members were allowed to comment on the feedback. It was then up to us, the team, to decide which comments to act upon and which advice to respond to in the following weeks. It was argued by the tutors that the productive value of this method is exactly the fact of the emerging structure, that is, the method is constituted by the team, in terms of distribution of roles and selection of tools.

However, the character of the tools provided by the facilitators made us question the radical nature of this methodology while working with it. Until now the perspective seemed to be rather user-focused and we had been forced into a rigid process qualifying our ideas in relation to a business reality, which seemed only to present further obstructions. The reaction from my team towards the conflict and process of negotiation could be explained as a means by which to protect our vulnerability within the team. This is explained by Meyerson, Weick and Roderick (1996, p. 172) as ‘cultivating adaptability and the feeling of mastery that “I can handle anything they throw at me” coupled with “distancing” oneself from the settings’. Furthermore, they describe the feeling of mastery as a ‘cognitive illusion’ that creates resilience in the system. Such emotional states contribute to a sense of self and otherness (Gilroy, 2000b) externalising an outside world to the dynamic of the team spirit. The tutors, facilitators and the client came to represent an outside – an externality we as a group had to fight in order to present a solution to the brief.

The paradox played out was one between the obstructions being imposed on the team in order to provoke invention and then, on the other hand, the expectation of the team to destroy the ‘taken-for-granted’ reality of the client. The most difficult process in the work-camp was for us to balance the obstructions and to actually overcome these. The idea of ‘extreme users’ was renegotiated not to invent a concept for people with autism, but to help people with lifestyle problems such as stress and anxiety in a corporate environment. This became a way to combine the call for radical innovation with the

Regardless of the critique, the Dogma-method entails a reconfiguration of the way in which we understand representational filmmaking such as documentarism. The claim to reach the real puts forward a vision where authenticity is decoupled from reality. In *The Five Obstructions* we are presented with a documentary effect that does not represent the real, but fictionalises a story, which investigates and puts issues of power at stake in the debate on creativity.

requirement of a stronger user focus and marketability of the concept:

The fourth week of work-camp consisted in validating the concepts each team had developed. Even though its process was now on track and fitted into the planned structure of the process, my team always felt like it was running late, which, of course, was enforced by the structure of the process and the use of deadlines. The deadline for the final delivery was 2 p.m. the day before the final presentation. This deadline resulted in a long night where the team worked to meet the deadline. At 1 p.m., when the intensity and stress was at its maximum, the deadline was postponed to 8 p.m. Again, working close to this deadline it was further postponed, this time to 10 pm. This meant that the level of stress and the pressure to finalize the presentation were manipulated and maintained for a lot longer than we had expected when deciding what to do the night before. This distortion and the expectations assumed by the team members imposed a transformation in the individuals' self-discipline, the group dynamic and the conceptions of control. Afterwards, the feeling increased of never completing the task and never being able to leave the imaginary world, as if the journey had never ended.

The camp performed a space in which the exemption would only be a temporary break in an unforgiving motion towards the next demanding phase, staging yet another conflict. The exemption became an obstruction that intervened in the team spirit and obliged the participants to cooperate and coordinate their movements, while being motivated by emotional investments such as blame, guilt and betrayal. The guilt of conspiracy meant that the rules were re-enacted as the exemption came to be thought of as a disruption to the progress of the camp – constituting yet another obstruction. Innovation consists here in the experimentation of a stage where the client and producer (facilitator and students) are involved in live and situated relations. The activities were not regulated by a disciplinary power as rules were reconfigured to fit to

Following del Rio's analysis of experimental film, *The Five Obstructions* might be considered an exemplary instantiation of the realism at stake in these cinematic techniques. Reality then is not considered as what might be externalised outside the fictional space of the film. Rather as, Crandall (2006) is arguing with Zizek: '[T]he real is only able to be sustained if we fictionalize it. To look for the real, then, is not to look for it directly, it is to look to our fictions, discerning how reality is transfunctionalized through them.... It is to look to the cultural fictions in which the object becomes lodged'. To utilise the social sphere, means to fictionalize a story, to pervert the social in order to investigate it – such as the way in which Trier forces Leth to explore the human. It is in this way, that Dogma is said to be an explorative approach that have been translated into innovation.

the purpose of the camp. In order to frame this point let me give one last example.

After the final presentations, I waited until everyone had left the hall. I was still uncertain of the outcome. Did we invent a solution to Evoke and were we intended to do so at all? What was exposed and what was revealed? I was not sure about these relations at all. Did the ambiguity of the process construct nothing else other than its own disruption and endless conflict-ridden journey? While reflecting on these questions I felt exhausted and closed my eyes for a few seconds. When I looked up again Partner W was stood in front of me. *'Are you okay?' he asked. I looked at him a bit confused. 'No, sorry' I said, 'I am just very tired, we did not get much sleep over the last few weeks'. 'I know' he said, 'sometimes I worry what we do to our students in these processes'.*

In this incidence Partner W expressed the guilt of conspiracy, making a self-conscious act to take responsibility for the manipulation enacted in the camp, at the same time implicating the students as the subjects of a social experiment. In doing so, Partner W performed himself as a facilitator taking the position of an executioner and thereby re-installed the binary where the students become victims. At the same time, again, following Gilroy's definition of camp-mentality the one obstructing the processes might also become a future alliance. Rules were transformed and used as shifting devices but not absolute imperatives that configured and re-configured the relation between the self and other in terms of friend and enemy – meaning that the actors' position in the game was constantly twisted and contorted. In the innovation process this relates to how the enactment of rules distinguishing friend from enemy – represented by the client and tutors – became a binding agent that motivated the progression of the camp.

Place, Space and Objects of Exception

The complex structure of the camp provoked by the appropriation and application of rules points to a paradoxical move forcing the participants to navigate within a space where any given order is only temporarily stable and at the same time conforming to a rigorous logic of regulative/imperative methods. Within the team we discussed the issue of how to deal with the stress and the deadlines up until the final presentation. We decided to divide the tasks among us. Student J and I got the task of preparing the presentation for the next day, while others were finishing the prototype and the technicalities of the Power Point slides. The conflictual relations entailed in having to

endlessly renegotiate the rules of the game both with the client and the tutors, as well as between us, took away both time and attention from rehearsing the actual presentation. In frustration over this situation, Student J and I decided to leave the campsite in order to rehearse the presentation elsewhere. Once we left the campsite Tutor D called us emphasising that we had to be present at the camp and that no rehearsal outside the fencing hall was allowed. We had to rush back to the site again. Our presence was a part of the game promoting a kind of improvised yet structured activity.

My later discussions with the team members revealed that we all felt that the task was never completed, but endlessly obstructed. The result and the shape of the weekly presentations were based on accidental decisions made at the last minute or even improvised on the stage, which meant that internal disagreements were also exposed on the stage in the act of presenting. We performed the findings from the five weeks in three 'customer journeys' illustrating the use and function of Evoke. Through the three sketches we presented hypothetical uses of the device and demonstrated its function. The device was an oval object that could record the sensations of an experience (sound, images, vibrations and smell). After recording the device could be separated in two parts, the one being able to send a signal to the other part to play the sensation at a later point in time. We presented Evoke as a tool to re-experience the sensation of a memorable event.

The object invented manifested a doubling of the theme analysed in this chapter. It presents the problem of emotional impact in innovation – which adds yet another layer to the camp. The fact that we were left to produce an object reaching the audience and ideas that we had been opposed to in the beginning seemed like an unavoidable capitulation, almost a consequence of applying the rules of the game. In the process of inventing an object that would communicate emotions we were subjected to the very same mechanisms that we were supposed to invent; it felt like performing a double pretence. Nothing ever seemed to emerge from it, and the solution to the brief ended up being the commercial device everyone had felt reluctant to produce in the first place. In the end we were left with the feeling of not having fulfilled the task set by the client or the organisers of the camp. The brief was staged as a real-life interaction – a film in which the client and facilitators invited us to participate – which effected nothing other than a pretence acted out on stage.

The final presentation took place in a film studio where the majority of the Dogma films have been shot, emphasising the feeling of playing a part in a reality film. At the very end of the camp, when every team had presented their solutions, one of the filmmakers initiating the Dogma movement gave the final speech. He declared that the camp was now to be remembered as nothing but an act or pretence. He compared it to the invention of Dogma which, in his view, only expresses the essence of 'poor' filmmaking, motivated by financial concerns. He promoted the Dogma movement as an effective business strategy for producing low-budget film turned into an artistic invention, gaining worldwide publicity without the high costs of special effects and advanced technical equipment. In this case the economic field is presented as an obstacle (or creative constraint) that generates the climate in which the Dogma movements were invented. At the same time he proposed the invention of the Dogma filmmaking not as a creative strategy, but as a strategic manipulation. This salute is an excellent example of how the spin-off buys into a film world where Dogma is appraised as an excellent marketing exercise. Not only was the artistic vision behind Dogma revealed as strategic but also my own resistance to the method used in the camp was exposed as contributing to the enactment of innovation. For a moment I felt caught in my own criticality, realising that it just turned out to be yet another strategic tool in the process of innovation. The relation between iteration and order, inclusion and exclusion, makes the experiment progress by the involvement from the participants.

I have presented the interrelation between the imposed constraints and the complex relations which they foster by drawing attention to my own participatory experience, being subjected to and witnessing the enactment of rules and the feeling of confusion, distress and guilt that accompanied such an enactment. This double reflection encountered both the object and its observer (Riles, 2001) insofar as my experience of guilt, blame and betrayal were the performative devices which constituted the innovation space. The distancing effect, the resilience and the detachment were what guided the process of invention. The use of Dogma as a strategy of innovation basically manifests a kind of spatiality suspended in-between 'exclusion' and 'inclusion' (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 96). The rules are not only externally imposed, they are constitutive of the intrinsic experience of success, failure and break-through, the purpose being to build a framework to access unconscious ways of thinking (Rodriguez,

2008, p. 47) presented through a liberating rhetoric (as in 'Hero's Journey').

Being under the close direction of a backstage team who monitored and supervised what was produced created a kind of 'isolation-in-visibility', a paradoxical form of inclusionary exclusion, a kind of 'state of exception' (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 81), that is, a space which promises a paradoxical form of liberation through constraints. Such an act or promise is what Thrift argues is produced as formative spaces: 'the most important reworking of experience that is currently taking place is the production of new kinds of not just attentive and responsive but formative spaces which act' (Thrift, 2008, p. 23). This re-working of experience happened via the symbolic representations (such as the fencing hall, the fire, the champagne) provoking 'decisive moments' (Thrift, 2008, p. 23), critical events or break-through. This performance was emblematic of the nature of the camp. The outside is included not simply by means of confinement, but rather by the means of the suspension of the rules' validity. Following Diken and Laustsen's argument that the suspension of the rule is what gives rise to exception, I argue that the particular 'force' of Dogma consists in this capacity to maintain its existence as a relation to an exteriority.

This actioning of space establishes its own momentarily non-democratic power enacted through codes, rules and rituals (cf. Simone, 2010, p. 325). The structure of the camp facilitates the performance of disruptive interventions and, as such, instantiates a process of striation only insofar as it destabilises our established world (the outside) at the same time. Distinguishing an *inside* from an *outside* means installing a principle of order. The spatial dynamic behind innovation is framed as a topological approach to sovereignty (Agamben, 1998; Simone, 2010, p. 307). This is not to say that there is no outside to such processes of change, which has been argued elsewhere (Hardt and Negri, 2000), but that the outside is exactly what is being performed and provides a background upon which the exception (or Rumspringa) occurs as an exception. Neither does the outside/inside divide exist a priori to its performance – which is what is meant by a more-than-representational space. The innovation camp is a hybrid organisational form. Its essence is the materialization of a space of exception, constituting a space topologically different from that of mere enclosure (a point I will elaborate in relation to Kafka's *The Trial* in Chapter 7).

Conclusion

Through my participatory experience this chapter has presented the innovation camp as a specific social technology. This chapter has also provided a way to account for more complex understandings of the emergence of new, mobile spaces of exception. The participatory experiences achieved during the recruitment process, Rumspringa and the following weeks of negotiation and conflict, anticipate such relations characterized by a logic of exception and self-exception characteristic of the camp. The notion of the camp offered a way in which to examine the relational dynamics as a specific form of de-organization taken partly from the film world and re-enacted in Rumspringa through the staging of rigidly structured activities.

The documentary style of filmmaking characterising the Dogma-method explained in the footnotes and the unfolding of this method in the camp means that innovation was enacted in a two-folded way. Firstly, the Dogma movement is considered as an innovation in itself, which is then secondly translated into the rules and constraints enacted within the camp. Dogma envisions not only the dis-integration of certain forms of territorialization, as explored in Chapter 4, but also discerns new modes of interaction that affect a call for the transformation of a process where rules, norms and expectations are explicitly at issue with, and are also used as tools to navigate and organise, the process of creativity; in this way the translation of Dogma into a tool of innovation contributes to the integration of its participants, and to changes in relations of power. The organisational form of the camp is a territorial phenomenon marking its spaces in between established centres of power, but in its own un-democratic form.

Taking material devices and cinematic techniques such as script, models, props and rituals that contribute to the performance of camp-like structure as well as the relational configuration, the conclusion to be drawn is that a vision of the future is enacted from the promise of 'another world' – a world beyond consciousness enabled by the appropriation and application of rules. In the following chapter, I move on to analyse a different promise: that is, a design practice concerned with the construction of an orientation to the future. The development of an anxiety about the future in this context frames a critique of current consumer culture, and the following chapter explores the staging of real-life scenarios probing the anxieties and fears which arise from current techno-scientific developments.

6. A Study of Design: Critique, Pain and Affect

Beneath the glossy surface of official design lurks a dark and strange world driven by real human needs. A place where electronic objects co-star in a noir thriller, working with like-minded individuals to escape normalization and ensure that even a totally manufactured environment has room for danger, adventure and transgression.

(Dunne and Raby, 2001, p. 6)

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the idea of 'Design Critique' as it was applied in a practice-based innovation process. In doing so, I present an ethnographic field study conducted in collaboration with a London-based design studio. The studio produces work on different projects and pioneers an approach which uses design as a medium to stimulate discussion and debate amongst business, industry and the public. The brief I present is a four-week process aimed to investigate the future of 'digital manners', that is, the emergence of etiquettes modelled around the invention of new digital technologies. The task was set by an international telecommunications company and aimed at a group of Masters students being taught to practice critical design. The project took place at an academic institution in London and was organised as a collaboration between a design studio, a large scale international company, their in-house innovation centre and individual practitioners (tutors).

The professor, whom I interviewed in 2009 to access the brief, explained that '*the principal aim of [Design Critique] is to use methods from fine arts in order to provoke debate, which allows the designer to investigate how users cohabit with new digital technology.*' He further explained this aim as being to create fictional worlds and not to predict the future, but always to ask '*what if?*' This question was reproduced in the brief, on their webpage and later repeated in my interviews with the tutors and again with the students. In order to deploy this vision the projects of this design practice are all embodied through a range of designed artefacts, which employ a hypothetical critique of, or commentary on, modern consumer culture.

However, critique was not only embodied in the design objects, but also used as a tool of creation within the brief itself. The design ‘crit’ is a shortage of critique (Horton, 2007) and defined as a pedagogical tool used in the studio to make the students communicate their ideas and evaluate the proposals (cf. McCoy, 1993). This method, together with artistic interventions and tutorials, was to be deployed as a ‘confrontational technique’ meant to provoke a debate by questioning the practices and norms of everyday life. In order to investigate how the utilization of critique as a method of creation affected the progression of the ideas stemming from the brief, I follow the invention of three design objects. I do so by reporting a few crucial incidents in order to reveal the methods and techniques of innovation applied by this design practice. In this way, the projects represent three fragmented snapshots from the brief, each telling their story of Design Critique.

Professor A explained the duality of the concept of Design Critique in the following way: *‘The critical thinking side is analytical, to break things up; then there is also the speculative side – to build it back up as alternative visions of how things could be – what we do here is using design to make these two work together.’* The aim to provoke results rather than to design functional objects is a material manifestation of the assumption that challenging assumptions and intentions provoke creativity. This seems to provide a direct reference to Garfinkel’s (1967) idea of ‘breaching experiments’ as a way of describing this method of research, which leads us to the second aim of this chapter. That is, to discover how the tutors, organizers, partners, clients, funders and students perceived the devices and what actually happened in the conduct of those devices. That is, how the students and tutors account for the techniques as a ‘reality’ destroying practice or as moments of ‘unmaking’ (Scarry, 1985) by breaking down any kind of logical reasoning or sense of the rational order of the world. I analyse these as characterized by a process of territorialization in order to also problematize the self-evident practice of artistic tools and its utility in the design process.

More specifically, the comparison with the notion of ‘breaching experiment’ enables me to focus on the students’ experience of breakdown, stress and anxiety in the search for, or observation of, the performative order by which this vision of design is enacted. I trace the distinctions they draw on and make use of in detaching themselves from a corporate world. This is a vision constructed by the use of affective devices of critique

in order to make the students reproduce a specific kind of reflexivity oriented *against* the business world (represented by the client). In this way I conclude that the exclusion of an outside construct is an inclusive mechanism explained as the inside-out of the assemblage (cf. Riles 2001). However, before explaining the broader perspective and methods of experimentation let me first introduce the brief by referring to my first encounter with this design practice.

The Brief

In the autumn of 2009, I met with Professor A, the designer who founded the studio practicing Design Critique and whom I had been recommended to contact in relation to my fieldwork. Furthermore, he practices the idea of Design Critique in a design studio in London. The interview comprised an informal discussion of the role of design, its methods of engagement and its public reception.

In the middle of the conversation, he handed me a green coloured booklet with a very simple and seemingly neutral surface, a front-cover without any title or letters. I skimmed through the pages of the book, which contained illustrations of design objects accompanied by a number of short stories. Each page was dedicated to the work produced by the students within the department over the course of the last year. Each design object was portrayed on the same green background as the front cover. The booklet contained no descriptions, only objects and their stories written by a well-known British writer. In the booklet, 'poetic objects' are exposed on the green surface, as they have 'to speak for themselves' as the professor explained to me in the interview.

The booklet is based on the idea of the green screen used in film and television to stage a location that cannot be represented within the physical settings of the studio space. In this way, the coloured front and background used in the booklet signify the transmission of the objects that it presents from one reality into another. As such, the green front serves as an analogy for the 'what if?' scenario embraced in this design approach, that is to enter a fictional world through the invention of new technological objects, not for a predetermined consumer market as predicted in forecasting models, but in order to provoke a fictional reality (Professor A, interview London 2008). The professor differentiated Design Critique from the traditional use of design by explaining the aim of the design studio as being to '*expand design's potential beyond narrow commercial*

concerns, thereby decoupling it from the industry'. The objects in the booklet use speculative design proposals to challenge narrow assumptions, preconceptions and givens about the impact of new technologies. In this way design becomes a tool to produce a speculative area materialising issues, concerns or beliefs about the future (cf. Beaver, Kerridge and Pennington, 2009).

In the last page of the booklet, I found the manifesto of this design practice entitled 'a/b' serving as the afterword to the design objects presented. This text states the idea of Design Critique, along with its own agenda, as redefining the discipline of design. In this move, design is recast from being a form of problem solving to one of intervention. Design is proposed as being a means for materialising issues, concerns or beliefs about socio-technical futures by the making of 'poetic objects', which are meant to shock and thereby provoke a debate around social controversies. The booklet is illustrated in the figure below.



Figure 5. Photographic documentation of the Booklet

Following this trajectory of design, the booklet – the green colour, the exhibition of the students' work and the associated small stories – are intended as a rhetorical intervention to reach this re-conceptualization of design. More specifically, the booklet embodies the aim, in line with the design projects illustrated within it, of stimulating discussion and debate amongst designers, industry and the public around the emergence of new digital technologies.

Returning to the brief, the experiment consisted of two tasks. Firstly, to invent new research methods to document so-called 'e-behaviour'. These methods are expected to

be an advance on current innovative research in capturing unusual habits of interacting with new technology. Secondly, the students were expected to build on and interpret the research findings and stories in order to subsequently model ‘unconventional products’. These products had to construct a narrative, which might engage the consumer or user in ways that would allow them to question future forms of user-interaction with new digital technologies.

The project included a project launch, a two-day workshop taking place at the clients innovation centre in Berlin, a round table discussion with the tutors, individual tutorials, as well as an interim crit and the final crit where the final prototypes were presented. The course of these events is illustrated in the figure below. The horizontal line is the continuation of time and the vertical lines indicate the key events announced in the brief.




Figure 6. Timeline for the Design Brief on ‘Future Digital Manners’

Altogether, nineteen students participated, two external tutors (freelance designers) and a few internal tutors (employed at the academic institution), as well as two representatives from the client’s in-house innovation centre. The two external tutors are named Tutor M, Tutor O, Client R and Client J respectively. In following the process, I have paid detailed attention to a few of the students’ work and methods used in the invention of such ‘poetic objects’ as illustrated in the booklet. On the basis of this, I

wish to explore the way in which Design Critique entails a process of social ordering mediated through the design of ‘poetic’ objects. In this matter, I ask: how does the experimental status of this design process relate to the invented objects and the critical status of this design approach? Or, put simply, what is the critical in Design Critique?

In presenting the brief, I explain the idea of Design Critique as it was considered in the project of ‘Future Digital Manners’. However, this also points towards another and perhaps more important theme for this thesis as a whole: that the idea and practice of Design Critique comprises a double view of innovation. On the one hand, the artistic idea of Design Critique is an innovation in its own right and, simultaneously, it may be applied as a means of enabling processes of innovation to take place. In order to capture this double configuration, and similarly to the previous chapter, I separate the text into two parallel narratives. The sub-text explains the way in which Design Critique is constituted as a critique of the capitalistic values, which are said to prevail within the field of interaction design. By analysing the manifesto written by this design studio and other published material that addresses the idea of Design Critique, I explain how this idea of design is based upon a reframing of the discipline of design. In the main text I show – through the use of artistic performances and interventionist techniques how design is cast as provoking rather than serving the industry, aiming to create insights rather than produce functional objects. In this text I outline the artistic idea enacted in the project of ‘Future Digital Manners’:

The Berlin Street Experiment

In the second week of the design brief an experiment was conducted at the clients’ innovation centre in Berlin. The students were expected to set up spaces of intervention in order to investigate social behaviour – in this case, in order to explore the etiquettes surrounding digital technologies. The experiment was to be conducted in the streets of

Apart from my study of Design Critique as it was applied in the brief of ‘Future Digital Manners’, I also engage with its conceptual implications outlining the way in which this notion has been the subject of intellectual debates. This subtext serves to contextualise the use of Design Critique in the brief ‘Future Digital Manners’. The most important point is that Design Critique entails a reconfiguration of design by focusing on the sculptural aspect to produce objects within the realm of ‘metaphysics, poetry and aesthetics’ (Dunne, 2005, p. 20).

Berlin and the students were cast as artists, designers, thinkers, or provocateurs that use the city space to investigate the social construction of etiquettes by provoking norms of social behaviour. One of the tutors explained: *'I am interested in extreme examples of the context in which etiquettes arise rather than defining the etiquette itself... like what leaves us with a turn which will create a situation where there will be etiquettes bubbling up'*. The students were encouraged to stage a social gesture inspired by mundane technical things like traffic lights, automatic doors or coffee shops with wifi.

The two external tutors facilitated the experiment and described this kind of exploration as 'experimental tourism' or a form of 'counter-tourism' that reverses an expected or traditional situation. The response to the experiment had to be captured by video or by photographic documentation. This documentary proof of the experiment was to be presented as an artwork in itself to be evaluated by the designers, tutors and the client.

The most significant presentation as evaluated by the tutors and the client, and therefore the one that I have chosen to pay attention to, was an experiment conducted as an artistic performance within a shopping mall in the city centre of Berlin. The experiment was conducted by a group of 5 students. Firstly, they performed a gesture, acting out a photo-shoot session done with different probes like a plastic camera, post-it notes and then just the bodily gesture of shooting without a physical camera. Then they tried the same experiment with a verbal conversation, and then a non-verbal text-based conversation on post-it notes. The two students performing the conversation dropped the written post-its on the floor around them. The post-its on the floor created a trail of the conversation between the two. In the end, the crowd of people gathered around them created a circle demarcating a stage for the experiment to take place. The students intentionally played with the situation to test a social line of politeness. That is, how

Design Critique is mainly associated with design projects done by small independent design studios and in association with an academic institution. A number of notable developers of this field of design are: Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby, practicing in association with the Royal College of Art; the Interactive Research Studio at Goldsmiths, University of London, lead by Bill Gaver; the Culturally Embedded Computing Group at Cornell and Agre, who has developed 'Critical Technical Practice' within artificial intelligence research. However, a few other designers make similar projects, such as Jurgen Bey and Martin Guixé. The term has also been referred to as 'reflexive design', 'Speculative Design', or 'Critical Design' (Zigelbaum and Csikszentmihályi, 2007). I refer to the notion of 'Design Critique' as an umbrella term for a set of related approaches which aim for similar ends by producing designed artefacts that afford critical reflection.

long could the distance between the two students having the conversation be stretched, depending on the time, the distance, and the amount of people gathering around them. The visible paper trail and the different colours triggered people's curiosity and worked as visual cues for the audience to reconstruct the conversation by picking up the written post-its. The content of the conversation was based on the question of what to do with the people watching them. As such, by following the trail of the conversation, people would engage in the performance from a second order perspective by reflecting on their own participatory role in the experiment. The development of the experiment is illustrated in the figure below.




Figure 7. Photographic documentation from fieldwork, the Berlin Street Experiment Oct 2009

This artistic performance was designed to violate the unspoken social rules of everyday behaviour in the streets of Berlin in order to study them and reveal data for issues around etiquettes in the digital sphere. The reactions provoked, such as curious questions, aggressive shouting or anxious avoidance of the situation, had to be captured by video or photographic documentation. This documentary evidence was to be presented as an artwork in itself, which claimed to construct a fictional reality. The assertion was that the documentary evidence was a non-representational construction of what Dunne and Raby (2001) in their study on Design Noir call 'a' social reality

Design Critique is not about transmitting a message through the designed artefact, which according to this approach would reduce design to sign-making and pure semiotics. The assertion is that the possibilities offered by the conventional semiotic-based approach depend on 'recognition', whereas the more experimental forms of design could open the way for an active critical receptivity provoked by the object (Sengers et al., 2005). As such, design might not only be reduced to an aesthetic representation of things, but to processes that affectively engage the consumer.

provoking 'real' human needs and desires. The deliberately constructed and artificial nature of the experiment questioned the nature of truths (as a given social reality). The exercise was not an attempt to define or represent already existing etiquettes, but to provoke and then capture the provoked reaction to an absurd or experimental situation. Tutor M described the experiment as follows:

...the spoken and unspoken is an interesting edge, I see the project as being about edges, about negotiations of edges and whether you speak about it or don't speak about it. The interesting thing about the video experiment was the exposure of this kind of probing of those edges.

The experiment might therefore be seen as a provocative method of investigation rather than a representational ethnographic exploration of the user who is assumed to pre-exist the design object and, in this case, who is associated with commercial design.

The Studio-Crit: Three Inventions of Poetic Objects

After conducting the experiment in Berlin the students were back in the studio and had the first crit a couple of days later. The crit was meant to give the students a chance to reflect on their own work while explaining it to others. The students were expected to relate the findings from the Berlin experiment to social ideals and belief systems and, finally, to synthesise all of these understandings into a design proposal. The crit was meant for the students to present their work and explain the criteria for the proposals. It is a space where the tutors were also meant to challenge the students' assumptions (Percy, 2003). For the roundtable discussion the students had to make a 10-minute presentation and then get 10 minutes feedback from the tutors. At the interim crit and the final crit, the students were expected to present the prototypes in 5 minutes, followed by a feedback session and a discussion around each presentation. At those crits the tutor, designers and clients were present and participated in the feedback session.

The idea of using design as a form of critique was inspired by the Italian Radical Design movement from the 1960s – 1970s, which was highly critical of the values prevailing in the current society. This movement was formed by 'Archizoom', 'Superstudio', 'Global Tools' and '9999' among other groups. Radical Design was ideologically close to what might be known as 'Anti-Design'. However, the latter was generally more interested in the intersection of art and politics. Instead, radical designers expanded the field of design into the fields of environmentalism, urban architecture and alternative lifestyles, raising issues around the limitations of capitalism and the role of the consumer. Their objects acted as ironic post-functional commentaries on the modern consumer movement and they especially directed their commentary against the inadequacies of modern aesthetics (Bosoni, 2008, p. 11-12).

The relatively short time allocated for the final presentation follows from the assumption that the designed prototype had to tell a story that necessarily escapes its own description, and since it cannot be captured in the objective structure of language it therefore needs no further explanation other than to demonstrate its function.

At the roundtable discussion the students were seated in the design studio and Tutor O started saying: 'We will go around and see what everyone is up to and ask general questions to see where you are'. Tutor M then started the discussion by asking: '*Who would like to speak. To bear witness to the group and report the last four days of striating work*'. No one replied and Tutor M asked one of the students if he would mind telling us about his work. He started to show the design proposal, while tutors M were sketching in a black notebook.

The tutors judged whether the students had understood the terms of the project and whether their proposals and ideas aimed to define, create, monitor or apply etiquette. In what follows I pay attention to three such projects representing different stages of the innovation process; some are only sketches or scenarios, whereas others are finished objects or prototypes. At the roundtable it was concluded that the projects engaged with Design Critique at different levels as a response, reflection and interpretation of the Berlin experiment. In what follows I present the three objects that I followed, each telling a different story of Design Critique and interpretations of a poetic object.'

Whilst Sengers et al, (2005), Gaver and Martin (2000) and Agre (1997) have emphasised design as a means of intervention provoking debate around the invention of new digital technologies, Dunne (2005) in particular has based this development on a concept of 'psycho-social narratives'. This term refers to the production of design objects that use technology to construct conflictual social situations. One example of this approach is shown in the critical design project *Do you want to replace the existing normal?* by Dunne&Raby (2007/08). One of the prototypes of this project is a statistical clock. This object functions as a clock that not only measures time, but also communicates, via a connection to the BBC website, every time a technologically mediated fatality happens (like car crashes or train accidents). This design object represents a *poetic object* or what Dunne (2005) defines as a 'post-optimal object' used to show how reality appears to be stranger than fiction. In this case, the objects were meant to make use of technology to give rise to psychologically changed subjects.

Object 1: Thinking with Others

The first project I turn to explored issues around public or private digital space, as related to the future of MRI scanning technologies. In doing so, I follow the insight and reflections presented by Student P. In this case, the student translated the insights from the Berlin-experiment into the mobile phone context. The student described his first tutorial in this way:

Before the tutorial I had read a lot about genes and cells that respond to light (optic genetics) and how to control the brain with light. Then I was thinking about public and private space, being in a phone call and in relation to the computer while talking with someone else. Then I got inspired by things happening in my own life, completely separate from the project, like talking to my brothers over Skype for hours while doing other things, so just being in each others' presence.

In the later interviews, the student explained that he came up with the idea before the experiment in Berlin, as he had always been fascinated by neuroscience. In this way, the experiment served to test that idea and transformed it into something else, which might fit better with the brief set by the client. At this stage of the process, he had a second idea to develop a digital funeral, so that people might acquire a digital presence after their own death. In relation to this idea, the student explained how this second idea was destroyed:

At the big dinner in Berlin I sat next to [Tutor M] and I presented the idea and he just said 'Swamp! Don't go there, it is a swamp, not a useful area to look at'. So I skipped it for a while... it seemed too far and [M] thought it was a bad idea, so I changed from the digital funeral to the neuroscience.

After that criticism, the student went back to the idea of MRI scanning and how it opens up the possibility of understanding and recording brain activity. He then related this to the mobile phone context and thought about how to detect what people were thinking. At the interim crit, he presented a short performance with one of the other students to illustrate a scenario of making a phone call in the mind. This means

The social and psychological discomfort that such a situation provokes is counted as the outcome of the project. That is what Hill (2005 p. 287) refers to as 'ambiguous objects' where the user is said to construct the meaning that the object might entail. In this way Design Critique does not circle around the qualities – it does not fulfil a need in the market – but addresses a way of managing a human relationship to the artificial world. In this approach, objects are brought into being as discursively *and* materially enacting values, identities, agendas and beliefs.

telecommunicating with other people through the transmission of signals in the brain. The sketch was meant to show how this technology would enable the control of others. The student demonstrated an exaggerated future use of MRI as a new digital technology, raising issues about the control of others.

Fragments of the feedback session sounded as follows:

Professor A: *'Great presentation! By going away from the screen it makes the presentation alive.'*

Tutor M: *'I want to know: how does this work in mundane everyday life? That's what you have to focus on and find a specific angle to work on for the next week until the final crit.'*

The client J: *'I like the acting as a way of representing the technology, but what will the everyday behaviour look like with this, how does it play out?'*

In the later interview, the student explained his conversation with the two external tutors after the crit as he asked for more detailed feedback. He explained to me:

At the interim crit, I presented the general idea and it was too concrete. I have gone beyond an idea to a physical concept that could be materialised without doing much experimentation and I think the tutors were worried about that, that I had a full idea that was not explored. So [M] said I had to 'crank the handle'. I asked if he could explain that in a less metaphorical way. He said it was not a metaphor and that 'there is a big handle in your head and you have to crank it'.... So I was really confused.... I did not really know what to make of that, but what I decided was that I had to do more work.

The time after the interim crit was characterised by a struggle to make the physical embodiment of the idea come to life. For the final presentation, the student proposed a prototype based on the research and new MRI technologies combined with thoughts on programming the body that the student had raised: *'How in the future will the mobile phone interact with this device so that we can have conversations in our heads and essentially be able to control*

The user is left to reinvent the purpose of the technical aspect or the scientific goal and thereby to question social behaviour. In continuation, the design product becomes a kind of 'role model', bringing about transformations of perception in the user as a 'protagonist' by embodying unusual psychological needs and desires. Ballard states that '[i]n a world "ruled by fictions," the writer's task is to invent reality' (quoted in Dunne 2005, p. 63). Underlying this perspective is the assumption that design driven by poetry, imagination and intuition rather than reason and logic constitutes a rationality of its own, that is, an alternative to the 'scientific-industrial rationality'.

and script our behaviour from that?' The future scenario of this situation was played out in a short film. The film illustrated a scenario where a girl is shopping, having a conversation with her friends and kissing her boyfriend at the same time. Furthermore, the student had developed the project into a business plan for a company that he had called 'Mimic'. The student presented 'Mimic' as a market place for scripting human behaviour. He stated that: *'In the future we will essentially have movies and also scripts to go along with that, so instead of watching it we might actually act it out with our friends'*. In order to illustrate this, the student acted out a scenario of going to the shop, downloading a script to his phone and then later interacting with it in his head. The student played out a dance scene as a small performance, illustrating the application of the script that he had bought from the shop.

In the feedback session, the tutors emphasised a lack of provocation in the project. In particular, they claimed that he failed to address the consequences for everyday life. Tutor M said:

The mimic stuff and body inhabiting stuff seem less convincing, less able to communicate. I think it was an interesting jump off point with the idea of controlling by others, I'm not thinking of the last part with the script and the dance scene, but more in terms of the interaction between people. The project has moved on nicely since the last crit. I thought the way people connected to each other was disappointing, almost a step back from the last time you presented it, as there could be much more interesting ways of exploring this human interaction.

Tutor O continued: *'you could have played with more subtle negotiations than what you did show in the scenarios'*. In the later interview, after the final crit, the student reflected on the design process. He described how the streams were right before both crits:

...so these moments help focussing – but I don't know if they were valuable.... Up till the end I doubted my idea. I was excited about the idea, but doubted how to make it tangible. To

These projects are supposed to provoke an exposure towards our own unspoken and invisible assumptions about social behaviour. Design Critique does not offer a critique of technology or of the consumer culture but offers an approach to design that can devise speculative methods of critical engagement with the future. That is, to apply strategies of defamiliarization and estrangement from modernist aesthetics (Bell, Blythe and Sengers, 2005; Mazé and Redström, 2009). Objects and materiality serve to critically engage its audience *as* consumers, questioning how reality could be differently expressed through the language of design. This is a language that is claimed to be closer to metaphysics, aesthetics and poetry, rather than addressing the optimal technical or semiotic functionality, which according to Mazé and Redström (2009) is already attainable in the present.

develop the idea and understand what to deliver was an uncomfortable process and there were many moments of just staring blankly at my computer. In the end, I returned to the brief and they seemed from the feedback to be most interested in the interaction with other people. I wanted to have this scripting element – so I had two ideas, like talking to someone else and then being someone else. I liked both and tried to integrate them in the end in a deliverable way...

Object 2: Etiquette of Pornography

The second project that I present is called ‘Etiquette of Pornography’ and investigates the interaction between etiquette and pornography by following the experience of Student J. The goal of her project was to discover the etiquette of pornography and to use that information to propose a future manifestation of pornography by testing the current etiquettes surrounding the use of pornography.

At the interim crit, the student presented the idea for a website that would filter pornography. The student focussed on the semiotics of pornography in relation to gender. The goal was to make a visual representation of Judith Butler’s concept of the ‘performative speech act’ (Butler, 1997). The student explained her view on how the concept of a speech act relates to that of etiquette as it addresses the use of language in relation to behaviour around pornography. She therefore suggested the need to investigate the semiotics of pornography. The aim was to change the notions by which the pornographic discourse constructs the image of gender roles. The student presented a programme where a pornography site is altered by changing words like ‘mummy’ to ‘liberated woman’, ‘teenager’ to ‘young woman’, ‘ass’ to ‘bottom’ etc. The etiquette-filter will then produce a new scene, having changed the narrative in the pornographic story told on the website. The student explained that her next step would be to film a scene from a pornographic movie, not in order to make a ‘porn-movie’, but to test the etiquettes and stereotypes that are produced by the different versions of pornographic movies.

This vision of the future is also expressed in the term ‘fictional functions’ presented in ‘Design Noir’ as ‘cautionary tales’ stated as leading to the subversion of function, as being related to not being able to find the right words, ‘leading to the coining of neologisms that bend language to accommodate something new’ (Dunne and Raby, 2001, p. 6). This function is inspired by the genre ‘film noir’, which implies a ‘not-always-happy-ending’. This vision entails a rather strategic use of design for research, which has been claimed to entail a rather dark or depressive vision of the future (Ibars, 2007).

In the feedback session, a general lack of justification for the reason why the project is relevant was addressed. Tutor M said:

...you have produced a transformation from etiquette to speech act, but where is the design brief in this proposal?' This is too much of an intellectual approach that can be applied to almost everything. It is as if you have moved away from what was interesting about looking at pornography itself, with all the different emotions and discomfort that it produces. The project you present now seemed to have disconnected itself from the project of studying etiquette somehow.

Professor A focused on the way in which she integrated her own intellectual interest with that of the client. He said:

When we do the industry projects, one of the underlying purposes is to see how you negotiate the relation of your own set of interests to the external brief and end up with this hybrid, so you end up with this individuality, your own interests cast fresh light on a topic that someone that does not have those interests would not be able to do. I feel when you go too much into your own agenda it loses that.

Finally Tutor O ended the session by commenting:

You only got to the 'if', you should have gone beyond that, you should be generating stuff from your insight, you only have sketches. Taking different audiences to different places... You have to start designing, not thinking. It is interaction design, not interaction thinking.

For the final crit, she decided to test the idea by making a movie herself. Also, to shoot the film she decided to escape from the studio space and to do it off-site, in order to avoid interference from the tutors. She explained, in a later interview, that she felt this was the only way she could control her time and thereby the making of a deliverable

One of Design Critique's roles is to question the limited range of emotional and psychological experiences that are offered through designed products. It emphasises the dark and complex emotions previously ignored in design in order to address the complex, contradictory and even neurotic nature of the human world, in which people came into view as 'obedient and predictable users and consumers' (Dunne and Raby, 2001). In a continuation of this idea, Design Critique projects are made to reveal a different 'psychological truth'. Design Critique provokes unexpected behaviour and an inverted use of objects' functionality. This refers to functions that reach beyond their intended use, creating narratives which never correspond to the predetermined usability that the objects are said to inhabit.

product for the final crit. However, a few days before the final crit, one of the external tutors asked to meet her for an individual meeting, as he felt she was on the wrong track, which he explained to me later. After the tutorial, the student entered the studio. She was very upset and had been crying about the direction the tutors wanted her to take with the design project. She stated that she wanted to quit the program. She later explained that she wanted to make a movie and the tutor found that to be a very bad idea. She was advised not to do the movie, as she had no experience within film production. They told her that the risk would be too big, that the film would be ‘crap’. After this incident, she said in the following interview:

I avoided tutorials, as the tutors do not believe in the idea if you cannot visualise it properly and then they judge you on it. They want to bring us into some kind of common denominator of thinking. My idea was destroyed a few days before the final crit – it is about personal taste, who you talk to, it is a bit of a lottery, so it is important who you listen to – you need to listen only to one voice and not take all of it in.

Another student continued:

‘... each tutor says something different and gives different directions, as they all have different perspectives and different backgrounds and that makes you question your own thoughts. I ended up doing one of my initial ideas, which I was most excited about.’

For the final delivery, the student went back to her original idea about producing a website that filters pornography. The final prototype was a mutated version of the client’s website called ‘T-Porn’, which touched upon issues about making a kind of pornography that is more accessible to women and minorities. She had programmed it to be a pornography-site that would make ‘etiquetted’ pornography. Together with this idea, she also presented an edited version of the film that she had produced. The film

This inspiration from film produces a narrative space where the users are left to invent their own reality. Ibars quotes Dunne as saying that ‘as designers, we cannot always change reality, but we can change the perception that we have of it’ (Ibars, 2007). Within this realm, solving problems with the use of design strives to change or fix the world, whereas Design Critique is directed towards changing perceptions, values and social behaviour (cf. Beaver, Kerridge and Pennington, 2009). It is claimed that the current space of design is preoccupied by future forecasts assigned to the commercial world, design scenarios assigned to the corporate world, and then utopias or dystopias, which might be assigned to the literary or cinematic world. ‘It is for imaginary purchases of reality, not in the traditional ways that scenarios work, but more aesthetic, as the narrative happens as imaginations’ (Dunne, 2005, p. 16).

attempted to reproduce the opening scene of a pornographic movie while applying different etiquettes. The student presented her prototype as being less of a design project and more of a critical artwork. She explained in the crit that the prototype aims to provoke a debate on what pornography is and how to produce ‘better’ pornography, that is, more ethical, socially acceptable and therefore consumable pornography.

The project was evaluated by the tutors as representing ‘a switch between logic, etiquette and philosophy’. Tutor M said:

The end point for me would not be to create etiquettes for pornography, but the thought process you brought to it is the project and it has been interesting to follow it through. What is the sliding scale between philosophy, etiquette and logic and how could you redraw those lines?

That would mean to go back from the extreme situations presented and think about what he called more ‘subtle things’ around etiquette, rather than focusing on the logical and systematic ideas that she presented.

Object 3: Fashion and Etiquette

The last project – and probably one of the most conflictual – was called ‘Fashion and Etiquettes’. This time I follow the process and reflections of Student M. At the beginning of the design brief, this project was presented as an investigation into the relationship between etiquette and the field of fashion. However, as a consequence of the radical transformation that the student went through during the process, the idea changed completely towards the end of the brief.

The student presented the initial idea as focusing on fashion gurus in order to address the idea of fashion as constituting a social order of exclusion. In this way, the idea was to use fashion as a medium to investigate social power relations and how technology

Instead of reinforcing the identity of the consumer, the ideal of design as critique is to invite the consumer to imagine another world where different values prevail. In her writing on design as a research method Laurel (2003) distinguishes this approach from what she claims to be traditional branding strategies. Rather, new ideas are tried out in the imagination of the user, whereby the designer becomes an applied and conceptual artist, socialising the practice of art by moving it into a larger and more accessible context than in the case of fine art projects (Gaver, Kerridge and Custead 2007).

might be used to express oneself in daily life. She suggested, as an example, conducting electricity to garments so that they become a means of interacting. At the same time, she also presented another idea about facial expressions, especially yawning. This idea investigated how to spread facial expressions, or communicate them as a virus through the Internet. She presented drawings and manipulated pictures of situations where yawning was used as a means of communication.

Before reporting the feedback given on this presentation, let me add that the student had had individual tutorials with Professor A before the critique in order to clarify her ideas. She went to see him because she felt confused, as she had too many ideas that went in different directions. The professor told her that confusion was good – and that he would be concerned if she was not confused. He encouraged her to follow the initial idea and not to produce a final product, or settle on a single idea, but to explore the narrative of each idea a bit further.

The feedback started with Tutor M commenting on the idea about facial expression, as it was not as well developed as the fashion idea. The feedback was as follows:

Tutor M: ‘...it has not really moved on from our last meeting. The presentation and the idea about yawning do not express the kind of thinking you have gone through. Very quickly you have to go through some specific ideas. The way of expressing and the scenarios turn into a dead end, as it turned into the objects performing more than the people’.

Tutor O: ‘You are projecting conclusions without examining them very well. It is a good set up, but very broad; you are proposing a platform as your solution’.

Tutor M: ‘You ‘platformatise’ by taking sample use cases at the edges of the platform and then you generalise, rather than starting off with a generalisation. So find those use cases at various points and generate from there’.

The outcomes of these critical projects are said to be ‘conceptual design proposals’ that offer a critique of the present through the material embodiment of functions derived from ‘alternative value systems’ (cf. Seago and Dunne, 1999, p. 16-17). The poetic aspects of this design approach are used as a design principle to ‘defamiliarize’ and ‘making-strange’ routine modes of perception (Bell, Blythe, Sengers, 2005). That is, design as method for characterising and demonstrating new sensibilities and imaginations becomes an end in itself (Macnaghten, 2010, p. 32). Such techniques are often associated with the artistic movement of the Situationist International, which was formed in the 1950’s and 1960’s rooted in Marxism and the 20th century European avant-gardes.

The student expressed her frustration with the diversity of the tutorial guidance during the brief. In the later interview, she reflected on the feedback in this way:

After [M]'s criticism, I realised that I had to be honest with myself; I had to stand up for my idea and make it, and give a surface or platform for discussion. I did not do a problem solution; it is fiction, a theory. He did not get it, and it was too abstract for him. You need to be very self-confident and trust your idea... My mood goes up and down very heavily during this project. I know the others feel the same way. Yesterday I was crying after the tutorials and they had to comfort me – a thing like this sets you back and it takes time to find your track again.

A few days before the final crit, the two external tutors went to the design studio to have individual tutorials with the students. The tutor asked Student M to completely abandon her idea and again gave her a new direction to follow. Her reaction after the feedback was as follows:

The weekend before the final crit I almost had a nervous breakdown and I was crying. I felt that the idea was not working and I did not get any support. Monday was the terrible breakdown. [O] made me feel like I was stupid. It was a personal thing. I did not ask him for a tutorial – so he pressed me to talk to him. He was afraid that people would not deliver something that [the client] would like. [M] came to my table and wanted me to tell him my idea – he came to disturb everyone, just in order to question their ideas ... in the end I had to make a decision and not give shit about the different opinions of the tutors.

The student explained in a later interview:

At the interim crit, I needed to have an almost finished idea but I just had the field. I actually did the project in two days and two nights just before the final crit ... it was very stressful for me, the whole project, so in the end I just decided to do something. I was so confused. I learned more about methods, and the way I should be working than I learned about the work itself... I decided in the night of confusion what to do – how to bring my idea to life and how to present it, which is the most important thing.

Design Critique is situated in relation to what Branzi has defined as the end of historical-avant-garde and the raise of a permanent-avant-garde (cf. Dunne, 2005, p. 92). The critical engagement afforded by a poetic perspective on design is constructed around such an anti-capitalistic narrative (Zigelbaum and Csikszentmihályi, 2007, p. 3). This critical engagement seems to owe a lot to the tradition of the Frankfurt School. However, Dunne has strongly upheld a distance towards this critical heritage in favour of what Mazé and Redströem (2009, p. 30) call 'active critical participation'. Design Critique might be critical towards consumerism; however, it does not negate materialism, but reaffirms it through a kind of poetic investigation.

For the final delivery, the project was re-titled 'Emotional pop-ups'. The project addressed a way of transmitting emotions through the Internet. The project investigated how to invade the web with emotions and the example of yawning was presented as one possible way to manipulate the emotional experiences transmitted through the web. The student explained her perspective on the project as being to 'take it to the extreme' and aimed at a sarcastic approach towards the transmission of emotions through digital communication. Yawning was presented as a physical gesture that spread between people, an observation that she wanted to translate into the digital communication space. The student presented an edited video of a few experiments investigating what makes people yawn. In preparation for the video, she had sent out a YouTube video to some friends asking them to film themselves while watching, and this resulted in everyone yawning in front of the screen.

In the feedback session, Tutor M emphasized the lack of more realistic and subtle aspects of the project, like *'how it would work as a small application and not as a full-screen interruption – how it might play out as another socially provoking thing, that is how would it fit with the Facebook context of always having an up-to-date status?'*

In continuation Professor A said:

Yawning is interesting and kind of neglected, but it might also be interesting to look at the video context, to look at how it's functioning by asking if it is only visual? To ask how to get to grips with this weird little social gesture. I would have liked to see some experiments testing how much you could have stretched it, so that it looks like a shape, and if it would still have the effect of making people yawn?

Professor A emphasised this in order to make a move sideways to consider gestures other than yawning that can be transmitted in this way.

The differentiation from the Frankfurt School entails a vision to overcome the post-structuralist critique (Riles, 2001) where no outside to the practice being criticised might be obtained. Mazé and Redström (2009, p. 30 describe this approach in terms of 'critique from *within* the conventions practice' (Italics added). A few critics have claimed that this concept of design might not have the impact that it claims to have, as it is only exhibited in galleries and design shows and therefore never reaches the politicians or scientists that it is meant to criticize (Hill, 2005; Natarajan, 2007). As such, Design Critique is criticized for only producing a theoretical critique without any 'real' impact (Ibars, 2007) or of purely promoting 'products of the mind' (Natarajan, 2007).

Design for Research

As we can see from these incidences that happened during the brief, the ‘crits’ and tutorials were more than just an opportunity for the students to explicate their ideas. They were also tools for the tutors to discuss design issues, check on progress and judge where the students were at, and if they have understood the aims of the project. It seems that the critique enacted the goal of the brief – to impose critique in order to disarticulate traditional design methods. To design for subversion by means of provocation was the main criterion for the evaluation of the design proposals, explained by the tutors, to challenge the assumptions surrounding new digital technologies. Professor A said: *‘We are not only transmitting an unambiguous message of likeliness – it still introduces ambiguity... when adding all these extra layers of emotional detection it will only enrich the process if they are going to be subverted’*. In order to enact this artistic ideal, the design methods (conducted as an artistic intervention) attempt to create an imaginary space as an exercise in ‘reality suspension’ to perceive the world differently and thereby create what this design practice calls ‘alternative futures’. In a broader perspective, these methods break down the order of traditional design in order to reconfigure a reality where other values prevail embodied in a criticism directed towards the corporate world.

‘Design for research’ then relates to the use of design as a tool for provocation, not only as it relates to the critical distance maintained towards the corporate world but also as it relates to the methods used in the process of innovation. The confusion expressed among the students related to the contradictory feedback at the crit and at the individual tutorials, as well as the negative criticism they felt subjected to. Student J explained to me after the event that:

Furthermore, some critics have stated the ambiguity involved in being critical towards the concept of Design Critique. First of all, because it is not a fully established design discipline, this makes it difficult to establish criteria from which to propose a criticism of this practice of design (Smith, 2006). Bowen (2007) argues that Design Critique might constitute a new genre or movement within the field of design, which means that traditional design critique, measured in terms of the objects’ functionality, usability and the sales they might generate in a market, do not apply to this practice. Together with the rejection of any association with the Frankfurt School and with past Marxist critiques of capitalism, Design Critique reflects an anti-capitalistic ideal that rejects a nostalgia for the past, and is projected towards a post-capitalistic future.

The roundtable was not a group discussion, it was rather an examination. They wanted to know which point you are at and what you have achieved. I avoided tutorials, as the tutors do not believe the idea if you cannot visualise it properly and then they judge you on it. They want to bring us into some kind of common denominator of thinking.

The situation the students felt subjected to in these circumstances was being exposed to personal attacks rather than professional guidance from the tutor. In this context, a lot of the students associated the effects from the ‘crits’ with being judged and evaluated. In order to account for the incidences that happened in the crits, I draw a parallel with the ethnomethodological notion of ‘breaching experiment’ (Garfinkel, 2002, p. 8). The corresponding definition of ethnomethodology is ‘the study of the methods people use for producing recognizable social orders’ (Garfinkel, 2002, p. 6). In continuation, Heritage writes: ‘to breach reality entails a simultaneously destruction of a common sense of reality’ (Heritage, 1984, p. 29).’

Enactment of Pain

The ‘crits’ were not only instances where the tutors, designers and organisers imposed unreasonable critique, but were also used as a way to structure the process of invention. However, the students reported on how they tried to avoid the tutorials by meeting late at the studio or how they were hiding ideas from the tutors in order to be sure of showing some kind of progression in every crit. Apart from the intention of subverting the deadlines, this strategic choice of how to present the idea in relation to the tutor’s expectations also suggests that the ‘crits’ were perceived as potential points of control. Professor A further said: ‘...*this reflects reality, like having a deadline for a client regardless of where the designer is in the mental process – having to quickly formulate and report the work is a good exercise.*’ As such, the criticism given in the feedback sessions and the individual tutorials seemed to enable or provoke the students to subvert the structure provided for them in relation to deadlines, tutorials and research methods. The brief was organised so as to

Considering these debates within the academic literature on these kinds of design practices, it might be argued that any criticism is seen as confirming its success by reaffirming the provocation that the objects are meant to produce (Smith, 2006). The controversy as to whether or not Design Critique has a ‘real’ impact touches upon different versions and contradictory representations of what the real is or what it might be in such a design aesthetics. The critical stance of this design practice is oriented towards advanced capitalist society embodied in the invention of poetic objects, by the use of experimental methods, which construct alternative real-life situations.

imitate the world of the client so as to challenge the students to orient themselves to a world where the reality of the client is intended to look like a fiction. That is, the client, who was said to represent the commercial world, was staged as an ‘artificial’ construct only then for the artificial construct to be subverted.

The experience of this kind of subversion occurs in concert with descriptions of the pain and break-down inflicted after each crit. Student P explained his experience of the confusion and pain he went through during this time of the process: ‘... *last night I had a total breakdown and I did not sleep at all... I am telling you it is exhausting. I did not sleep for the last days before the crits...*’. These statements and the breakdowns illustrated in the above description seem to be an outcome of a process associated with the idea of constructing reality in order to destroy a given idea or perception of the world. It is in this way that I suggest the experiments should be understood, as their conduct resulted in what Heritage (1984, p. 81) calls ‘interactive breakdowns’, as the ‘perceived normality’ of the events was challenged.

From observation of the contradictory feedback and the individual tutorials, it became clear that the accomplishments of success or failure were achieved within the setting of the brief and not subject to later re-evaluations. The experiment was constructed from rules based on unspoken consent or a set of normative constraints rather than fully explicated rules to be applied within the brief in order to reach a product solution. This relates to the ethnomethodological notion of reflexivity defined as the ‘consideration of the processes by which members of society organize and access the “rationality” of their own activities’ (Pollner, 1991, p. 371). In continuation Student M said: ‘*I totally block off my mind when they criticise my ideas a few days before the final crit. In the end I decide not to care about it anymore and not to take myself too serious.*’ This statement illustrates the way in which pain is constructed as a mean by which the students are ‘making sense’ of the event as a part of being inventive, that is the description of pain turns into a the performance of a particular experience. As such, the experience of the idea of ‘design for research’ contributes to the enactment of pain instead of providing a ‘regulating conduct’ imposed upon ‘pre-defined scenes of action’ (Heritage, 1984, p. 109). Instead the enactment of pain was ‘reflexively constitutive of the activities and unfolding circumstances to which they are applied’ (Heritage, 1984, p. 109). This points towards

the dual construction of this design approach as the students were subjected to the tools and methods they were also expected to apply.

The notion of the 'experiment' relates to the organisation of this process and the fictional status of this practice, as nothing seems to allow for anyone to decide for certain whether the cause of the events was a real accident or a pretence – whether it was a deliberate deception executed by the tutors and designers involved in order to distort the students' sense of reality. Student J said after the roundtable discussion: '*...I am not sure if it was purposeful*'. The inability to read the rules of the game resulted in such interactive breakdowns as were illustrated by the students' account of the process, which, following the later argument, might in itself represent a performance.

In this case, the students encountered a situation of action that shows the internalization of the enactment of pain. The students' actions in this context are then caused or reflexively constituted by the rules-of-pain which they have previously acquired (Heritage 1984 p. 105). What we see in the breakdowns and the following descriptions of pain in the student interviews were also expressed by gestural signs. Student J said:

[O] made me feel like I was stupid, it was a personal thing... a very subtle way of gesturing, like lifting his eye-brown, staring at the ceiling... it is the body language, saying like, 'hmm', 'yeah', 'I don't know' and then after a while he starts sketching what you need to do.

The gaze, a bodily movement, the tears, the cry following the description of the breakdown signal a moment where the methods of design become a felt-experience of the body. Scarry argues that pain has no object and unlike any other state of consciousness has no referential content. That is, 'it is not *of* or *for* anything. It is precisely because it takes no object that it, more than any other phenomenon, resists objectification in language' (Scarry, 1985, p. 5). As such, physical pain seems to be translated into an *affective* design principle.

Further to these findings was the observation that the students always deferred to the authority of the tutor. The students sat around the studio table with the tutors at the end. In turn the students presented their work to their peers. I noticed that even when the tutor wasn't speaking, the students' gaze would constantly return to the tutor to read any signs of approval or rejection. That is, the students produce the social experiment

by which they feel subjugated. It might not be the case that pain was directly imposed or constructed in order to make the students suffer in an artistic-aesthetic sense. However, the project was launched as if they intended to create the pain and inflicted the forces of experimentation as a drama. That is, a drama performed by the students, the tutors, the designers, the objects and the bodies involved, constituting the multiple layers of this assemblage entitled 'Design Critique'. As such, the students' experience of breakdown plays a crucial role as a performative construct making sense of the process as a design reality.

A Design Territory

To reach this conceptualization of design as enactment of pain I move from the students' experiences of breakdown into the way in which the tutors accounted for these experiences. This was reflected in the way I was given access to the design brief. Throughout my fieldwork within this design practice the access to the studio, and therefore the interaction with the students, was limited and at times restricted to observations only. Professor A explained his concern not to make the students too conscious of the process they went through as he defined it as existential rather than analytical. Furthermore, he described how he wanted to keep some kind of 'ignorance', 'naivety' or 'innocence' in the student. He said: *'a bit of ignorance is good, especially in the beginning, to keep their minds open and inventive'*. Therefore, he deliberately did not inform the students about future events within the design brief and did not want the student to reflect on the events before they happened.

However, another reality revealed itself throughout the four weeks. The lack of information that I faced throughout the process and the restricted access to interviewing the students was not only caused by a concern for the intuitive and subjective character of the processes. The resistance was reinforced by the tutors' own lack of information or internal planning of the events, which created a reluctance to answer my questions on future events. In this way, my presence came to test the tutors' organisational abilities. My role then changed from being an ignorant observer, to being a mediator of information between the tutors and, at times, a spy revealing this lack of information given to the students. Thus, my role shifted between being an external informer, or outside observer, and an internal spy. In this way, the design process cannot exclusively

be accounted for as a process of subjugating the students, but rather as a process of mutual victimization.

Taking this aspect of the process into account, the design process constituted an ever-changing play where no role was scripted and maintained and yet they all functioned together, forming the constitution of this 'design assemblage'. The indeterminacy of the roles played within the brief constituted an ever-changing game where the realms each actor was supposed to represent could not be clearly defined and where the relation between space, place and actor had been dismantled. It seemed as if no one was really accountable for what they said and that no single identity could be deployed to every participant or actor in the brief.

At the final crit, the tutors also revealed that they did construct some kind of informal role-playing. Client R proclaimed in the final crit that Tutor M had asked him 'to play the bad cop'. Professor A also explained in the follow-up interview that the confusion invoked was both 'intentional' and 'exaggerated', defined as 'the feeling of thinking'. The important point here is that the pain described by the students was not only a sign of inchoate sensations and an un-making of everything stable, but constituted a structure with its own affective logic.

The interactive game played out during the brief was set in motion by the tutors, designers and the client reproducing a specific way of being creative, which included the assumption of pain as a necessary consequence of innovation. Professor A said: '*...I do think that learning new things is uncomfortable and painful. I think that actually being really original is quite painful too*'. He further explained that he wanted the students to have 'a strong point of view' rather than 'mass appeal'. In this respect Tutor O said: '*...the emotions that go with this are just not pleasant, so the pain is confusion and conflict as doubts create emotions that are painful but really important experience...there is a healthy amount of confusion, but it can become frustration if there is too much confusion*'.

This recognition of pain makes it look like a strategy for innovation, where creation is built upon its inverse relation of un-making (Scarry, 1985), which Professor A describes as the ability to always ask 'What if?' or, in Deleuzian terms, to access the virtual defined by the capability to affect and in turn to be affected (Deleuze, 1986, p. 60). Not only is

the reality of norms and behaviour of everyday life in the streets of Berlin subverted as was the case in the Berlin Experiment, but also the reality of the students, the client and the tutors was, in one way or another, somehow intervened upon and reconstructed within the space of the design studio. Norms or rules are thus performative resources, which in this case pertain to the enactments of pain.

The performative experiences that I have paid attention to in this chapter explicate the multiple layers enacted within this design brief as the students are taught to breach a fictional reality, in Garfinkel's (2002) sense of the word. The design brief was organised around the concept of etiquette, which set the scene for the idea of the experiment that was conducted. In other words, the students were entangled in the production of a 'lie' that distorted their own sense of reality. At the final crit, Client R, who also acted as a tutor, announced that: *'etiquette is a lie, we have a kind of behaviour and we have to stage an etiquette, so we tell a lie to create a new kind of behaviour... etiquette is all about how we cheat a system.'* The students moved from the illusion of producing a lie, that is, investigating etiquette as described in the experiment in Berlin, to one where they themselves became the subjects of that lie by producing and constituting the very lie they were meant to produce.

The idea of cheating the system, that is producing a 'lie', is here used by the tutors as a way of accounting for the process of innovation. It shows the on-going tinkering and making up of contradictory criteria of evaluation as the process went along, and how the post hoc justification on the part of the tutors in itself constituted a reflection of relations of power. The client's announcement of 'playing-the-bad-cop' at the final crit and the 'production of a lie' had the effect of pulling away the curtains in a theatre to reveal the scene upon which the brief had been staged as an interactive game. However, this act counts as a performance in itself, that is, a performative act that plays a part in the game constituting the assemblage of Design Critique. In this way the experimentation was set up in a process that not only converted the students' sense of reality but also in a performative way announced the conversion of every conceivable aspect of the events within the brief. This means that any happening or accidental event might get included as a part of the 'unfolding' strategy of this design approach.

To sum up, the students' knowledge or descriptions of their experiences of Design Critique turn back into the setting of this practice as a constitutive facet of its organisation. The reality of the design practice is constituted by the students' reflection on themselves and subsequent enactment of pain accompanied by the tutors' professionalization, which reinforces the co-constitution of the norms and rules by which the students' engagement is guided as they are directed towards a critical orientation against the corporate world. Furthermore, the reflexive enactment of pain constructs the endogenous constitution of the accountable settings of this design practice. As such, the enactment of pain becomes a norm that is thus 'doubly constitutive of the circumstances it organizes' (Heritage, 1984, p. 107-108). In the following section I explain this point in further detail by referring to my last encounter with this design practice.

The Inside-Out of the Assemblage

It was in the last interview after the final crit that I faced Professor A again, who had given me the booklet previously. I asked about the Professor's view on the projects invented and the process that the students went through. He said: *'I should ask you ... you know more about the students than I do!'* As the interview finished and I switched off the recorder, packed my bag and turned toward the door, Professor A stopped me and said: *'actually... you know... this process was not really [Design Critique]'*. I asked him in response: *'What was it then?'* He said *'I don't know'* and kept the silence between us for a while, before he said: *'...some kind of experimental design process trying out a new domain of design, ... that is what we do, ... which cannot be reduced to a single concept of design.'* I looked confused at him. *'Well'*, he said, *'good luck with your writing'*. I suddenly felt like I was staring into the green screen again, without any defined space to focus on as the letters were missing. I realized that I was in the middle of this fiction myself. My encounter with the practice of Design Critique was a process by which it was again reproduced and enacted in a specific way.

Not only were the students deemed to be involved in the endogenous constitution of the accountable settings but so was I, as the analyst. The statement: *'you know more about the students than I do!'* and then at the same time being treated as a student participating in the course, plus the limited access to the studio and individual interaction between the tutors and the students, had placed me both inside and outside the practice that I

studied (cf. Riles, 2001, p. 19). This means that the analyst was included in the scope of reflexivity – as when Professor A considered the formulation of reflexivity saying ‘...*this process was not really [Design Critique]*’; I was to be considered an actor, an achievement internal to the constitution of the practice of Design Critique (cf. Pollner, 1991, p. 372).

The explicit rejection of Design Critique as a model applied to the brief implies that these kinds of reflexive design methods do not explicitly articulate criteria, concepts or methods to be applied as a model for innovation. However, the reflexivity of accounts contributes to the making of Design Critique as a principle of innovation even as a critical distance or rejection of their own status as a design practice might be achieved (Riles, 2001, p. 19). That is, reality is affectively enacted by the performance of pain, which makes this design practice ‘accountably constituted’ as innovative (cf. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 15). Following Riles’ (2001) terminology I might say it turns its own reality ‘inside-out’. The effort seems to be to recreate aesthetically the practice of innovation after post-structuralist critiques. The subversive structure of this design practice, in the course of events – the deadlines, the style and character of the feedback constructing the tools and methods used to disorient the students’ sense of reality – enacts a criticism that turn the students against the corporate world. This criticism constructs a specific ‘design reality’, that is, a social order that operates according to an affective logic that territorializes or infolds its outside to become ‘internal to the construction of its own reality’ (Riles, 2001, p. 3).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have analyzed the process of innovation by focusing on provocation as a design method for research by means of breaching a fictional reality rather than producing ethnographic representations of the user or producing for a pre-existing market. In this case, the method is deployed by producing a specific kind of critical engagement turned against the corporate world in order to produce ‘Design Critique projects’ or, more specifically, to produce ‘poetic objects’ raising awareness about future digital manners. Criticism is also utilised as a teaching method in the design studio. I have presented the utilization of Design Critique as a method of innovation. In this setting the mobilization of pain came to be performed as a creative resource structured by artistic tools, such as ‘crits’, tutorials and artistic interventions.

From my observations of, and interaction with, the students I found that the ‘crits’ and tutorials functioned as destabilizing events distorting the students’ sense of reality. However, these experiences were not only based on the interruption of everyday life, such as the way in which the students carried out the Berlin Street experiment disrupting everyday life in the streets of Berlin, or the way in which the students explained the feedback and ‘crits’ as absurd. These events also contributed to the construction of a sense that reality becomes unsettled – close to fiction or a performative game, which is re-stabilized into an affective logic.

By dividing the chapter into two separate texts, I have also provided an understanding of the underlying vision of this design practice. In doing so, I have explicated the way in which this design brief might be understood as ‘design for research’. The experimental methods, the booklet, and the idea of poetic objects show the way in which the principles of Design Critique function by means of disarticulation. The tutors and organisers aimed to ensure the failure of the traditional design principles associated with commercial design. The main text provided a description of the empirical events within a design brief based on the brief ‘Future Digital Manners’. I have investigated how the practice of Design Critique internally generates its own reality by following the inventions of three poetic objects. In doing so, I have described how this idea of design entails a critique towards the corporate world. The vision of the future evoked by this critical perspective also enacted within the brief of ‘Future Digital Manners’ produced the performative experiences as accounted for by the students. In analysing these performative experiences, the criticality presented in the subtext was repositioned – from being an anti-capitalistic orientation towards the corporate world to becoming an internally constitutive aspect of the practice of Design Critique.

7. Kafka: Individuation, Technologies and the Self

Introduction

In Chapter 4, I explained the way in which the process of innovation is considered a form of ‘extreme collaboration’ when interpreted in relation to different artistic visions. Furthermore, I described the devices, tools and methods used in order to instantiate an artistic or anti-capitalistic critique, creating territorializing zones, in the form of camps, labs and studio-workshops, testing the limits of inclusions/exclusions, inside/outside, and exemption/self-exemption. More specifically, I have described the tools and devices by which these practices distort the students’ sense of reality in order to destroy the ‘taken for granted’ (cf. Garfinkel, 1967). Student V explained in a later interview evaluating the design brief that: ‘...*this course messes you up with all the things you knew before. Not everything is clear. You learn that all you have learned may not be true*’.

This statement brings to light the practice of thinking differently, ‘to modify oneself through the movements of thought’ (Davidson, 2001, p. xviii; cf. Foucault, 2001, p. 15). Student V shows how she was prepared to lose her way, that is, to detach herself from already given systems, orders, doctrines and codes in which she believed. This is an instance of how Student V engaged in a self-reflexive practice making sense of the critique given at the design ‘crits’. As such, the ‘crits’, tutorials and artistic interventions are devices that enact an affective technology by which she is able to install a new and strange relation to herself.

Central to this analysis stands the concept of individuation, in particular, as it has been conceptualised by the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1992). Instead of assuming a pre-established divide between the individual and their environment, the principles of individuation grasp the dynamics of this establishment. More classical sociological studies have also proposed that individualities and the modern self are ‘produced’ within specific sets of practices (cf. Giddens, 1991; Elias, 1939; Weber, 1958). Other studies have highlighted the importance of technological materialities regarding subjectivation (Rose, 1999; Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996). According to Simondon, those devices, which at once bring the individual into being and determine

the characteristics of its development, organisation and modalities – also bring the environment to light. Following this argument, I mean to conceive of the individual's practical relation to their environment as a dynamic system of local, interdependent, self-organising movements, perceptions and affects that are both resources for and techniques of innovation. In doing so, this chapter asks: how do artistic devices, tools and technologies mediate or pre-figure the individuality of the subjects involved?

To recall Chapter 4, Professor A said that '*The students will not find any right answers, but have to look into themselves and take responsibility for their own ideas ... The idea is to challenge the assumptions of your own work, to be critical of critical design*'. He emphasised this in terms of techniques to make the students question 'who am I' and 'why am I doing it' as part of the facilitation of some kind of 'extreme collaboration'. This strategy is created within a carefully structured frame (a staged environment), which was in itself reflected upon by the students as a constraint and, as a consequence, acted in response to that. This setting will be investigated as the capture of, and adaptation to, specific evaluation criteria and their effects. In doing so, I bring together the analysis from the work-camp and design brief by exploring and questioning the linkages between innovation, technologies and the self.

More specifically, I demonstrate the way in which rules are reflected upon as a kind of technique, practice, exercise, attitude and event – which one might understand as a test of oneself. The artistic devices in question are considered as 'the specifically modern techniques of bureaucratic organization' (Kwinter, 2001, p. 105) where the performative criteria by which one is judged are never revealed. This theme is explicitly analysed in Kafka's writings. I draw a parallel to his work with special focus on the stories, *Before the Law* (1916), *In the Penal Colony* (1919) and *The Trial* (1925). These stories are concerned with the relations of social organisation presented in a novelistic universe whose objects, spaces and relations are apprehended and manipulated ostensibly in the same distorting way as in the organisation of innovation. Such a comparison highlights the structuring role of bureaucratic organisation and suggests that the enactment of rules and norms are associated with *governance at a distance* (cf. Kwinter, 2001, p. 104).

The second aspect of this is how the relation between the individual and its environment feeds into processes of valuation. A performative order is installed in a

two-fold way. Firstly, I analyse the way in which the students re-instate normality and make sense of the experiences enacted within the camp and the design brief, such as break-downs, crisis and frustrations, imposing a meaning upon the seemingly purposeless critique and contradictory feedback given in the crits, tutorials and events. In turn, the performance of pain, stress and anxiety acted out in the crits, tutorials and events provide evidence of the capacities considered necessary to be original and inventive. In this way, the devices themselves act as a public demonstration, test, or proof (Muniesa and Callon, 2007, p. 169), that exhibit *the necessary work of ourselves on ourselves* (cf. Foucault, 2001, p. 47), in order to be creative. That is, a performance gives validity to the processes carrying certain 'aesthetic values', which make anxiety, pain and suffering a criterion of success. I investigate the way in which these practices construct a mode of production where normality reinstitutes itself by means of such affective-performative devices and how such devices led the participants to recognise themselves as subjects of artistic creation.

As explained in Chapter 1 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) propose that, such tendencies are an expression of the economization of artistic practice based upon non-instrumental or anti-capitalist critique to be absorbed into, and used to generate, economic value. Constituting a space that allows for a certain kind of self-exemption differentiated from the business world is what makes these processes distinctive and commercially valuable. That is not to conclude that these practices fail to produce the creative economy they attempt to endorse. On the contrary, these devices are powerful tools that work according to a logic of differentiation where the evaluation of value becomes a part of the performative capacity of innovation. In this way, the artistic critique and its entanglement in the innovation industry transform the relation between individuation and the production of value.

Narratives and Personal Testimonies

Kafka has in the sociological literature been widely recognised as a writer of displacement (Goffman, 1959; Sennett, 1980; Giddens, 1991). Instead of projecting futures from current scenarios, in Kafka novelty is produced in and through a narrative set-up that tests reality, such as the law, bureaucracy and the rules of administration. For instance, in the parable *Before the Law* a man is waiting outside an open door all his life to get access to the law. At the end, when he is almost dying, the doorkeeper closes it with

the words: 'No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to shut it.' (Kafka, 1916, p. 4). According to Derrida (1992), the story exemplifies a narrative not of progression but of endless entanglement. The open door marks a limit 'without itself posing an obstacle or barrier. It is a mark, but it is nothing firm, opaque, or uncrossable' (Derrida, p. 203). In *The Trial*, this phenomenon plays out in K's search for the law, which is always to be found somewhere else, always displaced. The offices and chambers of the court are always displaced to the office next door, in attics, basements, a closet, a cathedral pulpit, a painter's studio etc. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, p. 51; cf. Attridge 1992). It is in this way that Kafka has been said to displace the familiar frames of reference, while stimulating engagement. His writings have been said to deconstruct the divide between the perception of oneself and the outer world as the law allows K. to perform himself by making himself a stranger. This interpretation touches upon the alienating forces in Kafka's writings, or what Kwinter (2001, p. 104) defines as its 'distance-effect'. Surprisingly, it seems that it is here that we are to find the link to the study of innovation.

In the practice of the studio-workshop, the notion of Design Critique emerged as a rather slippery, or at least complex, artistic concept. The partners always negated any predefined or analytical category from which to make sense of the artistic vision. Through my participation in the innovation processes themselves, I found those concepts to slip away from any determination, any objective description. They escaped categorisation of any kind, always pointing towards what they were not. This observation was supported by the fact that everything defining this space was always displaced. We might recall Client R's last comment at the final crit: '*etiquette is a lie, we have behaviour and we have to stage an etiquette, so we tell a lie to create a new behaviour. Etiquette is all about how we cheat a system*'. Also, the artefacts invented were said to employ a 'hypothetical critique'; the design process is characterised as 'speculative'; the projects are called 'placebo' and any functions are claimed to be 'fictional'. The mode of operation for those practices seemed to be the subversion of their own categorisation, which was justified as 'critical engagement'.

This reminds me of Deleuze and Guattari's opening when writing on Kafka's description of his world as a universe where everything seems false: 'According to a first view, everything is false in *The Trial*: even the law, in contrast to Kantian law, erects the

lie into a universal rule. The lawyers are false lawyers, the judges are false judges' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, p. 49). The exact same phrase could have been used to open the analysis of this case. On this view, everything seems to be fictional – we only need recall my last interaction with Professor A, where he rejects the design process as being about design critique – again trying to challenge my implicit assumptions about the concept of design, as well as my position as a researcher. Paradoxically, such contradictions, discrepancies, bifurcations and differences all contribute to a mode of dis-articulation, which simultaneously stage an explicit strategy of innovation, that is, an attempt 'to challenge assumptions' as Professor A framed it in a later interview. According to Kwinter (2001, p. 181) such statements are to be considered as a form of 'artificial closure' designed for narrative experiments.

The organisation of the design process and the fictional status of this practice was reinforced given that nothing allowed the students to know whether the coincidental state of the events was a real accident or a pretence: *'We did not know anything before the launch and then we were told that there would be a second launch in Berlin, so we were not sure what new information we would get... There was an atmosphere of – not anxiety, but hesitancy like being in a hidden space – we were off, on hold... In Berlin we were all looking for additional constraints, but we did not get that, so they also left it quite open for us.'* However, the processes are not completely without any direction or goals to be achieved, they are just seemingly distant and unspoken. The client added: *'It is not that the process is completely free and you can do what you want, there is a certain context, you will be lead to a certain path but in a very unpredictable way. It is not saying yes or no.'* It might even be argued that the crits, tutorials and workshops served as practical devices to turn a rather abstract artistic vision into a set of rules and behaviours. Client R explained those as 'an approach you have to learn'. He said:

If you go to modern Masters courses the rules for passing the exams are very clear and everyone knows them: You have to go to the classes. Then some people have more ability to understand the rules and therefore they pass. Here...you don't have to pass exams, you don't get a specific grade. But if you want to go through this process you have to discover the unspoken rules. This is a process that takes time and a lot of socialising.

In the cases I followed, no matter whether rules were imposed from the outside or internally generated from the experimental setting itself, the criteria by which the

students were judged at the crits, tutorials and shows were never made explicit. The same client later said:

There is no point in having marks or exams as everyone know that there is a goal to achieve. There are these unspoken rules that everybody knows, but no one is going to make explicit. This makes people very stressed to push themselves to be really original, creative, innovative, and to find new ways of understanding reality and things like that.... In this process you know nothing else than yourself and your ideas to pass the program.

In addition, Professor A added to the conversation that *'the students have to qualify their own work, however created in a very rigid structure'*. He further emphasised that this existential process always relates to the students' work, which is to create a space from where to question reality. Therefore, they were not given any external criteria by which to evaluate what needed to be tested. Professor A described this as a play with assumptions and expectations in order to install a kind of reflexivity:

The students will not find any right answers, but have to look into themselves and take responsibility for their own ideas ... we focus the students to ask: who am I? What am I doing? Why am I doing it? What is the purpose of my design and why do I think it is good? The idea is to challenge the assumptions of your own work.

Echoing the latter, Partner W said: *'In the final exam we are listening to them telling us why their work makes sense. They have developed the criteria to evaluate their own work'*. Phil Race defines self-assessment as *'when students [are] making judgments about their own work'* (Race, 2001). In this way the crits might be understood as events where the students were guided to focus their attention on themselves (Foucault, 1984, p. 5). We end up here with a specific artistic vision assuming that creativity cannot be imposed from the outside, but has to be enacted in and through the students' relation to themselves. What is at stake is not only defining reality anew, but also implying a narrative experiment that reinforces strangeness and causes the trauma of losing oneself. Kafka (1939, p. 437) writes that: *'...it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not know'*. Stark explains, from an organisational context, that situations where one is accountable in many crosscutting and conflicting registers create a kind of *'performance anxiety'*, because with no external reference or instance to justify one's actions. One is then ultimately accountable to oneself (cf. Stark, 2009, p. 113). Student J confirmed this point by saying: *'...with an open process like this you are on your own'*. Professor A said: *'It is lonely to be inventive, as no one else is doing it, which adds another emotional layer. They have to go*

their own way.' This emphasises an experimental attitude based on 'the testing of oneself', which plays a crucial role in Foucault's later lectures at the Collège de France, published in *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (2001) and Rose (1999, p. 144) refers to such devices as technologies that 'intervene' upon oneself. In order to demonstrate this point in more detail, let me report another incident, again from the design brief.

On the first day of the brief, a trip to the Whitechapel Gallery in London was planned as a part of the project launch. Once I had arrived together with the students it turned out that the gallery was closed. It was another half an hour until the tutors showed up. In the meantime, the students wondered whether they were part of a reality TV show programme. Student M looked around and laughed: '*... now I want to know where they have placed the cameras?*' Similar to my experience in Rumspringa during the camp, a conspiracy was formulated – promoting a rather paranoid space. Student J later described the incident: '*You always try to make sense of the process and sometimes overanalyse every step, like the way the gallery was closed one day and we all constructed a conspiracy of how this was a test for us. You become paranoid about what kind of pedagogical experiment you are supposed to be taking part in.*' In this case, self-assessment effects an exposure to the nightmare presented in Kafka's writings. The students confront rules that do not simply command or prohibit, but as Derrida (1992, p. 203) says, 'operate at the limit, not to prohibit directly, but to interrupt and defer the passage, to withhold the pass'.

The Trial presents a universe where the eternal postponement of the verdict conceals the expectations applied to the accused. According to Derrida (1992), 'being before the law is being in fiction' as the criteria by which you are being judged are never revealed; as such, a revelation would impose a function, meaning and rationality to the activities. Instead, disruption, crisis and frustration effected a rather neurotic space where the creative goal seemed to have no external instance with which to justify itself. However, I not only look at how this amounts to Kafkaesque absurdity, existential meaninglessness or infinite goallessness represented by the individuals struggling against the bureaucratic machine. Rather, I also look at how a narrative is constructed around the experience of breakdown, which acts to validate the process as inventive.

Performative Techniques and Devices of the Self

The problem with these people is that they take themselves too seriously and therefore feel free to criticise people and let them down in a way. What happened yesterday was definitely a personal problem with the tutor. And every one of the students feels like this after yesterday. I overheard that they told one of the other students just to give up his project, as the idea was too bad. I mean you don't do that just a few days before the final crit... we only have two days left now.

(Student V during the design brief)

In Chapter 6, we saw how the students reported that they sometimes found the conflicting advice and feedback they received from tutors, partners and clients in the crits and tutorials confusing, and that they found the process to be a test of their personal or psychological strength rather than their design skills. The crit, initially defined as a peer feedback process in which the students mutually evaluate each other's work, turned into an occasion for public humiliation. Race explains the crit as a performance, whose primary function lies not 'in the opportunity for students to demonstrate their learning, or debate with their peers and their staff, but rather to witness the virtuoso performance of their tutors' (2001, p. 5).

The crits enabled a narrative structure which the students were forced to navigate. Student J explained that the crits were not especially useful in helping to develop the project further. He said:

At the roundtable, I had the idea worked out and I was holding back what I had, as I knew there would be more presentations – we did not know what was expected at the interim crit at that point, so I knew I had to go through some kind of progression, so I just showed some initial sketches and prototypes.... I am glad I did not present them before, as I like my idea, and I would still have two more weeks where they could turn it around... I would say that the deadline is almost false... to really use the crits to develop the ideas is sometimes tricky.

In this way, the narrative structure set out in the scripts (see in Chapter 5 and 6) are not to be interpreted in terms of a linear progression of time, where the progression happens in one stage following the other. The crits were not considered deadlines designed to focus the work, but were in themselves re-narrated as creative constraints. The temporality that lies beneath the event of Rumspringa is not one of progression, but rather a passage to the outside, a means by which to transgress oneself. The narrative effect from these devices is symptomatic of the structure of the camp, which is

explained by Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 95), with reference to Bauman as ‘installations are conceived and planned as a hole in time as much as in space, a temporary suspension of territorial ascription and the time sequence’.

At the follow-up interview several weeks after the final crit, Student V explained the confusion she went through as a natural part of creating new knowledge: *‘To be placed in a structure would be too uniform for creating something new. You need to be lost and find your own way to deal with a situation without a structure’*. She explained further that structure is an easy solution for people who are not able to deal with new and changing situations.

Student V: *I am still very sceptical of the whole process we went through. The whole process was very painful for me and I am not sure we got anything out of it in the end.*

Researcher M: *Yes, I know that you struggled a lot with the whole set-up of the process, especially before the final crit and all the criticism you had to go through.*

Student V: *Yes, but that kind of pain was necessary I think. It is a kind of thing you need to go through to be creative and original. A little bit of suffering is good I think – you need that. We have to be original and think for ourselves and that is what they try to make us do, so I know that it is... well, I can understand why they do that. But the tutors just did not get my idea. They didn’t understand anything of what it was about.*

Artistic devices such as crits, Rumspringa and the tutorials created a process of differentiation by which the students came to perceive themselves as creative. That is, through this process, they come to see themselves as different from how they were before. The students gain an awareness of developing their own design approach and not of ‘serving others’, that is, producing design not ‘to solve problems’. Client R defined the purpose of the devices as: *‘about creating a reality that doesn’t exist and not lecture about it, rather you have to engage people in a new reality through the objects and working with the material.’* This is further implied by the notion of ‘facilitation’, used to describe methods of innovation which are not reduced to a specific program or strategic method, but as governing the students in the name of their own transformation.

The students seemed to appreciate the confusion after recognising the pain enacted in the crits as necessary in order to become ‘real’ creatives. Student V further stated that: *‘They don’t want you to be a school child, but to start a process in you that will never change back, it is not about a mark, a goal or a paper ... You need to have a special mind-set to deal with this environment as it is not about finishing something... it is about self-confidence in what you do’*.

Another student commented on inventiveness and the creative process thus: *'It is hard work and it is painful to be creative, it just can't be fun'*. The self-declared purpose gives an interesting clue about one thing these experiments do: they implement artistic theories by way of transforming them into operational tools enacted by the participants themselves. Foucault defines such 'techniques of the self', or 'arts of existence', as:

...those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make of their life into an *oeuvre* that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. (Foucault, 1984, p. 10-11)

In evaluating the project, Student M said that: *'You will get very harsh critiques from all the tutors, which can be very hard to take, but then you calm down and often realise that they are right and there is a point to what they are saying and that moves you forward'*. The way in which students re-narrate the experience as 'necessary to creativity', akin to a personal sacrifice in the name of art, demonstrates a tacit acceptance of those events as devices of creativity. This acceptance has to do with the affective side of such tools. Scarry (1985) writes that the felt-experience of pain, in relation to its gestural physical presence, makes such processes, or power relations, seem 'incontestably real'. Confirming this point, Student M described the pain she went through: *'I feel like a shop and that I sell pieces of my body – you need time to let it grow back – it is really physical sometimes.'* She described the process as painful but explained that what she has done in this program of design was also 'personal' and 'weird'. The 'crits', tutorials and shows initiate a documentary effect, that is, an exposure to unscripted behaviour (Biressi and Nunn, 2005, p. 2). The crits served as an act in which the authentic enactment (see Chapter 4) of 'real' creativity was staged by critique and exposure. In both the camp and the brief, the exposure of uncontrolled feelings, such as the eruption of anger or a breakdown in tears, was a stressful moment of self-revelation. The 'crits' are spectacles in which the participants carry out necessary transformation on themselves, strategic modifications, ascetic exercises and renunciations in order to access aesthetic-creative forces. An affective response to the critique given in the crits was displayed through the students' performances of pain and, in this way, affectedness is performed as the criterion of success which represents certain aesthetic values.

Terms used by a lot of the students to describe the process and the pain were ‘honest’ and ‘true’. This was framed as a positioning against the current debate on innovation in the creative industries, which the students considered to be superficial marketing promotion and thereby not ‘real’, in the sense of not-affecting. Student M explained:

When you are working on this program you become idealistic. I am afraid of this process, because I know that I will not be the same. I am not sure if I will work for a company as you need to adjust your personality and ideas to a bigger thing – that is how big companies work.... I think I am too edgy for that.

The affect and bodily gestures of persons get connected with artistic or aesthetic ways of legitimizing innovation and assign value to the process. In retrospect some students considered the experiment as a way of challenging themselves and a way of performing their own project in a public space: ‘*it is a way to bring your project to life and test the effects of it*’. Another student described the purpose of the experiment in relation to critical design as ‘*to encourage, not to do the obvious*’, creating a self-perception amongst the students of being ‘on the edge’. This is what Scarry explains as a reality-conferring function, which in this case depends on the attributes of artistic creation, such as pain and suffering.

By exploring the empirical evidence and personal testimonies that serve to document such affectedness, in what follows I consider the way in which the clients and funders account for the practice of innovation in and through the techniques produced in the camps, labs and studios. The evidence of affect, or its empirical instantiation, is not just provided through psychological consequences such as stress, neurosis and anxiety; the way in which such performances are in themselves acted upon, performed and transformed becomes something integral to modern innovation practices. What I attempt to capture here is the way in which the participants involved are able to account for the new; that is, how the traumatized experience gets repaired and normality is reinstated through personal narratives of acting, coping, frustration, disappointment and appraisal. The central question that is asked here is: what is the relation between the emotional acts in the crits and the project brief on behalf of which these acts are performed? This is a question about the relation between the interior content of innovation and what stands outside of it. In order to answer this question, I go back to some of the statements which evaluate the design brief.

The Fiction of Power

The attempt to destroy any conceivable aspect of the process in order to distort the students' sense of reality might be expressed as 'referential instability' (Scarry, 1985, p. 121). The sense of reality that is destroyed through unspoken rules is rescued or re-established by appending a direction in the statement 'for the sake of creativity'. Such a statement credits the tutors and the partners, providing them with a justification and the opportunity to rather cruelly humiliate, which serves a kind of function.

The students perform Professor A as a creative guarantor legitimizing the course of the brief, just as Lars von Trier legitimised the course of the camp (see Chapter 4). Evaluating her experience of the brief, Student J said about working with Professor A:

He talked about two genres of projects that had been done the last years in the telecom space. That was helpful to push the ideas.... He is one of the most thoughtful and impressive minds I have worked with. He talks through the ideas and helps you to explore the actual idea. He is not judgemental, and there is no right or wrong.

Student V also mentioned the Professor as her creative mentor despite the horror scenario she went through during the brief itself. She explained the experience of pain as a 'seed' that they plant and that you become part of a 'life-project'. The basis of this power is to make the participants feel that they belong to something greater and more powerful than themselves. Professor A explains that what keeps the students in the studio is some kind of a shared 'ethos'. So far the point is that these practices are organised around this belief created within the experimental setting through the enactment of charismatic individuals. These are individuals who, in Arvidsson's (2009, p. 8) words, 'accumulate affective status', which might be why the students volunteer to contribute with free labour as 'they believe in, feel for, or belong to a community around the charismatic person'. The appraisal on the part of the students indicates not only the adaptation to a specific creative environment, but also confirms what Scarry defines as the fiction of power. She writes that the element of 'as if' in the performance of pain 'lead[s] out into the array of counterfactual revisions entailed in making' (Scarry, 1985, p. 22). This point picks up on the idea that pain seems 'to confer its quality of "incontestable reality" on that power that has brought it into being' (Scarry, 1985, p. 27). It is in this way that the crits, tutorials and artistic events are given some kind of legitimization which has to do with the affective relationship between the student, tutor

and client than the reception of a specific innovative outcome such as a consumer product or business strategy.

The fiction of power is an aspect of what professor A explained as the ‘what if’ function of innovation, that is, the fiction-generating or reality-conferring function of the artistic devices. The students described the innovation processes as providing a ‘safe space’, an ‘atmosphere’, or a ‘special climate’. Student J explained the studio as ‘*a space to say silly things, which are not silly but just undone*’. The ‘what if’ function is what certifies the reality of the not yet enacted disposition of the new, original or unexpected. The students further described themselves as being ‘sensitive people excluded from normality as crazy’. The students disappear into the ‘apparatus of capture’ or, perhaps more precisely, become ontological exiles (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 153), and this substantiates a feeling of being integrated by dis-integrating from the world ‘out-there’⁴⁴. A sort of de-realization takes place. From the students’ enactment of the space it seemed as if the studio were more real and everything outside became a shallow replacement of the intensity of that reality. Student V explained the struggle to get an idea brought to life as a process ‘to fight normality’, so the studio-space represents a sphere that is meant to produce the students’ self-confidence and not ‘reproduce’ knowledge. Scarry (1985, p. 133) writes that ‘this framing unreality of the exterior’ is what constructs or appropriates the reality of the interior content, in this case the reality enacted within the walls of the studio-space. This relation of inside to outside is a relation that directed the students’ orientation, enabling certain performative activities and indirectly prohibiting others.

The fiction of power turned the emotions generated from pain, crisis and anxiety into a promise of innovation. It is in this way that the exposure of pain becomes a legitimate criterion in a collective spirit of making; for example, ‘I scream and cry’ was a repeated expression when I later talked to the students about the experience of the design process. That is to say, they reify, isolate and demote creativity to the beyond, regardless of whether this is understood as an inside to which the participants painstakingly seek admittance (working on the self), or an outside (guru) that serves as a divine guarantor of originality and ultimate creativity. Such a beyond is enacted by the fiction of power, which in Kafka’s novel is presented by access to the law (Kwintner, 2001, p. 112).

⁴⁴ The various partners explained this aspect from different innovation practices as ‘a safe space’ (see Chapter 4).

In what follows I elaborate this point by claiming that it is in the very search for its meaning and legitimization that the students impute a value to the one in power (the tutors and partners). This point indicates that valuation ‘stems not from some concealed essence but from its very accessibility’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 182). It is in the shadow of such fictional reality that this peculiar valuation takes place in such innovation processes. The inside/outside divide in what is considered creative is what is at stake in the relationship between the use of artistic devices and changes in what we tend to consider as economic value; as Muniesa (2011, p. 32) remarks: ‘Valuation is about considering a reality while provoking it’.

Let me unravel this rather complex dynamic in further detail below. I trace the performances that define what count as inside and outside the economic world in relation to the notion of artistic pain or suffering performed by the client representing the telecommunication company. The interview below took place just after the final crit and was conducted outside of the studio space, but was still inside the academic building where it had all taken place during the past four weeks.

Valuation and Artistic Assessment

Client J, who had worked with Professor A before and also graduated from the course in Design Critique a few years ago, explained her reason for collaborating with the design practice:

...even me, working two years in the [lab] I realised that I kind of start to, not close, but in a way get this narrow way of thinking. You need on a regular basis to open up again to get lateral approaches to keep that brainstorming muscle working. Therefore it is important to engage with research on a regular basis, which is very important for us, to step out there and not just go out and do research where we look at user research but expand our minds and look at fresh minds, like the bunch of students here.

An important point to state is that Client J not only acted as a tutor, but also represents a past student. Client J explained that she felt as if she was betraying her ‘creative mind’ by working in the telecommunications industry. She described the lab, which she represented, as an in-house agency having a ‘satellite’ status, not located in the same building as the head-office of the company. She explained her job as a mediator bridging those worlds, which is why she liked to stay connected to the design space run by Professor A. She further explained her role at the lab as ‘keeping the organisation’

thinking as it otherwise might become closed around its own organisational self-image. She defined the brief as a way of maintaining open-mindedness from the design perspective and of 'keep[ing] the brain thinking'. She explained the tools of art and design as a means of initiating a process of ideation and thereby fostering change in these large-corporation-environments. She said: *'I like the extreme approach. The more extreme you are the better the signal comes across in the organisation. Sometimes you need to shout very loud in a company like this before anything moves...'*

It is the 'extremity' and 'endurance' of the process that assigns economic value. That is, it is the vivid and experienceable alternation of reality enacted in the performance of self-transformation, crisis, frustration and stress among the students, that makes it look like innovation. The crits, tutorials and events are tools through which the client, facilitators and students are able to give an account of this extremity and they are used to legitimize its value. The lab buys into that world in order 'to shake things up a bit'. Client R, a freelance designer employed by the lab for the project on e-etiquette and who had also graduated from the course in design, added:

It is a very rich space for working together and experimenting. The whole atmosphere is very unusual/rare and something you do not get in many places. When I was here, I learned from the students, the everyday discussion and the networks they draw on. You go through a process with ups and downs in activities with all the people here. This is something you take with you in your future career... You build a platform here that influences you to think in a certain direction.

In this sense, the justification for engaging with 'critical design' feeds back into a justification for the existence of the lab itself. The engagement with the design practice was, for her, a strategic relationship in order to actualise her self-perception as being creative. The crits, tutorials and staged performances serve as a testimony of that – almost like a demonstration or public proof of creativity, which was a matter of bearing witness to the pain suffered and participating in its display.

In Chapter 6, we saw how the clients in the crits also acted as tutors criticising the students and giving instructions on how to progress with their projects. We might recall Client R, who revealed his role as playing 'the bad cop' in the final crit. In this way we are to understand the crits, tutorials and events as devices enabling the tutors, funders and clients to prove their own creative talent or inventive capability in guiding and

leading the process of invention. The implied consent from the tutors to 'be creative', meant that they performed a critique that would normally place them outside the moral limits of what is common practice in an educational setting. Client J said that *'I know these methods from my degree in fine art. It is only in art and more experimental practices that you still find these horrible ways to educate the students'*. In the crits, the clients were to suspend the most basic ethical rules of norms and behaviour. Although the client considered the methods as too strong, or not appropriate for an academic setting, they claimed it to be necessary in the case of creativity. In Client J's case, she consented to 'unmaking' herself, deconstructing herself, emptying herself of any ethical responsibility for the sake of the experiment (cf. Stengers, 1997 on scientific justification of experiments). As the act of critique does not guarantee creativity (or more generally creation for that matter) as a causal effect – the fact that it is imposed on the students in order to produce the new then becomes the legitimization for the act of public humiliation, which was verbalised in the statement: 'for the sake of creativity'.

Client J exempted herself from certain codes of conduct and norms of behaviour. What is being displayed in and through the clients' participation in the evaluation of the students is the capacity for self-exemption as the attribute required for artistic creation. Santner refers to this as what he calls 'immanent traumatism, a point at which the very resources of legitimacy are linked to a power of suspension and disruption' (Santner, 2001, p. 41). The notion of 'betrayal' used by Client J to explain her activities with the telecommunications industry is itself an indication of a perceived difference in selfhood (Adkins, 2005). As Percy (2003, p. 145) notes, artistic devices such as crits, tutorials and events present 'a spectacle of performance that conveys much authority and power'. However, the relation between the facilitators, partners, professors, students, clients and funders is not purely one of domination, but one of individuation, of 'making up' persons whose 'relations to themselves are configured within a grid of norms and knowledges' (Rose, 1999, p. 92).

To succeed in this case does not entail following a set of rules, formulas or best practices, rather, it entails a display of 'affectedness' evident from the students' testimonies. The interview with Client J also adds to these findings, claiming that 'staying real' and 'being real' were significant criteria for assessing the value of creativity. What I see as the 'I betrayed my creative self' variant of enacting creativity is a means of

co-constructing business and art as distinctly different. This was evidenced by the claim that employment in the business world closes off the ability to think ‘the new’ and to insist that the exposure to pain, crisis and failure experienced together with the students is evidence of an artistic-creative environment. This points to the fact that the domain of examination, testing or the trial becomes an apparatus of self-actualization, which in this case can be reformulated as the capacity of the participants to turn an artistic vision into their own territorial self-definition. The use of artistic devices such as crits and tutorials influence the actions of the individuals showing that the subject cannot be separated from the relations and ensembles into which it enters. This approach to valuation offers ways in which to understand the process of creation as something different from self-realization widely acknowledged as a driver of social value in organisations (see for instance Arvidson, 2009).⁴⁵

The Kafka-Machine

Instead of referring to an external instance justifying the process of innovation, I have demonstrated the way in which a narrative can be enacted, making the experience of innovation look like a Kafkaesque universe. Left with these traces of personal experiences and the enactment of the fiction of power – how are we then to understand innovation? So far the notion of innovation has been performed in and through a narrative representing an artistic vision related to the act of differentiation and self-transformation. Comparing this to a Kafkaesque universe, we see that no cause is given, which creates ‘validity without meaning’ (Santner, 2001, p. 39, italics in original) or governance without the state (Rose, 1999). This is the theoretical argument behind the relation between individuation, technologies and the self. To demonstrate this relation I include one more of Kafka’s stories.

In *In the Penal Colony* (Kafka, 1919) a kind of territorial legitimacy without reference to any external instance such as the state, is explored through a fictional representation of torture. The story is centred on a machine designed to inscribe the sentence of the crime onto the body of the condemned with a multitude of vibrating needles. Subjection to this machine is dependent upon the way in which one assigns value to its power,

⁴⁵ In the present case of innovation, the issue of self-actualization does not rely on the assumption of an autonomous individual striving for self-realization within an external environment. Rather it is the performance of autonomous selfhood that is acted upon in these processes elaborated by the affective, interpersonal techniques.

which is portrayed towards the end of the story when the officer controlling and executing the violence gives himself up to the machine. Let me set out the analogy to the case study already here. It becomes clear from the empirical material that it is not so much the attempt to access creative forces through critique and pain that creates the fear and horror of subjectivation. Rather, as in the functioning of this machine it is through the very search for its meaning and legitimization that the students impute a value to the one in power (the tutors and partners). Moreover, the desperate search for meaning and the attempts to impose a meaning on to the actions and critique enforces a struggle, which is retrospectively romanticised by the students themselves. An apparatus, or torture-machine is created, which provokes its own reality. Kwinter argues that the apparatus in Kafka's story functions as a machine exactly via its separation from an external instance which justify its existence (the state apparatus). In this way, power is imposed by a legend, which is evident from an unreadable script, demanded by the officer to explain the working of the machine to the explorer and this is what constitutes its 'divine program' (Kwinter, 2001, p. 202).

The machine has been allegorized as the law inscribing itself on the body, or the violence in the very act of writing (Schaffner, 2012). It is through a belief in creativity that the students restore a sense of self through a narrative performance by which the student can re-establish a sense of continuity and make sense of the events they have gone through (such as crits and tutorials and artistic interventions) and impose meaning on the actions of the tutors. They are performing an unreadable script, which assigns a double role to the participants as both storyteller and protagonist. Kwinter (2001) in relation to the writer 'Franz Kafka' and the protagonist K. in *The Trial* explains this role:

The task of Kafka the writer was perhaps no different from that of "K." the land-surveyor in *The Castle* or the accused in *The Trial*. It was, on the one hand, to chart the topography of this peculiar emergent world, to discover the laws of how things combine, and on the other, to trace by trial and error the mysterious principle of its functioning. But at the same time no sketch or figure is anywhere offered up, unless it be one of those deliberately scrambled and inscrutable images like the officer's blueprints for the inscription apparatus in the *Penal Colony*'. For in Kafka, the task is no longer to trace the *visible* form of the world by recourse to an external schema or representational mode, but to somehow espouse its very substance, to become *of* the world by becoming one with it (Kwinter, 2001, p. 107).

The invention of the new is not born out of the type of transformation which occurs in a linear, progressive manner from one state to another when a challenge or obstacle is overcome. Rather, it is in and through the reproduction of that narrative that the innovation network is able to sustain itself. In this way, as Kwinter also suggests, a narrative is less a medium for the telling of events as it is performative, in the sense that it creates the procedure for developing the practical conditions for the enactment of innovation.

The currency placed by the client and also the students on this unscripted emotion in design and artistic practice can be related to the trend towards the commercialisation of feeling (Hochschild, 1983). The study of the students' reaction to those tools support this idea by suggesting that the main criterion of valuation lies in detecting the moments of ontological integrity when people are not acting according to explicit rules but are apparently 'transforming themselves'. Not only is the affective status of innovation displayed in the crits, but also in the acts, which in the end, 'authenticate' the client's actions (cf. Irwin and Michael, 2003, p. 126).⁴⁶

The narrative constructed by the students refers not to any kind of 'progression', but rather, to the breakdown, the crisis and the conflict that carry the process forward. No final result was ever approved either by the client or the tutors, and neither was any kind of feeling of a successful break-through experienced. Student M reflected on this after the final crit: *'I struggled with the idea until the very end. The night before the crit I just had to do something, so it was then the idea was brought to life. I made the presentation just the night before. It was all very stressful...'* There is no revelation in this world, no harmonious state where the self comes to terms with its environment. It is the documentation of crisis upon crisis that is produced as a result. In the penal colony, the condemned is always found guilty. The torture machine and the values that were initially associated with it amount to a mystical experience characteristic of its very functioning. Power relations are rendered unstable as the officer gives himself up to the machine and is transformed from omnipotent torturer to helpless victim. The condemned is the one who lets the

⁴⁶ Flexible processes of organisation and new management techniques have in recent critical management studies been translated into a Kafkaesque narrative of endless postponement, in relation to issues of self-management, evaluation schemes, performance measure etc. See for instance the work of Bernard Stiegler (2009), Stefano Harney (2008) and Christopher Grey (1994). In their view, Kafka is to be read as a critique of the individual fighting against the state or any larger machine determining its destiny, meanwhile forgetting the constitutive or performative aspect of the law or the apparatus making the bureaucracy work.

killing take place and the observer is guilty of preventing their escape (Schaffner, 2012 p. 227). Commenting on the universe constructed in Kafka's writings, Kwinter (2001, p. 108) notes: 'The subject – either as protagonist or narrator – is no longer continuous, stable, or identical with itself, but is caught in a perpetual, complex, and nearly imperceptible process of variation and transformation'. Again, this dimension of the self is by no means a pre-existing determination. It is a line of subjectivation as a process, a production of subjectivity enacted in and through the apparatus, just as Deleuze defines the principle of individuation: '... it has to be made, inasmuch as the apparatus allows it to come into being or makes it possible' (Deleuze, 1992, p. 161).⁴⁷ The artistic devices create a domain of power and authority enacted by cross-cutting vectors, which means that the client is also being tested in the crits, just as the status of the guru was performed by the students themselves.

In this world, neither the students nor the client are to be considered as actors faced with an environment external to themselves. An exclusive space in which the participants came to exempt themselves (see Chapter 5) is perceived as 'an "invented structure"' (Scarry, 1985, p. 128) and not a pre-given world to which one can enter as if it were naturally given (1985, p. 128). In the interview with Client J, we saw how she performed the brief as an outsider in the business world yet she projects onto herself this *outside* in order to stay connected with her creative self. The artistic tools that, in the practice of innovation, rendered the process commercially valuable by providing a space for self-actualization also mean that the funders and clients themselves generate the proof that they need to justify their own participation. In this sense, the reality enacted is proven unstable and it seems as if it is the clients themselves who in the end produce the 'creative' environment in which they invest. This relation between world-making, self and creation is lost, or transcended, through the intensity of the process of innovation and, in return, does not entail a *realization* of that self in the creation of innovation. Rather, it is through the process of making sense or justifying innovation that value is assigned to such processes.

The fact that Client J was a former student and that the students quoted in this thesis will be possible future clients indicates that the client cannot be considered an external agent to the practices in which they participate. It is by the folding-in of the outside that

⁴⁷ Foucault (1984) refers to the apparatus as made up of intrinsic aesthetic criteria where immanent evaluation schemes have replaced transcendental judgement and examination.

a field of innovation emerges – that is, how it moves and creates what Director S in Chapter 4 framed as ‘a bureaucracy of its own’. The doubleness of innovation, or the way in which it moves, is by this folding-in of the outside enacted by artistic critique which dismantles the stable constellation and structure of the institutions and organisations investing in it. Progress is ensured by the contradiction present in the arts, which requires opposition in order to challenge (Horton, 2007). The actualization of such an artistic vision, as we saw in the practical application of Design Critique and the Dogma movement, relies on differentiation, which is played out as a kind of ceremonial event in crits, shows etc. In organising innovation in this way, a tactical space is constituted, which proceeds by local interventions (and not global oppositions) immanent to the institutional power it aims to subvert or intervene in. It is a mobile technology operating in and through the individuals and objects themselves, that is, a tool which operates ‘at intimate proximity from within’ (Kwinter, 2001, p. 123). The coherence of a world formed and totalised by an external agency is, in this case, replaced by a new, internal, and concrete multiplicity. An apparatus that in itself remains silent, is constituted in and through principles of individuation, regimes of tutoring, exposure, types of normativity and subjectivity – it works without making itself visible.

In this case, the pressure to endlessly differentiate through the act of subversion becomes a structuring system in itself (machinic). Derrida (1992, p. 203) writes: ‘The present prohibition of the law is not a prohibition in the sense of an imperative constraint; it is a difference. When breaking the rules becomes the norm, then the machine does not limit itself to distinguishing what is inside from what is outside but instead produces a threshold between the two, which enters into the complex relations that make the validity of this ‘innovation’ order possible. What they differentiate themselves from is less important than the act of differentiation itself. As such, the problem of critique is no longer to critique given values – but to create them and Zepke (2005, p. 13) writes that ‘critique is the art of creating values’.

Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 167) write that ‘aesthetic critique seems to have liquefied into a post-fordist normative regime of justification, which promotes creativity, flexibility and difference’, referring to the principle of individuation whereby the undifferentiated tends to become individual or the process through which differentiated components become integrated. This coincides with Boltanski and Chiapello’s (1999)

theory that any capitalist order is constantly traversed by its own critique. By producing an alternative discourse to that of the creative industries, the practices investigated in this thesis contribute to the field that they negate. In the camp and the design brief, criticism preceded and did not follow justification (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 168; Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991). This means that value is what emerges through the evaluation that creates it, which is what Zepke (2005, p. 13) refers to as the ‘re-valuation of value’. This makes the students’ interpretation an affirmation – evaluation is therefore pre-individual and expresses the ‘innovation regime’ in terms of appraisal. Put another way, resentment gives birth to values, which means that the machine incorporates its own negation into its very functionality. Said differently, what we have seen is a machinic assemblage that functions in and through the production and re-production of difference. Capitalism, or innovation orchestrated through its own critique, is a Kafkaesque irony, or as Deleuze and Guattari (1980) would have said – a schizophrenic logic.

Conclusion

Kafka’s writings, such as *The Trial*, *Before the Law* and *The Penal Colony*, present a capitalistic-bureaucratic machine that functions in and through the fiction of power. In the case of innovation, artistic tools such as crits, tutorials and events become ordering devices which evaluate the affective capacity of the tutors, clients and students. I have shown, via the notion of individuation, the way in which the tutors and client buy into this practice as an instance of self-actualization. This means that the client generates their own ‘results’ or proof of creativity, which justified their participation in the brief. It is in this way, I argue, that the market of innovation is not a collective that pre-exists the individual players acting within it.

More generally, there is an issue that relates to the importance of individuation for the rise of capitalism. Giddens writes that in a capitalist order:

[I]ndividualism becomes extended to the sphere of consumption, the designation of individual wants becoming basic to the continuity of the system. Market-governed freedom of individual choice becomes an enveloping framework of individual self-expression. (Giddens, 1991, p. 197)

However, Kwinter's reading of Kafka has enabled me to take this point further, claiming that the process of innovation is a process in which the participants are being individuated in and through the environment, which they also constitute. I have demonstrated this by analysing the way in which the participants were led to assign meaning and value to their conduct, breakdowns, feelings and sensations. In short, it is a matter of seeing how the 'experience', or performance, of pain came to be constituted in and through the experiments in which they took part – a performance that caused the individuals to recognize themselves as subjects of 'creativity'.

What I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter is that a particular narrative can figure, at one time, as the program of a specific artistic practice and, at another time, as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent. A particular narrative may also act to figure as a retrospective re-interpretation of these practices stimulating new forms of valuation that reconfigure the relations between art and business. This kind of 'artistic management' becomes a matter of the management of self – the students' self-perception became an object to be managed. As Kafka (1919, p 140) states in *In the Penal Colony*: "It's a remarkable piece of apparatus".

8. Conclusion: An Inclusive Logic of Differentiation



Figure 8: Photographic Documentation from Occupy Wall Street, Oct 2011, New York

I opened this thesis with a comparison between Price's installation and the event of Occupy Wall Street as it started outside the New York stock exchange in the financial district of downtown Manhattan and its relation to Boltanski and Chiapello's notion of artistic critique. What is at stake in these events is the mixing of the values and principles associated with the field of art and business – or how those divisions facilitate a differential reconfiguration of the economic world. Having investigated a variety of practices and techniques by which innovation is produced, I revisit these examples in order to make sense of the way in which the art-business relation was accounted for in the empirical cases. In doing so, I hope to show that, when analysed in innovation practice, the distinctions rely on a great deal on social reasoning in artistic practice, as well as in political and social theory.

At the time of writing – a year later – the Occupy Wall Street Movement re-assembles outside the NY Stock Exchange. Many scholars now understand the protests as a symptom of a hybrid or diverse movement that never really took final shape and that appears without any clearly defined aim. Rather, a diverse range of goals have been posed producing multiple and contradictory demands (from war oppression to cuts in public funding) that do not work according to an overarching ideological standpoint. Instead, Occupy Wall Street has been framed as a kind of collective articulation which gives voice to a divergent series of protests. Grusin (2011) suggests that Occupy Wall Street is 'a becoming movement, still in a stage of preacceleration or incipient movement', or perhaps put differently, it is what one might call a *performative occupation*,

one that is said to remain in an ongoing process of inventing what a global social and political movement could be in the 21st century. Following Escobar and Osterweil (2010) it can be understood as a virtual politics, a politics of the 'not-yet', posing similar critiques against the capitalist domination of the world as the artistic avant-garde. This enactment of critique is said to be, by politicians and political commentators, what makes Occupy Wall Street a disruption, yet according to Grusin (2011), these commentators are 'trapped within neoliberalism's calculus "of the rational modern subject"', a logic to which the Occupy movement is said not to compute.

This interpretation of the event resonates with the theories presented in this thesis concerning the role of the market, the aestheticization of the economy, social critique and new forms of labour. The argument posed by Grusin (2011) is that Occupy Wall Street has become a symbol of modern social critique in a capitalist world. What I hope to show in this chapter is that a complex logic underwrites the diverse practices of boundary-making between the field of art and business. I follow here the links made visible by the research at hand in order to answer the overarching questions of the thesis presented at the outset: what does an innovation strategy between art and business look like? What is its mode of operation? Was there indeed something new and disorienting about the forms of knowledge that were practiced? How are capacities for creativity being legitimized, how are they being mobilized, and with what effects? Having presented the study of innovation from inside the camps, labs and studio-spaces, this thesis has yielded many diverse answers that add layers and folds to the study.

Having mapped the territorial configuration of innovation throughout the chapters, it should be clear that the thesis, in the context of late capitalism, does not so much employ a single geographic perspective as such but, instead, gives an introduction to the ways in which critical thought is being applied to artistic techniques and 'spaces of exception' in their strategic use as devices of innovation. In respect to the sociological foundation of this study, I should mention that George Simmel in *The Sociology of Conflict* (1903) has already pointed out the paradox of conflict and friction as being the major, perhaps even the principal, mechanism of social inclusion. However, this term might indicate here something else than traditionally suggested within social science. The notion of integration is not taken as an overarching explanatory category; it is rather understood as an operational mechanism that contributes to the differential enactment

of this *innovation assemblage* that occurs on a variety of scales, from the trial of a new commercial product or business strategy to the design of an entire market system. The title of this thesis – ‘a differential strategy of innovation’ – refers to exactly this point. A consideration of this in relation to artistic critique serves to focus on collective performance with a self-organising or spatial dimension, which explicitly seeks to break away from the kind of rationality that has been proposed by neoclassical economic theory (see Chapter 2).

In this concluding chapter, I draw out what the implications this poses for further sociological investigations within the field of innovation. I relate the findings from my ethnographic studies of the application of artistic techniques as tools of innovation to the theoretical debates with which this thesis has engaged. This chapter is in two parts. Firstly, I draw a few lines together from the cases to demonstrate the way in which I came to consider the artistic critique as both opposed and internal to contemporary capitalism, and as enacting a differential strategy of innovation. In so doing, I include some considerations on how ethics might also be thought of as an aspect of this economic integration. Secondly, I reflect on the way in which sociological research and assemblage theory contributes to a critique of creativity.

Occupational Territories

Throughout the preceding chapters I have demonstrated the assembled strategy of these practices posing differentiation as their main challenge. I have encountered a series of affective environments that enable specific performances. The landscape that I have portrayed in and through these practices does not offer a straightforward and coherent scene that can be processed according to spatial and representational conventions (within and outside the social sciences). From this it might be concluded that territorial relations undergo transformation, globalisation and flexibilization; it is clear in addition that they are non-representational or ‘performative’. However, an immediate result from the ethnographic studies presented in this thesis is the fact that the crisis of territories (cf. Chapter 2) does not coincide with their disappearance. Rather, I have shown their productive and social dimensions.

One of the main concerns of this project has been the questioning of the effects and uses of the complex and hybrid boundary-making process between art and economic

life. In doing so, I have shown how a differential strategy was promoted by an orientation towards the affective relations afforded by a specific critical engagement (*against* the capitalist world). Both in the academic literature and in innovation practice the ‘art-inside-business’ was enacted as a crucial divide, which also made it a project of anti-capitalist engagement.⁴⁸ I investigated the way in which these *differential events* constitute a self-producing system that performs the economy by giving it an internal difference that drives it forward and again feeds back into the capitalistic production of value.

In Chapter 4 I described the way in which an artistic vocabulary was introduced into the field of business producing an expressive strategy of innovation by differentiating art from the industrial world. I introduced this as mapping a kind of grammar of business imperatives, an innovation assemblage, where a new territory is marked out or rather performed by the mechanisms of inclusion, exclusion, exemption and self-exemption which are intimately bound up with new sites of action (such as the formation of camps, labs and workshops). The studies of Dogma and Design Critique served as prime examples of what it means to look at innovation as process, especially as one that is constitutive of economic valuation. In the ethnographic studies, art emerged as a privileged site of corporeal experimentation, bodily sensation and affective performance, enabling the integration of an aesthetic dimension into business innovation.

Having focused on the *inside* of such trials, I established some similarities between the enactment of various roles that would otherwise be considered to be at the opposite ends of the innovation process. Firstly, the issue of funding was considered not only as an external requirement *outside* of the practice itself, but also providing the themes and issues to be tested within the labs. Secondly, the art-business distinction is twisted and reapplied as the client who represented the business world came to act as an artistic tutor imposing constraints upon the students. Chapter 5 also illustrated how rules were transformed and used as shifting devices but not absolute imperatives that configured and re-configured the relation between the *self* and the *other* in terms of friend and enemy – which meant that the actors’ position in the game was constantly twisted and

⁴⁸ In Chapter 5, I described the way in which the work-camp applied the artistic tools and devices inspired by the Dogma, which have roots back in the French New Wave films that emphasised a critique against Hollywood filmmaking. In Chapter 6 I showed that the case of the design brief was inspired by what was called Radical Italian Design or Anti-Design.

bent. Even the dedicated artistic space was recalibrated – using this same distinction – by momentary gestures or utterances, voicings that made the students rethink their own relation to those distinctions which create less institutionalised and more spontaneous spatial divisions during interaction. As we saw in the final closure of the work-camp presented in Chapter 5, the film instructor announced *Dogma* to be a consequence of economic constraints. Again, the economic world was externalised, but at the same time this act of externalization also informed the artistic practice of experimental filmmaking. In this way, the outside is folded into the setting – recalibrated – and becomes a constitutive element. This practice of the folding-in of the outside has informed many of the chapters in this thesis and raises a new set of ethical concerns that I have, so far, left undeveloped.

In Chapter 5 I showed how the camp's physical confinement, the rigidly structured tasks and the dramaturgical events were organised in order to facilitate a mode of embodied activity. The spatial-temporal constitution of these spaces was designed in order to enable a transgression of dominant social norms and orders. The key focus was an investigation of how such relational structures were variously staged, materially and semiotically, including the collective emotional investment inscribed upon bodies (via rituals, scripted actions and conflicts) and the performances that served to generate accounts about such events. As Irwin and Michael (2003, p. 119) note, in relation to the public understanding of science, aspects of this connect the assemblage with sociological traditions including ethnomethodology. In Chapter 5, I explored this in relation to the notion of reflexivity defined as the 'consideration of the processes by which the participants organize and access the 'rationality' of their own activities' (Pollner, 1991, p. 371).

Identifying these links between assemblage theory and ethnomethodology opened up new ways of questioning how particular events and their effects are performed and made manifest through artistic tools or devices and their impact on the shaping of such accounts. Moreover, this view rendered the transformative capacity of such spaces visible, or rather showed how emotional intensification and creative interaction happen through the focus on personal traumas, crisis and beliefs (cf. Chapter 6). An affective environment was created in which the tutors came to be subjects of the experiment as well. I was denied access and, at the same time, included as a participant within the 5-

week design process, as well as being considered an internal spy by the tutors, which in turn produced the enactment of a kind of mutual victimization (cf. Chapter 6). Chapter 4 and 7 of this thesis brought together the discussion on the 'trial' as an experimental tool that tested the limits of de-subjectivation and thus demonstrates the deterritorializing forces of innovation. This was also seen in the design brief with the promotion of reality-destroying techniques, which enacted moments of unmaking. To recall Chapter 2, Parr (2005, p. 67) defines the process of deterritorialization as the 'transformative vector of a territory', that is, a process of 'coming undone' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, p. 322). Thus, spaces that are associated with the business world can be turned into artistic ones by folding gestures (i.e. the cry, the scream and the critique), which re-territorializes in turn divides as those gestures were retrospectively re-narrated as creative. These are the processes of stabilization and destabilization that define the connectivity of this as an *innovation assemblage*, which again gives rise to new ways of folding art into business. The conceptualisations of crisis and conflict as tools of innovation, in turn, share the same topological property where internally constructed divisions or boundary-making practices are what holds the experimental field together, that is, a form for connectivity promoting economic integration.⁴⁹

It was the enactment of critique within the crits, tutorials and interventions that differentially produced the links that tied the participants to the practice. This seems particularly true when looking in detail at the utilization of artistic devices and the way in which affect seems to act as a resource of innovation. The emotional performances, crisis and breakdown were played out at the scene as part of the creative evaluation of the process of innovation. The integration of the *technicity* or *machinic* functioning of such devices into a study of innovation rendered another fold: one's relation to oneself, or the affect of self on the self (Deleuze, 1986, p. 101). It is such differential relations that I paid attention to as they were actualized in and through artistic techniques as tools of innovation. In this way, an inside is hollowed out and constitutes its own industrial territory that not only enables, but also depends on a highly self-reflexive exercise including the basic human capacities, such as the ability to be affected, thought, expression and relationality.

⁴⁹ The innovation produced in the camps, labs and studio workshops did not consist of producing new products to create economic value when realised in a 'pre-existing' market. It was not the *poetic objects* invented in the design brief or the business strategy for Evoke invented in the work-camp that led to the creation of value for the client.

What makes those spaces disturbingly violent is this subtle interplay between the power of fiction and its reality conferring aspect, which acts to unleash and actualise the potentially valuable activities of the participants. It is in this way that these spaces might be considered as topological in nature. They engage the participants, students, clients, organisers and funders in processes of mutual affection in which the artistic idea, social relationships and the environment itself are brought into being. A new kind of work ethic – a kind of neo-management – is proposed that embraces what Thrift (2005) has claimed as an ‘exploratory mode of capitalism’, one in which differentiations give rise to new oppositions and, in turn, transform the ethics of ethical values.⁵⁰

In all this the sense of self – embodied, social and political – undergoes some interesting shifts while forming an integral part of economic change. This is not to be understood as the ‘entrepreneurial self’, which Rose (1989; 1996) writes about and in a Foucauldian sense takes as the figure of neoliberalism – a figure through which the human is turned into capital. This account of the *self* relies on autonomous subjectivity where one is self-motivated, self-reflexive and consciously organising a life-project which, according to Heelas and Morris (1992), are the characteristics that define the individual’s choice, accountability and responsibility and are at the core of an ‘entrepreneurial culture’. Instead, the *folded self*, as defined in this thesis, is not ‘controlled by’ economic development or *embedded* within specific performative regimes. It is a self that is generated and is generative of the environment in and through which it was also produced.⁵¹ More generally, Kwinter (2001, p. 171) emphasises this logic as a process ‘twice cleaved: first as a subject distinct from a world become an instrumental, exterior object; and then, once this exterior has been introduced into our world, we are able to –

⁵⁰ This is closer to Isabelle Stengers (1997) critique of scientific experiments than Arvidsson’s claim about an ethical economy. The repurposing of art when utilized as a tool of innovation is a production of value or ethics. According to Arvidsson, Bauwens and Peitersen (2008), in the realms of late capitalism and post-Fordist production, ethical values are beyond the moral codes of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in order to define what he calls an ‘ethical economy’. He grounds this argument on the democratization of value, which he claims has happened due to diversification of various orders of worth and immaterial production. Rather, the divide between good and bad is what has been twisted, and re-enacted in practice. Stengers writes that such experiments created torturers in the name of science – meaning that the ethical values have been twisted, bent and stretched in the course of innovation. Thus, the aim has been to investigate how the divide between what was encountered as good and bad, art and business was utilized as a powerful tool in generating economic profit. This was investigated as the ‘revaluation of value’ in Chapter 7.

⁵¹ The experimental trial produces an act of folding different from sociological accounts of the entrepreneurial self which rely on more individualistic accounts of the self, such as self-control or self-relation as in ‘self-made’. What I aim to show is that the folded self is always constructed in affective relations that are generated and generative of its environment.

and do – see ourselves from the outside as also distinct, that is, as an Other?. A folded self is enacted in and through differential relations externalising the business world and again re-enacting a new set of binary oppositions associated with the world of art and business.

These accounts (or folds) demonstrate a shift where self-performance comes to be a source of legitimization and the site of the creation of value rather than the self being authorised by external institutions, such as the company or the market. As I suggested in Chapter 7, this is a kind of government without the state – producing an ethics which is at the heart of late capitalism: it is the source of value production, of legitimization, of culture itself. Furthermore, the theorisation of conflict as a means of ideation and the declaration of innovation as a viral or anti-capitalistic movement makes it look as if a topology structure is produced (Marres 2012; Allen, 2011).

Behind this spatial politics is an appraisal of mystification and strangeness where art is taken as a tool to access affective and potentially creative forces. I refer here to sociological critiques of capitalism as outlined in Chapter 2, which tend to favour conflict and crisis as a kind of aesthetic violence that gives access to hidden and virtually valuable creative forces. However, to include folds, the self and subjectivity in the study of innovation is not to conclude that art is able to transport the participants to an elsewhere; instead, it is to look at the utilisation of artistic methods and techniques in producing multiple ways of folding the world *into* the self, which meshes with what Clough (2007, p. 25) has called an ‘affect economy’. As such, capital produces its own outside from inside what Clough (2007, p. 25) calls ‘the viscera of life’, accumulating at the level of pre-individual bodily capacities and putting those capacities to work. On the one hand, artistic innovation seeks to make possible and profitable the utilization of the affects performed in and through the crits, tutorials and interventions. On the other hand, the processes of production, aestheticization and capitalization are changed as they become directly engaged in modulating affectivity – and a creative apparatus emerges as *economic potentia*, a sensed production of the world that reconstitutes the conditions of innovation.

In the established categories which define art from business (outlined in Chapter 2), art is seen as either being instrumentalized by business or posing a critique against the

business world. As emphasised in Chapter 1, others have contrasted, denied and opposed such a divide, emphasizing a hybridization of the art-business relation. However, to account for the art-business relation in terms of unstable boundaries tends to subordinate such divisions to a single dichotomy. Such an ultimatum seems to miss the more intimate or local orderings – folds and differentiations – that are indistinguishable from the outside but by which they are produced. That is to say, the art-business relation is not to be derived from overarching political strategies or macroeconomic models but something that is being worked out from ‘those ‘micro’ experiences and experience-laden values’ which serve to perform relatively radical forms of change (Heelas, 2008, p. 208).

In this regard, the notion of assemblage suggests that we must be wary of oversimplifications when analysing the organisation of innovation practice. To think in terms of assemblages is to be sensitive to the way in which fictions, promises, visions and rituals themselves play a crucial role in contrasting, opposing and denying specific (economic) realities. Furthermore, the critique given in crits, tutorials and interventions in one context seemed to appear as unethical violation of the students and the tutors perception of reality resulting in a huge amount of stress, anxiety and confusion. In other events it was justified as part of artistic creation. I include this aspect to note that the folded self is part of an embodied practice where unethical actions are justified in the name of innovation and artistic creativity, which give rise to a specific ontology of innovation – a kind of ethics of the unethical. At the same time the unification of the dichotomies between art and business also harbour an indifference to the act of critique as it is enacted, performed and provoked in practice. This aspect of innovation and its potential for critique in relation to the process of capitalization leads me to the second part of this chapter.

Critique and its Folds

An important aspect of the present version of critique concerns its entanglement in practice. To lay the groundwork for the chapters on the cases themselves, I heuristically divided the text into two parallel narratives. I did so in order to account for the criticality invoked by a specific use of artistic practice, that is, one that stems from some of the more radical avant-garde groups of the twentieth century, such as Oulipo and the Situationists. I divided the text in order to keep this heritage in sight while untangling

the ethnographic accounts of its application in practice. This process of doubling is one that informs the analysis of the consequences of artistic critique when applied to business *and* challenges the relation between representation and data in social science. The artistic ideas explained in the subtext, and their enactment in practice explained in the main text, point to innovation as a *transformational practice* continuously re-defining the dominant values and techniques within the study of innovation. I conclude that this is an ever-changing logic of innovation re-forming what creativity may look like, as well as dictating what a sociological study can illuminate with its ethnographic techniques. Firstly I explain this point with reference to its sociological entanglement and I then return to the duality of the design of this study.

My participation in and observation of this practice in itself afforded yet another layer of the act of folding. This was most evident in my meeting with practitioner N, who changed the interview setting to a testing site, informing his practice of innovation and turning me into *his* informant. In this way, I have shown that even to enter or leave the assemblage, to be in it or to distance myself from it, were all components of its construction. The feeling it involved to contact, to reject, to ask for permission, to gain access and again to be restricted from participation is all part of the assemblage, changing the orderings and dis-orderings of its stability. Methods, in this case are as much about acting on the boundary as it is about describing it.

More specifically, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, innovation is a relational construction where the outside of one practice might comprise the inside of another. In my meeting with Director S, I was suddenly included in this *innovation assemblage*, which mediated the connections and collaboration between various practices. However, at a later point in time she considered me as a spy sent from the other innovation practice. Relations were performed and did not stay the same. I was put under observation and enacted as a subject of innovation. However, it is important to note that I was included even in my capacity as an outsider. In this world, there was no stable model or point of reference that would make those relations interchangeable and unite them in a division assignable to an outside observer. The way in which I was considered to be an internal spy by some of the tutors during the design brief (see Chapter 6) is a case in point. One does not see the object (and its relations) from a distance in a performative space like this. There was no transparent view from where to observe the practices I studied, rather a

sociological study of innovation became a matter of working on the border challenging the relation between the inside and outside, exclusion and inclusion. I was never *outside* any more than I was *within*. Those considerations gave rise to some of the methodological questions that I have dealt with throughout this thesis: what can an ethnography of innovation tell us about artistic critique and what can it teach us about its constitutive practices and theoretical principles?

Before directly answering this question, I stay with the notion of assemblage for a little longer. The kind of assemblages that I have investigated in this thesis do not refer to a reality outside of themselves, but have acted upon oppositional or antagonized structures – they were, so to speak, constructed by differentiation or the act of the folding in of an outside produced in and through its own performative practice. The fold is a technology produced by the utilisation of artistic devices in the production of the new. Incorporating non-humans into innovation studies shows the materiality behind the myths, rituals and stories, which are utilized as resources of innovation. This is one way of doing empirical philosophy (cf. Adkins and Lury, 2009) informed by the new anthropological approaches and their practices found in STS or what Clough (2009, p. 47) has named an ‘expanded empiricism’.⁵²

Such a study cuts across and blurs conventional sociological registers and poses a critique of typical accounts of subjectivity that presume a simple divide between the interior and the exterior.⁵³ This study shows that *the enactment of* innovation entails a process of territorialization, characterized as the fixation or stabilization of relations that generate particular differentiations where the inside is nothing more than a fold of the outside (Deleuze, 1986). This is not a spatial construction where the one field (either art or business) could be understood as context and thus as an explanatory device for the

⁵² In order to respond with an adequate method to this idea of an ‘expanded empiricism’, Clough (2009, p. 47) calls for the use of performative methods. Throughout the empirical chapters I have aimed to show how the use of traditional ethnographic methods, such as interviews and participant observation, enable a kind of intervention which is central to the modulation of affect. At the same time I have considered the performative aspect of such methods as they have been entangled with the self-organizing capacity central to the logic of innovation, subjectivity and contemporary modes of governance.

⁵³ This means a kind of subjectivity that does not rely on a subject that stands in relation to an object, as a phenomenological approach would suggest. The point that follows from Chapter 3 on the methodological implications of the study of affect, is that the fold is not to be understood as the phenomenological doubleness *of a* body that stands in oppositional relation to *things* and a *perceiver* of these things. Equally, things are not reduced to our perception of them (cf. Harman, 2009, p. 104-105). Rather, the fold is to be understood as a relational concept that includes the relation to oneself (which are both constitutive of and mediated by objects or things).

other (cf. Riles, 2001, p. 69) – there exists no clear category of creativity and capitalism that conform to the current criticism of either new forms of capitalism or to the instrumentalism of art, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Neither does there exist first a field of capital from which creativity is then produced. Instead, I have looked at the way in which this folding or doubling of spatial relations composes in itself a field or industry of innovation. I take this point further to conclude that the process of innovation itself is a kind of fold – the folding in of what is also negated. That is to say, the practice of innovation as it happened in *Dogma and Design Critique* differentiates itself from other forms of innovation by the use of a specific artistic logic (explained in the subtext in each chapter). In this way, the field site came to be indistinguishable from the objects that it contained, the relations through which they circulated and the market in which they might have been embedded.⁵⁴ Such relations have been covered by the notion of ‘machinic assemblage’, which according to Clough (2007, p. 12) ‘connects and convolutes the disparate in terms of potential fields (crossing the usual thresholds between scales)’. Put differently, such a field was characterised by a differential topology – the kind of geometry that is not embedded within, but enacts an *occupational territory* produced in and through a range of divisions that tend to repeat themselves across scales (from the self to the construction of an entire market system).

The utilization of art or the process of aestheticization (Lazzarato, 2008) has transformed the logic of innovation into a form of sociality characteristic of contemporary economic life and practice. The camp performed a space in which the exemption would only be a temporary break in an unforgiving motion towards the next demanding phase, staging yet another conflict. The result of this study is not to propose a response to a new stage in a progressive development, where the conflict is seen as a externality, anomalous to social life or economic development. This is perhaps even more explicitly expressed by Diken and Laustsen (2005), who, with reference to Simmel, point to the spatial formation of innovation as a form of sociality including antagonistic values, friction and conflict as internal to its constitution. The task has, therefore, not been to trace a visible (or representational) form of innovation and its industry with reference to an external schema or representational mode, but somehow to expose its operation; that is, to propose a territorial construction of innovation not defined by a

⁵⁴ For the sake of clarification, Durie (2006, p 179) explains the concept of topology thus: ‘Like Riemannian geometry, topology deals with surfaces of figures as spaces in themselves, rather than from the perspective of the space within which they might be embedded.’

network of relations between stable entities that are to be mapped out as they cut across pre-given boundaries between art and business. The spaces are not held together in a formal network identified by the territorial occupation of land but by their performative capacities, by the activities and investments they at once promote and enable.⁵⁵

In summary, the form of innovation that I have described involves a folding or doubling of the object of study and its analysis. The further this study has enquired into the reasons ‘behind’ the enactment of innovation, the techniques applied, the responses which they have produced and the reasoning by which the participants made sense of the events, the more difficult it became to reach a definitive answer as to how to measure the effect of introducing art into business or capitalization of the artistic world.

Like Occupy Wall Street, it is not just a single distinction that is imposed. Therefore, it is not possible to understand artistic critique as a single opposition or outside to current innovation studies. At the same time this study cannot be reduced to a single dichotomy such as the ‘creative industries’ or the ‘cultural economy’ that assumes the inclusion of a field ‘creativity’ or ‘culture’ into the economic world. In the ethnographic studies I have demonstrated how the distinction between art and business was reproduced repeatedly by projecting it onto smaller scales (de-selving) and broader ones (the industry). In the case on Design Critique, the students’ knowledge or descriptions of their experiences of the innovation process turn back into the setting of this practice as a constitutive facet of its organisation. The reality of the design practice is constituted by the students’ reflection on themselves and subsequent enactment of pain accompanied by the tutors’ professionalization, which reinforces the co-constitution of the norms and rules by which the students’ engagement is guided as they are directed towards a critical orientation against the corporate world. Through recursivity each of these parts can then be re-categorized again, so that an initial division between art and business gives rise to subsequent splits within the field of the ethnographic material that a sociological

⁵⁵ By territorial occupation of land I refer to the way in which an industry is often defined by external measures of scale, (or stable relations between fixed entities). In Chapter 4, I explained that the territory of innovation is constructed in and through a funding context, which acts as a configuration against which these practices define the notion of innovation and at the same time justify their value. It is in this way that the use of assemblage theory offers a different interpretation than the one proposed by studies of actor-network theory. Harman (2009, p. 30) argues that actor-networks are made of ‘individual actors, events fully deployed at each instant, free of potency or other hidden dimensions lying outside their sum of alliances in any given moment’. According to these characteristics, actor-network theory tells nothing about the process of actualization (cf. Chapter 7) as in actor network theory everything is always empirically present.

study itself has brought to life.⁵⁶ In this way, critical ethnography contributes to the boundary-making practice which constitutes new sets of divisions. It is not the same art-business in each subdivision, as even though the same co-constituting contrast of art and business is retained, a partial transformation takes place on each folding.

As I have also shown, by reflecting on the dual structure of the empirical chapters, sociological writing itself enacts yet another set of oppositions (between data and its representation in the written text), which tend to repeat themselves across scales. Firstly, the artistic ideas of Dogma and Design Critique differentiate themselves from other artistic fields. Secondly, those ideas are then translated into business by producing differential oppositions – excluding the realities that were also experimentally tested. This differentiation is exactly what attracts business clients and funders to the practice, which produces yet another set of differences. It was in order to keep this continuous double in sight, that I divided the two ethnographic chapters into two parallel narratives. The text was in itself folded between an ethnographic account and a representation of the critique this account was said to emerge out of.

This thesis has presented the logic of innovation as an inclusive differentiation, that is, as a logic where undifferentiated space progressively differentiates, eventually giving rise to actualised structures or machines as I explored in Chapter 7. I have emphasised the way in which this enactment of space acts as a progressive strategy for innovation, informing the current debate around innovation. Taking into account the spatio-temporal dynamics of innovation illuminated a topological logic, that is, a spatial construction in which art cannot be distinguished from capitalistic production but rather entails a mutual reconfiguration of space (or boundary-making). This logic has been mapped out as a movement between de- and re-territorialization in this thesis. The argument is that innovation is an effect of that pattern and not a condition outside of the practice observed. It is therefore difficult to distinguish an outside from where to conduct sociological analysis. One could say that reality is an effect of the specific assemblage and not external to it (Riles, 2001, p. 22). This study is in itself performative in the sense that it feeds into a logic by which the practice of innovation keeps

⁵⁶ I have divided the text into two narratives in order to reflect upon the impossibility of taking sides and the endless boundary-making practice in ethnographic writing. In the design of this study, I have attempted to acknowledge the folding of the relation between social data and its discursive or textual representation.

reinventing itself. Or perhaps to put it differently, it is a movement, one that is said to remain in an ongoing process of inventing what innovation can be on the horizon of so-called 'late capitalism', which defines economic relations in the 21st century.

A Little More on Those Folds

To sum up, this thesis has used a relational account to link theory to real-world events and has developed a praxis for future research based on a sociology of critique rather than binary oppositions – whether denied, upheld or provoked – which have dominated many of the debates concerning the creation of value and innovation. I have looked into processes of innovation in order to untangle the art-business relation and have posed a critique of the simplification of what was, in practice, complexly recursive. Informed by tendencies within economic sociology, combined with aspects of STS, I hope at least to have highlighted some of my concerns in attempting to provide a critical account of innovation beyond post-structuralist critiques. Throughout the last chapters, I have attempted to provide detailed information regarding artistic devices and techniques and how they operate. However, I have only looked at some particular practices, and some of these have been the most contentious or radical practices within this field of innovation. Other artistic encounters could have been investigated and further empirical data could have brought about a different result studying the entanglement between art and the field of innovation. I could have chosen less extreme or more conventional cases to broaden the study in order to see if one might find similar kinds of orderings and to what effect. There are many avenues of research and empirical fields which have not been taken.

As I have argued earlier on, my primary aim has not been to produce a commentary on the contemporary debates about the evaluation of the effects of innovation – to judge in a binary fashion if something is innovative or not but to understand the ethics that it produces. Neither have I tried to develop a normative frame or description of how to innovate, or to reveal the truth or hidden insights from inside innovation practice. Instead, the aim has been to question how innovation, when considered a performative practice, could be articulated with ethnographic techniques. This research has been guided by a more open-ended question on the prevailing social form and production of the new and a desire to empirically follow how ideas are translated into practical action. Due to the scope of this study, my primary aim has been to provide detailed

information about particular artistic techniques and devices as they were utilised as sources of innovation. The focus of this thesis has been on the particular encounters between anti-capitalistic critique, artistic practice and innovation and its consequences for the way in which we tend to understand the creation of economic value.

The connectivity between the practices I have encountered was not one to be choreographed according to regimen or calculated rules (as in neoclassical economic models) but enacted in the making or differentiation of an outside. I have mapped the contours of an emerging industry characterised by the act of folding. The notion of the assemblage offers a possibility to grasp such a politics of the not-yet or, in Deleuzian terms, the becoming movement of specific innovation practices, which cannot be subsumed under the neoclassical model of the market. The notion of topology offers a way in which to consider the complex operation of innovation defined by the acts of folding as a new kind of metric. Furthermore, this strikes me as an important topic to be developed in future research subsequent to this thesis. Every threshold, between inside and outside, old and new, fiction and reality contributes to the boundary-making of a domain legitimised by the perspective of its performative capacity.

In the cases presented, the potential for differentiation or the act of folding was embodied in a diversity of techniques, such as critique, public humiliation, physical locations and time restraints, which produced altogether certain types of visibility, exposure and display. Furthermore, regimes of supervision and tutorials enabling personal interaction were assembled and infused with the aim of governing capacities and actions. Such interventionist assemblages are far more complex than explained by the nature of domination, which is so brilliantly portrayed in Kafka's universe. For instance, in *The Trial* (Kafka, 1925) the character K. is not the symbol of the re-integration back into society of an exempted or asocial individual, but an effect of their entanglement in an individual's own processual or generative self-creation. It is from here that I have developed a critical contribution to the study of innovation as an intermingling between creativity and capitalism. This thesis has pointed toward innovation as a temporary construction of freely navigable and mobile spaces that in themselves create a form of social subjection that establishes new scales of thresholds and effects. Indeed, contemporary innovation might be understood as precisely a topology of such folds.

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